Essays Upon Heredity and Kindred Biological Problems. Weismann August

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Essays Upon Heredity and Kindred Biological Problems - Weismann August

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and that it is potentially contained in the egg from which the individual developes.

      We know further that the growth of the individual depends chiefly upon the multiplication of cells and only to a slight extent upon the growth of single cells. It is therefore clear that a limit of growth is imposed by a limitation in the processes by which cells are increased, both as regards the number of cells produced and the rate at which they are formed. How could we otherwise explain the fact that an animal ceases to grow long before it has reached the physiologically attainable maximum of its species, without at the same time suffering any loss of vital energy?

      In many cases at least, the most important duty of an organism, viz. reproduction, follows upon the attainment of full size—a fact which induced Johannes Müller to reject the prevailing hypothesis which explained the death of animals as due to ‘the influences of the inorganic environment, which gradually wear away the life of the individual.’ He argued that, if this were the case, ‘the organic energy of an individual would steadily decrease from the beginning,’ while the facts indicate that this is not so5.

      If it is further asked why the egg should give rise to a fixed number of cell-generations, although perhaps a number which varies widely within certain limits, we may now refer to the operation of natural selection upon the relation of surface to mass, and upon other physiological necessities which are peculiar to the species. Because a certain size is the most favourable for a certain plan of organization, the process of natural selection determined that such a size should be within certain variable limits, characteristic of each species. This size is then transmitted from generation to generation, for when once established as normal for the species, the most favourable size is potentially present in the reproductive cell from which each individual is developed.

      If this conclusion holds, and I believe that no essential objection can be raised against it, then we have in the limitation in space a process which is exactly analogous to the limitation in time, which we have already considered. The latter limitation—the duration of life—also depends upon the multiplication of cells, the rapid increase of which first gave rise to the characteristic form of the mature body, and then continued at a slower rate. In the mature animal, cell-reproduction still goes on, but it no longer exceeds the waste; for some time it just compensates for loss, and then begins to decline. The waste is not compensated for, the tissues perform their functions incompletely, and thus the way for death is prepared, until its final appearance by one of the three great Atria mortis.

      I admit that facts are still wanting upon which to base this hypothesis. It is a pure supposition that senile changes are due to a deficient reproduction of cells: at the same time this supposition gains in probability when we are enabled to reduce the limitations of the organism in both time and space to one and the same principle. It cannot however be asserted under any circumstances that it is a pure supposition that the ovum possesses a capacity for cell-multiplication which is limited both as to numbers produced and rate of production. The fact that each species maintains an average size is a sufficient proof of the truth of this conclusion.

      Hitherto I have only spoken of animals and have hardly mentioned plants. I should not have been able to consider them at all, had it not happened that a work of Hildebrand’s [See Note 12] has recently appeared, which has, for the first time, provided us with exact observations on the duration of plant-life.

      The chief results obtained by this author agree very well with the view which I have brought before you to-day. Hildebrand shows that the duration of life in plants also is by no means completely fixed, and that it may be very considerably altered through the agency of the external conditions of life. He shows that, in course of time, and under changed conditions of life, an annual plant may become perennial, or vice versa. The external factors which influence the duration of life are here however essentially different, as indeed we expect them to be, when we remember the very different conditions under which the animal and vegetable kingdoms exist. During the life of animals the destruction of mature individuals plays a most important part, but the existence of the mature plant is fairly well secured; their chief period of destruction is during youth, and this fact has a direct influence upon the degree of fertility, but not upon the duration of life. Climatic considerations, especially the periodical changes of summer and winter, or wet and dry seasons, are here of greater importance.

      It must then be admitted that the dependence of the duration of life upon the external conditions of existence is alike common to plants and animals. In both kingdoms the high multicellular forms with well-differentiated organs contain the germs of death, while the low unicellular organisms are potentially immortal. Furthermore, an undying succession of reproductive cells is possessed by all the higher forms, although this may be but poor consolation to the conscious individual which perishes. Johannes Müller is therefore right, when in the sentence quoted at the beginning of my lecture, he speaks of an ‘appearance of immortality’ which passes from each individual into that which succeeds it. That which remains over, that which persists, is not the individual itself,—not the complex aggregate of cells which is conscious of itself,—but an individuality which is outside its consciousness, and of a low order,—an individuality which is made up of a single cell, which arises from the conscious individual. I might here conclude, but I wish first, in a few words, to protect myself against a possible misunderstanding.

      I have repeatedly spoken of immortality, first of the unicellular organism, and secondly of the reproductive cell. By this word I have merely intended to imply a duration of time which appears to be endless to our human faculties. I have no wish to enter into the question of the cosmic or telluric origin of life on the earth. An answer to this question will at once decide whether the power of reproduction possessed by these cells is in reality eternal or only immensely prolonged, for that which is without beginning is, and must be, without end.

      The supposition of a cosmic origin of life can only assist us if by its means we can altogether dispense with any theory of spontaneous generation. The mere shifting of the origin of life to some other far-off world cannot in any way help us. A truly cosmic origin in its widest significance will rigidly limit us to the statement—omne vivum e vivo—to the idea that life can only arise from life, and has always so arisen,—to the conclusion that organic beings are eternal like matter itself.

      Experience cannot help us to decide this question; we do not know whether spontaneous generation was the commencement of life on the earth, nor have we any direct evidence for the idea that the process of development of the living world carries the end within itself, or for the converse idea that the end can only be brought about by means of some external force.

      I admit that spontaneous generation, in spite of all vain efforts to demonstrate it, remains for me a logical necessity. We cannot regard organic and inorganic matter as independent of each other and both eternal, for organic matter is continually passing, without residuum, into the inorganic. If the eternal and indestructible are alone without beginning, then the non-eternal and destructible must have had a beginning. But the organic world is certainly not eternal and indestructible in that absolute sense in which we apply these terms to matter itself. We can, indeed, kill all organic beings and thus render them inorganic at will. But these changes are not the same as those which we induce in a piece of chalk by pouring sulphuric acid upon it; in this ease we only change the form, and the inorganic matter remains. But when we pour sulphuric acid upon a worm, or when we burn an oak tree, these organisms are not changed into some other animal and tree, but they disappear entirely as organized beings and are resolved into inorganic elements. But that which can be completely resolved into inorganic matter must have also arisen from it, and must owe its ultimate foundation to it. The organic might be considered eternal if we could only destroy its form, but not its nature.

      It therefore follows that the organic world must once have arisen, and further that it will at some time come to an end. Hence we must speak of the eternal duration of unicellular organisms and of reproductive cells in the Metazoa and Metaphyta in that particular sense

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<p>5</p>

Johannes Müller, ‘Physiologie,’ Bd. I. p. 31, Berlin, 1840.