the work on cindynics:- By focusing on the human and the organizational elements, the difficulties of interpreting the information to be classified on the five axes of the hyperspace of danger were great (4). They posed the problem of expertise that would be necessary.- The cindynics approach was reinforced (5), because it allowed in-depth work (3), widened the perception of risk by taking into account the notion of danger (3), emphasized the importance of the context – horizon or situation – (2), but above all by the fact that it proceeded by successive adjustments (2) by emphasizing the human and the organizational elements, which refined the understanding of past phenomena that have led to the sequence of causes of an accident.- Cindynics concepts thus made it possible to go beyond the only questioning on the reliability of the equipment.- Moreover, the analysis, established from the danger hyperspace, had the advantage of an organization testing the coherence existing between the five aspects of the danger hyperspace.- However, it involved difficulties: when studying complex systems (3), within which the actors themselves had complex relationships – implicit or unknown – (2), it required working on precise data with a clear delimitation of the scope of the study (2) and the actors to be taken into account (2). However, there were few real cases studied that could serve as reference (2).
– What it seemed essential to take further:- The question of the production of work “outside” of the group was again raised (5), either in the form of a glossary, or by resuming the work done on Bhopal, or in the form of teaching students (initial or continuing education).- Conversely, the other question was working on a real case proposed to the group by an external authority (2), in order to question the predictive power of a cindynics study.
– In the search for deeper knowledge:- A more precise study on deficits was requested.- A critical reading by the group of an article already written by one of the members.- The search for a computer tool to facilitate the task of data exploration and exploitation.
Subsequently, members of the group were interested in studying a case presenting dysfunctions, but not yet having caused an accident, with a view to using the approach in the field of prevention. However, this work could not be completed in the time allotted. Indeed, the insufficiency of the available information made it impossible to correctly establish the context of the activity situation and to thus study the deficits and dissonances that could exist within this chosen situation compared to the situation deemed satisfactory by the study’s sponsors. On the contrary, this example highlighted the real difficulty in choosing the “networks of actors” working within the situation or in integrating a team of cindynicians into a project from the design phase. It also showed the need to conduct interviews with the actors deemed relevant, in order to record their knowledge and perceptions of the situation.
Subsequently, other examples of accidents were studied and the results of the different experiments and work were compiled in a collective file (see Chapter 8). Even though the studies were sometimes incomplete, they nevertheless prove that cindynics concepts can provide a better response to our problems of dangers, threats, conflicts and risks. Hence, the members of the working group wished to disseminate their work in order to demystify cindynics concepts, which are neither an obscure science nor reserved for a few specialists, and to show that, on the contrary, cindynics are adapted to the complexity of today’s sociotechnical or societal systems.
In view of the difficulties encountered, it would seem that, more than the obstacles related to vocabulary, it is indeed the amplitude of this new discipline of thought that may have put off the very first aspirants to cindynics concepts, who tried to embark on the adventure without sufficient preparation or clarification of the process.
July 2021
1 1 Consult the IMdR website: https://www.imdr.eu/offres/doc_inline_src/818/Fiches_methodes_m2os.pdf.
2 2 See: http://www.patricklagadec.net.
3 3 Aviation security report, 2016: https://www.ecologique-solidaire.gouv.fr/sites/.../rapport_securite_aerienne_2016.pdf.
4 4 Founded in 1794, this scientific journal with an international audience is published in English, German, Spanish, Russian and French.
5 5 Grounded theory (Glaser and Strauss, 1967), adapted by [PAI 94]. See: https://doi.org/10.7202/1002253ar.
1
Understanding Cindynics
While the methods, studies or standardization commonly used to manage risks have been quite effective, it is undeniable that through the history of accidents and disasters, their effectiveness is still not entirely satisfactory.
In order to fully understand cindynics, it seems useful to examine what its concepts can add to postponing the occurrence of feared events.
Indeed, any risk study currently conducted starts with the knowledge of the dangers existing within the situation under examination. This phase, which is the keystone of a risk study approach, is called the “hazard study”.
Let us recall that the method most often used for risk studies is the one called MADS–MOSAR which involves:
– a model called “Methodology of Systems Dysfunctioning (MADS)” also called Universe of Danger [PÉR 00];
– a method called MOSAR, “organized method of systemic risk analysis” that allows the identification of major risk scenarios using methods and tools for operational safety.
The use of the MADS model makes clear the priority given to the search for hazards1: it uses “systemic modeling by breaking down the installation into sub-systems and systematically searching for the hazards presented by each of them”.
This model is used to establish a hazard qualification grid. 7
Concepts linked to cindynics are therefore perfectly aligned with the principle of thinking about danger before paying attention to the risks and the initiating event. However, the hazard research carried out by MADS is limited to the exploration of a table of hazards of technical origin2. And while these have been brought to our attention, it is because they have been described and catalogued, because they are perceptible. It is therefore on this level that cindynics concepts differ and bring about very great originality, because the dangers or sources of risks are certainly of technical origin, but they are also organizational, cultural or managerial (see section 1.1).
Cindynics therefore meets the need for in-depth research into complementary sources of risk, either difficult to identify or coming from pathogenic elements which, if they do not attract attention, can unknowingly weaken an organization’s ability to resist hazards (see the term “organization” in the Glossary)3. Recalling the importance of focusing on sources of risk that are difficult to perceive, [DEL 20] notes: “the two-week fall in the Dow Jones and the CAC 40 gives credence to the famous black swan theory, developed by the statistician Nassim Nicholas Taleb, according to which the greatest financial catastrophes are triggered by seemingly minor events whose rarity is such that it makes them unpredictable for market operators”.
The ISO 31000:2018 standard states
