style="font-size:15px;"> This, my lords, is surely a precedent which I have a right to quote, and which will vindicate me to your lordships from the imputation of partiality and malignity; since it is apparent, that I do only in the case of another, what I willingly submitted to, when an inquiry was making into my conduct.
But, my lords, this is far from being the only precedent which may be pleaded in favour of this bill; a bill which, in reality, concurs with the general and regular practice of the established law, as will appear to every one that compares it with the eighth section of the act for preventing bribery; in which it is established as a perpetual law, that he who, having taken a bribe, shall, within twelve months, inform against him that gave it, shall be received as an evidence, and be indemnified from all the consequences of his discovery.
To these arguments of reason and precedent, I will add one of a more prevalent kind, drawn from motives of interest, which surely would direct our ministers to favour the inquiry, and promote every expedient that might produce a complete discussion of the publick affairs; since they would show, that they are not afraid of the most rigorous scrutiny, and are above any fears that the precedent which they are now establishing may revolve upon themselves.
To elude the ratification of this bill, it was at first urged that there was no proof of any crime; and when it was shown, that there was an apparent misapplication of the publick money, it became necessary to determine upon a more hardy assertion, and to silence malicious reasoners, by showing them how little their arguments would be regarded. It then was denied, with a spirit worthy of the cause in which it was exerted, that the civil list was publick money.
Disputants like these, my lords, are not born to be confuted; it would be to little purpose that any man should ask, whether the money allotted for the civil list was not granted by the publick, and whether publick grants did not produce publick money; it would be without any effect, that the uses for which that grant is made should be enumerated, and the misapplication of it openly proved; a distinction, or at least a negative, would be always at hand, and obstinacy and interest would turn argument aside.
Upon what principles, my lords, we can now call out for a proof of crimes, and proceed in the debate as if no just reason of suspicion had appeared, I am not able to conjecture; here is, in my opinion, if not demonstrative proof, yet the strongest presumption of one of the greatest crimes of which any man can be guilty, the propagation of wickedness, of the most atrocious breach of trust which can be charged upon a British minister, a deliberate traffick for the liberties of his country.
Of these enormous villanies, however difficult it may now seem to disengage him from them, I hope we shall see reason to acquit him at the bar of this house, at which, if he be innocent, he ought to be desirous of appearing; nor do his friends consult his honour, by endeavouring to withhold him from it; if they, indeed, believe him guilty, they may then easily justify their conduct to him, but the world will, perhaps, require a more publick vindication.
These, my lords, are the arguments which have influenced me hitherto to approve the bill now before us, and which will continue their prevalence, till I shall hear them confuted; and, surely, if they are not altogether unanswerable, they are surely of so much importance, that the bill for which they have been produced, must be allowed to deserve, at least, a deliberate examination, and may very justly be referred to a committee, in which ambiguities may be removed, and inadvertencies corrected.
Lord CHOLMONDELEY spoke next, to the following purpose:—My lords, this bill is, in my opinion, so far from deserving approbation, that I am in doubt whether I should retard the determination of the house, by laying before you the reasons which influence me in this debate; nor, indeed, could I prevail upon myself to enter into a formal discussion of a question, on which I should have imagined that all mankind would have been of one opinion, did not my reverence of the abilities of those noble lords who have spoken in defence of the bill, incline me, even against the conviction of my own reason, to suspect that arguments may be offered in its favour, which I have not yet been able to discover; and that those which have been produced, however inconclusive they have seemed, will operate more powerfully when they are more fully displayed, and better understood.
For this reason I shall lay before your lordships the objections which arose in my mind when the bill was first laid before us, and which have rather been strengthened than invalidated by the subsequent debate.
It appears, my lords, evident to me, that every man has a right to be tried by the known laws of his country; that no man can be justly punished by a law made after the commission of a fact, because he then suffers by a law, against which he never transgressed; nor is any man to be prosecuted by methods invented only to facilitate his condemnation, because he ought to be acquitted, however guilty he may be supposed, whom the established rules of justice cannot convict. The law, my lords, is the measure of political, as conscience of moral right; and he that breaks no law, may indeed be criminal, but is not punishable. The law likewise prescribes the method of prosecuting guilt; and as we, by omitting any crime in our laws, disable ourselves from punishing it, however publick or flagrant, so by regulating the process in our courts of justice, we give security to that guilt, which by that process cannot be detected.
The truth of this assertion, my lords, however paradoxical it may perhaps appear, will become evident, if we suppose a man brought to the bar whose guilt was unquestionable, though it could not be legally proved, because all those were dead who might have appeared against him. It is certain that his good fortune would give him no claim to pardon, and yet he could not be convicted, unless we suppose him weak enough to accuse himself. In this case, my lords, it is not impossible, that some might be prompted by their zeal to propose, that the foreign methods of justice might be introduced, and the rack employed to extort, from his own mouth, a confession of those crimes of which every one believed him guilty.
With what horrour, my lords, such a proposal would be heard, how loudly it would be censured, and how universally rejected, I need not say; but must observe, that, in my opinion, the detestation would arise principally from a sense of the injustice of exposing any man to peculiar hardships, and distinguishing him to his disadvantage from the rest of the community.
It will, my lords, not be easy to prove, that it is less agreeable to justice to oblige a man to accuse himself, than to make use of extraordinary methods of procuring evidence against him; because the barriers of security which the law has fixed are equally broken in either case, and the accused is exposed to dangers, from which he had reason to believe himself sheltered by the constitution of his country.
This argument, my lords, I have mentioned, without endeavouring to evince the innocence of the person whom this bill immediately regards; because the intent of it is to show, that no man is to be deprived of the common benefits of the constitution, and that the guilty have a right to all the advantages which the law allows them. For guilt is never to be supposed till it is proved, and it is therefore never to be proved by new methods, merely because it is supposed.
That the method of procuring evidence now proposed, is new, my lords, I think it no temerity to conclude; because the noble lords who have endeavoured to defend it, have produced no instance of a parallel practice, and their knowledge and acuteness is such, that they can only have failed to discover them, because they are indeed nowhere to be found.
In the case of bribery, my lords, the person accused has the privilege, if he be innocent, of prosecuting his accuser for perjury, and is therefore in less danger of being harassed by a false indictment. But, my lords, this is not the only difference between the two cases; for he that discovers a bribe received by himself, has no motives of interest to prompt his evidence; he is only secured from suffering by his own discovery, and might have been equally safe by silence and secrecy; since the law supposes the crime out of the reach of detection, otherwise than by the confession of the criminal.
But far different, my lords, are the circumstances of those who are now invited to throng the courts of justice, and stun us with depositions
