target="_blank" rel="nofollow" href="#ulink_43520d70-6fb7-5d97-b03d-2f54dd7dae0e">9 Dr. Payne was a pioneer in army operations research and pre‐eminent leader in the field for more than three decades. He began his career in 1955 as an analyst at the Army Operation Research Office at Johns Hopkins University to eventually become the first deputy under secretary of the Army Operations Research from 1968 to 1975 and the first director of the systems analysis activity of the US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) from 1975 to 1986. In 1990, the Department of the Army Systems Analysis Award became the Dr. Wilbur B. Payne Memorial Award for Excellence in Analysis in order to honor the memory and contributions of Dr. Payne to the Operations Research field.10 10 The terms “reactive” and “active” were used as defined by Saadia Amiel to characterize two complementary land force elements within the framework of a defensive strategy. In contrast to the all armor general‐purpose forces of the Cold War designed to fight in both, the reactive and active mode, Amiel proposed a land force structure “…of two components: one consisting of defensive combined arms teams committed to reactive defense where precise and high firepower is at a premium, and the second of offensive combined arms formations where maneuverability is at a premium.” [Amiel, Sadia: “Deterrence by Conventional Forces”. Survival March, April 1978. pp. 56–64].
11 11 Initially, the Bundeswehr Universities in Munich and Hamburg were founded in 1973 primarily as academic institutions to meet the significant deficit of officer candidates at the time by preparing them for professional carriers after leaving the military. As one of the institutes of the computer science departments in Munich, IASFOR's teaching and research emphasized defense and security issues as applications for computer science.
12 12 The categories of reactive defense include: 1) Static Area Defenses characterized by small combat teams fighting from a network of prepared positions and field fortification; 2) Dynamic Area Defenses fighting a mobile attrition‐oriented delaying battle by falling back through a series of prepared and partially reinforced positions; 3) Continuous Fire Barrier Defenses feature a fire belt along the demarcation line acting as a barrier that the enemy has to penetrate; 4) Selective Barrier Defenses are implemented depending on the tactical situation by “barrier brigade” composed of thee infantry battalions and one engineer battalion deployed to fight the initial forward defense battle from prefabricated field fortifications set up prior for the opponents expected assault. The brigades are manned largely by reservists living in the vicinity of their battalions.
13 13 For a detailed description of BASIS the reader is referred to Hans W. Hofmann, Reiner K. Huber and Karl Steiger: “On Reactive Defense Options – A Comparative Systems Analysis for the Initial Defense Against the first Strategic Echelon of the Warsaw Pact in Central Europe,” Modeling and Analysis of Conventional Defense in Europe (Huber, Ed.). 1986 Plenum Press, New York. pp. 97–139.
14 14 Reiner K. Huber (Ed.): Systems Analysis and Modeling in Defense. 1984 Plenum Press, New York.
15 15 In 1976, after the mandate of SPOSS was widened to cover scientific and environmental affairs, the NATO Science Committee decided to terminate supporting System Science and OR/SA altogether feeling that military applications should fall within the realms of other more endowed NATO divisions and directorates concerned with armaments and defense research such as the DRG and its Panel 7 (on Defense Applications of Operations Research) that adopted the members of SPOSS. DRG had been established in 1967 by the NATO Military Committee with the mandate to specific problems that NATO militaries may be faced with.
16 16 Therefore, many of the participants of the Brussels conference suggested that, in order to keep up with state of the art of scientific military modeling and analysis, a time interval between meetings of five years would be more appropriate than the eight years since the Ottobrunn conference in 1974.
17 17 As part of the reorganization of NATO in 1998, NATO's Research and Technology Organization (RTO) was created through the merger of DRG and AGARD (Advisory Group for Aerospace Research and Development founded in 1952 as an agency of the NATO Military Committee). Among others, RTO reorganized, not without some controversy, DRG's Panel 7 by establishing two panels, the new “Modeling and Simulation Group” (MSG) and the panel “System Analysis and Studies” (SAS). Both, SAS and MSG build on the methodological legacy of the Science Committee's APOR/SPOSS and DRG's Panel 7, albeit pursuing different objectives. Finally, in 2012, RTO was replaced by the NATO Science and Technology Organization (STO) “with a view to meeting, to the best advantage, the collective needs of NATO, NATO Nations and partner Nations in the fields of [military] Science and Technology.”
18 18 G.G. Armstrong: “Canadian Land Wargaming.” Systems Analysis and Modeling in Defense (Huber, Ed.). 1984 Plenum Press, New York, pp. 171–179.
Preface
Several parallel events did lead to the development of this compendium on wargaming and simulation.
In December 2017, the United States Marines Corps (USMC) conducted a two‐day workshop on the future of wargaming in the light of the plans to set up a new USMC Wargaming Center. The rapid change of technology accessible by opponents as well as useful to improve own forces’ and allies’ capabilities requires a better support for experts when developing new concepts or new structures to fight in such a complex environment, with the objective of enabling the best USMC planning process. This “5th generation USMC Wargaming Center” shall not break this focus, but add more capabilities to it, using the latest technologies, including but not limited to simulation, artificial intelligence, data science, and visualization. Out of question was that the human mind is and must remain the center of wargaming. Reducing wargaming to computational analysis would lead to results that are too limited, as human innovation and creativity are pivotal components of the process. Nonetheless, models, methods, and tools are needed to refine conditions, inform decisions, and clarify factors to identify issues, substantiate findings, and indicate directions. Decision tools, scenario tools, adjudication tools, and synthesis tools must support the human mind in the wargaming process. Industry and academic partners presented methods and tools pushing the limit of what has only been theoretically possible toward what is now practically feasible. These discussions contributed to initiate this book: how can such new methods and tools enable the next generation of wargaming?
Unfortunately, one of the titans of military operations research, Dr. Stuart Howard Starr, born on 29 January 1942, passed away on 17 March 2018. Many authors have been influenced by his research results and works, some as colleagues, others as scholars or even students, but all as friends. Stuart was often ahead of his time and introduced innovative ideas and concepts early, any many of them would need years to get fully understood to finally make it into the mainstream approaches. Examples are his early works on cyber warfare when computers were just being introduced to military headquarters to support command and control with digital means, and the command and control assessments for the new operations of the armed forces after the end of the Cold War, asking for command structures that just today are seriously evaluated to be introduced in the armed forces. His vision on a more prevalent role of simulation solutions enabling rigid wargaming was driving us, the editors, as well as many of our contributors. We therefore decided in agreement with all participants to dedicate this volume to his memory.
Finally, the recent
