the UK and Italy shows the severe limitations of the theory. The case of Italy in 1988 … “shows that a relatively materialist country, and also the least cognitively mobilized country, has the most supportive, public opinion”.49 The more fundamental problem with Inglehart’s influential theory is that it argues at a high level of abstraction using vague, holistic explanations that do not take into account historical factors and the special role of personal elite identities within a highly centralized policy-making structure like the EU. The historical factor would seem to be particularly important; thus the sociological approach has little to offer in trying to come to terms with the new diversity of an EU of 27 members. As regards citizen attitudes, they appear to be much more unstable than assumed by sociologists.
It is symptomatic that analyses of globalization tend to stress its ambiguities to the point of becoming indeterminate. Michael Zürn argues that it can produce both fragmentation and integration.50 If that is so, how useful is this rather vague concept anyway? Indeed, globalization has not done away with religious feeling, or with other forms of non-rational politics. To be true, religious feeling is much stronger in regions where poverty is rampant than in regions like Europe, where affluence is wide-spread. Yet, in America decades of affluence has not led to a decisive weakening of religious feeling – in fact the reverse seems to be the case. In some other parts of the world the weakening of nations has perhaps caused citizens to seek fulfilment of their need to belong in new religious groupings.
It must be stressed that globalization does not necessarily lead to cultural homogenization. Globalization has various dimensions, and a disaggregation of the concept is helpful. As consumers, citizens may overall become more alike, but at the level of high culture and ethnic groups this is not necessarily the case. At this level, citizens are likely to become more different or at least remain different. This is because technological globalization also offers new opportunities for implementing life projects or maintaining links between diasporas and the mother nation. Instead of gradual assimilation we are likely to see the emergence of parallel, ethnic communities on the fringe of national communities. Ralf Dahrendorf has talked about the emergence of a “new tribalism” in the world. This is a promising concept to the extent that it points to the growing cultural fragmentation and the decrease in the size of the typical cultural unit. Yet, Dahrendorf’s use of the concept of tribalism is unfortunate, since its ontology is fundamentally holistic despite the fact that what Dahrendorf wants to emphasize is precisely the loss of predictability and order.
What are the implications for the study of European identity? Putting it briefly, I regard European identity at one and the same time as
• personal
• composite and
• additive
Personal in the sense that agency is regarded as more important than holistic structure, which implies that essentially identity – like culture – is not so much a matter of customs as a matter of (existential) choice. Now, existential choices can be made in many ways and contexts and can be difficult to identify. Discursive institutions compete for the attention of identity-seeking individuals, but essentially have no identities themselves. Thus even the seemingly rock-solid phenomenon of nationality is, I would argue, increasingly personalized. This understanding implies that research should focus upon the ideas and activities of citizens and “exemplary individuals”. In the EU-context research is being facilitated by the fact that a large amount of the common decisions are made by elites. Thus personal elite identities are an important field of study from this perspective.
Composite in the sense that, like European legitimacy, European identity must be seen as composed of different layers or sources, each of which to varying extents potentially contribute to a sense of common identity. The importance of each source depends upon its degree of fit with the innate needs of human beings. The basic view underlying this proposition is not altogether new: Psychologists increasingly emphasize the multidimensionality of social identity. Thus Cameron referring to other similar approaches proposes a three-factor model of social identity centering on centrality, in-group affect, and in-group ties.51 What is important in this context is the introduction of the notion of a composite identity – not so much the precise variables emphasized by Cameron. However, given my individualistic assumptions psychological research on individual identification must be accorded a role in the study of national or regional identity, although the emphasis must be upon existentialist, meaning-oriented psychology. It is interesting to note that Cameron also finds evidence in support of the conclusion that “group membership can mean different things to the same person”.52 And he observes that individual differences on various dimensions of social identity can be quite stable over time. All this implies that identity is reminiscent of a chord on a piano – composed of different sounds of attachment. Over time the relative weight of different sources of identity may change.
What I am advocating is in a sense an extension of a general conception of complexity. Thus Adrienne Héritier has characterized democratic legitimation in the EU as “composite”.53 Although he draws attention to some mutually contradictory elements in the structure of legitimation, the interesting point is that it is argued that legitimation may rely on several, different sources, and – I shall come back to this point – that in large part these elements are additive.
This understanding can be assumed to be applicable to the realm of European identity as well, since our underlying assumption is individualistic: Culture and democracy are not only linked but fundamentally overlapping. Just as we as citizens choose which politicians to support, so to a large extent we choose our own political – and to a significant extent, also our own cultural – identity. The important proposition I wish to make about Europe is that the variety of sources of common identity has ensured that a kind of supranational democracy has been able to survive in the absence of a foundation of common ethnicity.
Additive therefore in the sense that at least in the European post-war context, common identity has not generally been seen as an either/or question, but more pragmatically as a multiple phenomenon, perhaps a reflection of a European learning process. This does not mean that there are no factors disrupting or slowing down the endeavours in the direction of a common European identity. It just means that it is possible for various sources of common identity to function in an additive way.
This theoretical position involves certain methodological problems: It is difficult to test the “composite identity proposition” empirically. We have no polls explicitly comparing the relative importance of different sources of European identity. Nor do we have polls asking European citizens, if different sources of European identity are additive as opposed to competing. In this situation one has to make do with a theoretical argument, and try to back this up with reasoning by analogy. In any case, my individualist and pluralist conception of European identity implies that instead of talking about a European identity, it might be more helpful to use the softer concept European identity area, thus indicating the rejection of a strong and reified notion of identity.
The integrist position is not without its drawbacks: It implies i.a. a certain loss of predictive capacity. The emphasis is more upon situational logic, processes and personal experiences than upon structures and macro-patterns. It involves applying a kind of epistemic pragmatics, which is necessary in order to grasp contemporary complexity. In epistemological terms, it implies the need to use hermeneutical and perhaps also grounded theory and anthropological methods. However, from this it does not follow that one has to abandon positivism. A modern reflective positivism is compatible with a broad understanding of human motivation and agency. Some sociologists have tried to adapt to the challenges referred to in the foregoing, but simply talking in terms of i.a. a “comprehensive
