of Embeddedness–A.533 All humans will value as “prudentially good” that which allows them personally to act–F.
4 All humans, personally, will value as “prudentially good” the acquisition of as many goods from the Table of Embeddedness as possible (in hierarchical order)—1−3.
5 Respecting the general grounds of action, all humans are alike—F.
6 Respecting the general grounds of human action, logically there can be no idiosyncratic preference—5.
7 Whatever attaches as an essential Natural condition of a species viewed contextually from the various community worldview imperatives (shared human, extended human, eco, and extended eco) is proper to that Natural species condition—F.
8 To be “mutually life-affirming in an environmental perspective” is a fundamental positive normative environmental value—A.54
9 Whatever is proper to a Natural species condition is morally good if the summation of all and every Natural species conditions (i.e., general, generic conditions) are mutually life-affirming in an environmental perspective—5−8.
10 The prudential values set out in premise #4 (for individuals) can be generally life-affirming in an environmental perspective—9.
11 Prudential values for particular individuals in an environmental context become general moral values when they attach to generic Natural species conditions—9, 10.
12 The prudential values set out in premise #4 are morally good and incur positive moral duties on all (capable of voluntary action) to facilitate outcomes that are life-affirming in an environmental perspective—4, 9, 11.
Argument Two: The Moral Perspective of Human Nature Within the Environmental Perspective
Argument Two, though it begins with prudential values (seen from the perspective of individual natures), transcends to the ethical when the understanding of the relationship between humans and their fundamental definition is generalized within the environmental context. This is because there is no longer an agent acting for themself only. Rather, the logical substitution instance is a generically described individual and, as such, could be understood as applicable to any substitution instance for the variable that has undergone universal generalization.
Along with some undergirding mechanism such outcomes can be projected into a law-like structure.55 This depiction of humans as situated within their environmental communities (severally understood) constitutes a fundamental structure of ethical duty.56
The Making and the Things Made. Earlier in the chapter Nature, as an existent ontological entity, was contrasted with things created by humans, “the making.” The making was connected to a process described as an art or techne. Nature was set out as primary to human making because humans do not make themselves. This assessment relies upon a principle about making: “There is a priority in making that gives priority to the maker over the artifact created (that which is made).”57 This relationship does not depend upon knowing the identity of the maker. For example, Nature (as an all-encompassing material system affecting of all living things and that which supports them) exists, and within this systemic structure, brings about the conditions whereby life and its supporting components—air, land, and water—come to be and are sustained. Humans are a part of this grand system. But Humans did not create it. It was created by some systemic material agency since by the Principle of Sufficient Reason, everything that is must owe its existence to some material, causal explanation.58 Under this account the material system, Nature, is understood to be the named entity that is responsible for our very human existence. As such, under the hierarchy of the making and the output of the making (things made), we owe a level of respect and precaution when dealing with the operation of Nature’s systems when we go about our making of artificial devices (teche => technology). In a situation in which there was a conflict between human making and the material system, Nature, the status of the latter should trump the former.59 This can be seen in Argument Three.
1 There is a priority in the process of making that puts the maker above the output of the maker: things made—A.
2 The status of priority in the process of making means that the operation of and the interests in the maker always trump the operation of and the interests in the things made—A.
3 Nature’s relation to Humans is as maker to output made—F.
4 The operation of and the interests in Nature’s systemic operation always trumps the operation of and the interests of Human’s own making—1−3.
5 The operation of and the interests in Human artifacts (technology) are always subservient to the ultimate interests of Humans—1, 4.
6 The operation of and interests in Human artifacts (technology) are always subservient to the operation of and interests in Nature’s systemic operation—4, 5.
Argument Three: The Priority of the Maker Over the Maker’s Output
Argument Three has some interesting corollaries. Among these are that if we rank the priority normatively, from the vantage point of the thing made, the maker is (in an important sense) normatively good. This would make Nature (from the point of view of Humans and all other living things) good. In turn, if Nature is good and if technology created by Humans harms the operation of Nature, then that human technology is bad and ought not be adopted. This gradation of the evil is a function of how much harm Nature incurs.
Since the level of harm and the elasticity of Nature to rebound from temporary or ongoing harm is speculative at best, the principle of precautionary reason60 dictates that we should refrain from harming Nature whenever it is in our power to do so. It is one thing to see that such a corollary would apply in prohibiting air, water, and land pollution. This seems very straightforward. However, more difficult cases (beyond the scope of this chapter) are when one proffers technology that seeks to improve Nature. A pivotal example of this is in genetic engineering.61 If we try to improve the genome by the use of “knockout” gene strategies (that will affect future generations) for fatal genetic diseases or genetically-based handicaps, are we “helping” or “hurting” Nature? In the earlier terminology: is it kata phusin or para phusin? This a difficult question and may turn on other criteria such as the difference in somatic treatment versus germ line alterations. There are arguments that can be made on each side of this and related controversies. It is not the purpose of this chapter to solve these and other such important practical issues, but rather to offer a theoretical framework by which the discussion should proceed.
What we are left with in this second section of the chapter is a moral commitment to care for Nature. This moral commitment is based upon what Nature is (a series of concentric and overlapping human and Natural communities that are symbiotic). As humans, the study of Nature creates the value/duty relationship that outlines the ground of general moral duty from the human side. Then, this general ground becomes more practical when it is specified that there is a moral prohibition not to interfere in a harmful way with our human makings because Nature stands in relation to all of us as “maker.” As such, Nature’s makings (which includes us) requires the respect owed to a maker not to have its own artifacts come back to harm it. This second principle grounds our practical duties to Nature and acts as a firm moral limitation on human technology.
Notes
