founders”.10
As regards the proposed European constitution, over half of the people living in the countries, which at the time of the survey had not yet ratified the treaty establishing the European constitution, supported the constitution (53 %). This represents an improvement of 6 % compared with spring 2006. But it is a far cry from the large majorities normally associated with constitutional decisions.
The European citizens’ attitude to the European institutions is not very well analyzed by Eurobarometer. Significantly, in a 2006-poll the question is not asked, what Europeans think about the European institutions as a whole, but instead a comparison about trust in individual institutions is made. This is a clever tactical move in that it sidesteps the fundamental question, if the current set of European institutions are deemed worthy of support and trust.
The European Parliament remains the most trusted European institution with 52 % of all EU-citizens trusting it. The European Commission is trusted by 48 % of Europeans. Once again, the validity of this polling can be questioned. In recent years the summits (European Council) have gained in importance as an agenda-setting institution. Yet, neither the attitude to the European Council nor the attitude to the Council of ministers has been examined.
Turning to more traditional questions, one notes a very considerable support for a common European foreign policy (68 %), and an even higher support for a common security and defence policy (75 %). The latter figure is surprisingly high and probably to some extent reflects context-specific factors such as widespread concern over US-policy in Iraq.
To enquire about European identity also begs the question, which Europe? Not only in geographical terms but also in cultural and ideological terms. Our knowledge on this matter is imperfect in a number of respects. Thus a number of the existing polls, for instance on attitudes to citizens from other countries, only cover attitudes in the EU-15. We do however have data on EU-25 attitudes to further enlargement. On average, 46 % of EU citizens support further enlargement, while 42 % oppose it. This is a very significant opposition and a politically relevant opposition, since an important country such as France intends to hold a referendum on future enlargements beyond the most recent one (Bulgaria and Romania). Support for further enlargement tends to be considerably higher in the ten new member states than in the former EU15 (72 % versus 41 %!). Support is now strongest in Poland and Slovenia. After these countries Greece and Slovakia follow. Support for continuing enlargement is lowest in Germany (30 %), Austria and France (34 %).
If one defines Europeanness in terms of behaviour, an important indicator of trust could be argued to be interaction with other Europeans. This argument is based upon the assumption that dense interaction produces understanding, and understanding over time makes for solidarity. Not that solidarity is an automatic outcome of interaction – there are intervening variables, and it is not unimportant who interacts and under which material conditions. There are even levels of dense interaction that tends to produce conflict. Thus in the case of the Netherlands scepticism about immigration is correlated with a high degree of socializing with other foreigners.
Almost one out of two citizens in the EU socializes with other European nationals (43 %). However, this figure covers big differences. Citizens from the Netherlands (74 %) and Northern Europe tend to socialize most with fellow Europeans from other member states. And conversely, citizens from Hungary (19 %), Portugal (22 %), Spain (24 %) and Greece (31 %) socialize less.11 Among the Baltic countries, Estonia was clearly above average (50 %). Latvia below average (40 %) along with Lithuania (38 %). Socializing with other Europeans presupposes an ability to speak foreign languages. Unlike, for instance, India and the US – but much like Switzerland – the EU has no lingua franca or Union language. However, 56 % of Europeans say they are able to hold a conversation in at least one language apart from their mother tongue. 28 % answer that they are able to converse in at least two languages apart from their mother tongue. More interesting perhaps is that as many as 44 % answer that they feel unable to converse in any other language than their own. This constitutes a significant, though not immutable, barrier to any notion of inter-cultural dialogue. On the whole, however, these figures do not support Karl Deutsch’s interactionist theory.
Socializing is related to patterns of travelling, another issue covered by Eurobarometer polls. Over a period of 12 months just over a third of European citizens had visited another European union country.
If we turn to attitudes, it is interesting to note that whereas 63 % of European citizens take an interest in their own country’s politics, only 47 % show an interest in European politics. 30 % of the people, who are interested in national politics are not interested in European politics. Obviously this is a static measurement and generational change may change this. A study by Lutz et.al. thus estimates that over time the number of Europeans having multiple identities is likely to grow.12
Evidence from other continental unions like the USA indicates that we are also dealing with a basic dilemma between geographical size and democracy. Distance tends to produce disinterest. One should, however, also be aware of a validity problem: not every definition of Europeanness requires the individual citizen to take an interest in European POLITICS. Theoretically speaking, one can feel a strong cultural affinity with Europe and be disinterested in Europe at the strictly political level. A number of sources of Europeanness do however pre-suppose involvement in European politics (see chapter 7). What then are seen to be the main sources of European citizenship broadly defined? When asked to choose two out of eight reforms with a view to strengthening a feeling of European citizenship, the majority (32 %) mentioned a European social welfare system and a European constitution (27 %). Not only a bill of rights but also everyday democracy seems to play a role in forging common identities: 21 % of Europeans would particularly welcome being able to vote in all elections organized in the member states where they lived. Purely symbolic gestures, such as creating a common Olympic team elicited very limited support (5 %). Overall then, it appears that Europeans tend to conceive of Europeanness in predominantly rational and utility-oriented terms.
Table 3.1 How to strengthen European citizenship?
However, the empirical evidence is far from unequivocal: Another poll indicates that a majority of Europeans associate Europeanness with immaterial values. Thus when asked the question, “When you hear the words ‘European Union’, what comes to your mind first?” a majority emphasized soft, immaterial aspects … “the European Union is above all a symbol of cooperation between the member states” (22 %). Others – but far fewer (15 %) – mainly associate the EU with the Euro.
Demarcation towards the outside world is often associated with group identity (see below). Is there then a “club feeling” in the EU? A Eurobarometer poll examining attitudes to EU enlargement could be read that way: 53 % of Europeans feel either indifference, fear, annoyance or frustration at the prospect of further enlargement. As we have seen, a very significant majority of Europeans support a common foreign and security policy. The significant score of “indifference” is particularly interesting: It could be a sign that Europeans are becoming more introverted, inadvertently erecting an emotional wall against outsiders, who are not members of the club. This ties up with another poll showing, perhaps less surprisingly, that 52 % of Europeans take the view that Turkish EU-membership … “is primarily in the interest of Turkey”.13
All in all, then, one can note on the one hand a growing emphasis upon Europe’s values, identity and culture on the part of the European political elite; on the other hand, a considerable discrepancy between these elite views and the attitudes of European citizens. While European citizens
