Pandemic Surveillance. David Lyon

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      But what makes COVID-19 or any other disease a “pandemic?” Is it, for example, its explosive transmissibility, or the severity of infection, or both, perhaps with other features as well? Medical experts disagree and debate this. After the outbreak of the H1N1 influenza virus in 2009, an article in the Journal of Infectious Diseases debated various options, concluding that “simply defining a pandemic as a large epidemic may make ultimate sense in terms of comprehensibility and consistency.”2 Yet the same article makes many points about how pandemics relate to other factors such as urban population size, modes and ease of transportation, the state of medical knowledge, the actions of public health officials and the role of disease in domesticated animals. These point clearly toward social, technical, economic and political aspects of pandemics.

      Indeed, one factor that connects “pandemic” with “surveillance” is that pandemics, however widely distributed, are far from evenly distributed. Even a nuanced reading of the Greek word demos hints at this, suggesting a social division between elites and the “common people” or “the crowd.” While in the early 2020s no one in the world is untouched by the pandemic, at least as a social condition, people are affected with differing degrees of severity, often relating to social class, gender, race and other decidedly social factors. This became more marked as surveillance “solutions” appeared.

      More generally, we may think of surveillance as any purposeful, focused, systematic and routine observation and attention to personal details. Those “personal details” are sought, today, in digital data, made available in multiple formats that can snowball in some contexts. For instance, the data for contact tracing depends on location-tracking possibilities embedded in the smartphone. If, say, police obtain access to the public health data, as has occurred in several places, including Singapore, the same data could be used for crime investigations as well as contagion control.

      Public health data, then, might make people visible in terms of their relative ages – elderly people are generally more likely to become seriously ill or die if they contract COVID-19, for instance – or where they live – postcodes are often used as proxy for lifestyles by any and all of police, marketers and healthcare scientists – so that testing or vaccines can be targeted appropriately. Equally, public health agencies may wish to know who has been in contact with infected people, or whether those people are isolating or quarantining themselves, and surveillance may be sought for that quest.

      As an example, in February 2020, South Korean citizens found that the government was publishing on websites and in texts the details of the exact movements of unidentified individuals for all COVID-19 cases. One could read, “Patient No. 12 had booked Seats E13 and E14 for a 5:30 pm showing of the South Korean film, ‘The Man Standing Next.’ Before grabbing a 12:40 pm train, patient No. 17 dined at a soft-tofu restaurant in Seoul.”5 Doubtless, the aim was to see whether undiscovered contacts could be traced and tested. But such data, in the wrong hands, could also be misused.

      As well, cultural differences are significant – seen also, for instance, in the willingness to wear masks in public – in relation to allowing authorities to think that they can impose certain behavioral requirements or post personal details publicly. How people respond – for instance, by stigmatizing or even attacking those who fail to wear masks or who appear to have been contagion carriers – is another matter.

      Surveillance capitalism had discovered how to make profit from apparently inconsequential data exuded by these platforms, prompted by everyday users of platforms like Facebook and WeChat. But, crucially, that data could also be repurposed by, for example, police and security agencies. Governments found ways of using that data, too, and often sought to attract those large corporations to set up shop in their countries. An example is the attempt by Alphabet, Google’s parent company, to plant a smart city in Toronto – “Sidewalk Labs.”7 The “smartness” lay in the data-dependence of the project, a high-tech “utopia” with sensors embedded everywhere. As the Atlantic put it, “The city is literally built to collect data about its residents and visitors.”8 The plan was aborted during the pandemic in May 2020.

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