The Works of Samuel Johnson, LL.D. Volume 11. Samuel Johnson
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The objections which have, on this occasion, been made against it, are such as no law can escape, and which, therefore, can have no weight; and it is no small confirmation of the expediency of it, that they by whom it has been opposed have not been able to attack it with stronger reasons, from which, if we consider their abilities, we shall be convinced, that nothing has secured it but the power of truth.
It is inquired, by the noble lord, how we shall distinguish true from false evidence; to which it may be very readily answered, that we shall distinguish them by the same means as on any other occasion, by comparing the allegations, and considering how every witness agrees with others and with himself, how far his assertions are in themselves probable, how they are confirmed or weakened by known circumstances, and how far they are invalidated by the contrary evidence.
We shall, my lords, if we add our sanction to this bill, discover when any man's accusation is prompted by his interest, as we might know whether it was dictated by his malice.
It has been asked also, how any man can ascertain his claim to the indemnity? To which it may be easily replied, that by giving his evidence he acquires a right, till that evidence shall be proved to be false.
The noble lord who spoke some time ago, and whose abilities and qualities are such, that I cannot but esteem and admire him, even when conviction obliges me to oppose him, has proposed a case in which he seems to imagine that a murderer might secure himself from punishment, by connecting his crime with some transaction in which the earl of ORFORD should be interested. This case, my lords, is sufficiently improbable, nor is it easy to mention any method of trial in which some inconvenience may not be produced, in the indefinite complications of circumstances, and unforeseen relations of events. It is known to have happened once, and cannot be known not to have happened often, that a person accused of murder, was tried by a jury of which the real murderer was one. Will not this then be an argument against the great privilege of the natives of this empire, a trial by their equals?
But, my lords, I am of opinion that the murderer would not be indemnified by this bill, since he did not commit the crime by the direction of the person whom he is supposed to accuse; nor would it have any necessary connexion with his conduct, but might be suppressed in the accusation, without any diminution of the force of the evidence. A man will not be suffered to introduce his accusation with an account of all the villanies of his whole life, but will be required to confine his testimony to the affair upon which he is examined.
The committee, my lords, will distinguish between the crimes perpetrated by the direction of the earl of ORFORD, and those of another kind. And should an enormous criminal give such evidence, as the noble lord was pleased to suppose, he may be indemnified for the bribery, but will be hanged for the murder, notwithstanding any thing in this bill to the contrary.
It has been insisted on by the noble lords, who have spoke against the bill, that no crime is proved, and, therefore, there is no foundation for it. But, my lords, I have always thought that the profusion of the publick money was a crime, and there is evidently a very large sum expended, of which no account has been given; and, what more nearly relates to the present question, of which no account has ever been demanded.
On this occasion, my lords, an assertion has been alleged, which no personal regard shall ever prevail upon me to hear without disputing it, since I think it is of the most dangerous tendency, and unsupported by reason or by law. It is alleged, my lords, that the civil list is not to be considered as publick money, and that the nation has, therefore, no claim to inquire how it is distributed; that it is given to support the dignity of the crown, and that only his majesty can ask the reason of any failures in the accounts of it.
I have, on the contrary, my lords, hitherto understood, that all was publick money which was given by the publick. The present condition of the crown is very different from that of our ancient monarchs, who supported their dignity by their own estates. I admit, my lords, that they might at pleasure contract or enlarge their expenses, mortgage or alienate their lands, or bestow presents and pensions without control.
It is, indeed, expressed in the act, that the grants of the civil list are without account, by which I have hitherto understood only that the sum total is exempt from account; not that the ministers have a right to employ the civil list to such purposes as they shall think most conducive to their private views. For if it should be granted, not only that the nation has no right to know how the whole is expended, which is the utmost that can be allowed, or to direct the application of any part of it, which is very disputable, yet it certainly has a claim to direct in what manner it shall not be applied, and to provide that boroughs are not corrupted under pretence of promoting the dignity of the crown.
The corruption of boroughs, my lords, is one of the greatest crimes of which any man under our constitution is capable; it is to corrupt, at once, the fountain and the stream of government, to poison the whole nation at once, and to make the people wicked, that they may infect the house of commons with wicked representatives.
Such, my lords, are the crimes, the suspicion of which incited the commons to a publick inquiry, in which they have been able to proceed so far, as to prove that the publick discontent was not without cause, and that such arts had been practised, as it is absolutely necessary, to the publick security, to detect and punish.
They, therefore, pursued their examination with a degree of ardour proportioned to the importance of the danger in which every man is involved by the violation of the fundamental laws of the constitution; but, they found themselves obstructed by the subtilty of some who confessed only that they were guilty, and determined to be faithful to their accomplices and themselves.
A farther inquiry, my lords, was, by this unforeseen evasion, made impossible; the ultimate and principal agent is sheltered from the law by his guard of mercenaries, wretches who are contented to be infamous, if they can continue to be rich, and value themselves on their adherence to their master, while they are conspiring to ruin their country.
The nation, my lords, in the mean time, justly applies for redress to the power of the legislature, and to its wisdom for methods of procuring it by law. The commons have complied with their importunities, and propose to your lordships the bill before you, a bill for making a publick inquiry possible, and for bringing a minister within reach of the law.
On this occasion, my lords, we are upbraided with our own declarations, that the person mentioned in this bill would quickly find accusers, when he should be divested of his authority. Behold him now, say his advocates, reduced from his envied eminence, and placed on a level with his fellow-subjects! Behold him no longer the distributer of employments, or the disburser of the publick treasure! see him divested of all security, but that of innocence, and yet no accusations are produced!
This, my lords, is a topick so fruitful of panegyrick, and so happily adapted to the imagination of a person long used to celebrate the wisdom and integrity of ministers, that, were not the present question of too great importance to admit of false concessions, I should suffer it to remain without controversy.
But, my lords, this is no time for criminal indulgence; and, therefore, I shall annihilate this short-lived triumph by observing, that to be out of place, is not necessarily to be out of power; a minister may retain his influence, who has resigned his employment; he may still retain the favour of his prince, and possess him with a false opinion, that he can only secure his authority by protecting him; or, what there is equal reason to suspect, his successours may be afraid of concurring in a law which may hereafter be revived against themselves.