Hitler’s Terror Weapons: The Price of Vengeance. Richard Overy
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The Paris gun had therefore been an impressive piece of ordnance indeed. Superlatives abounded. But it had some drawbacks. The huge barrels had to be renewed after firing 60 rounds (the French 6 inch gun could fire 3500). One, indeed, had exploded. It was not accurate, its pattern of shot being some 9.4 mils5 in range and 2.5 in bearing, and the explosive carried in the shell was only some 25lbs in mass. The sheer size of the guns hampered their mobility, and rendered them vulnerable to counter fire, or to aeroplane bombs. Dornberger was therefore drawn to the use of rockets as a means of overcoming these drawbacks, and perhaps of increasing the weight of attack. Much genius would be expended in this investigation, but none seems to have been directed towards the utility and expense of bombarding a city. Gigantism seems to have been self-justifying in Germany, even before the advent of National Socialism.
Rockets had a long history of use in warfare. “The rocket’s red glare, the bombs bursting in air …” over Baltimore in September 1814, with which the British had failed to subdue Fort McHenry despite the use of some 1800 projectiles, were to be immortalised in ‘The Star Spangled Banner’, which became America’s national anthem in March 1931.6 But the rocket had never become a serious rival to the big gun. It even ceased to impress savages upon a closer acquaintance.7
At a meeting on 17th December 1930 Becker reported that ‘There has been a quantity of irresponsible talk and literature about space travel, and we must approach the rocket question with some misgiving. Our task is to investigate how far the rocket is capable of supplementing our weakness in artillery equipment.’ Becker reported that the increased accuracy of the rifled gun had made the rocket obsolescent, but that a Swede, Lt Col. Unge, had patented an ‘air torpedo’, which had been tested by Rheinmetall and the great armament firm of Krupp in 1909–10. This rocket had secured more accuracy by a means of rotation and a primitive sight. It nevertheless had a higher dispersal than a comparable howitzer.8
Becker reported on the status of rocket research in Germany, listing Oberth’s Raketenflugplatz, Ing. Sander (line carrying rockets for sea rescue), Prof. Wiegand (meteorological), Nebel (who had worked with Oberth and who the army did not trust), Tiling (a winged target rocket), Notgemeinschaft der Deutschen Wissenschaft (stratospheric research up to 24.8 miles.) and Prof. Goddard in America, who had published ‘A Method of Reaching Extreme Altitudes’ in 1919–1920.9
It was decided to pursue rocket research with all vigour, flak (anti-aircraft), smoke and long-range ground to ground rockets being planned. The main object of research was into the propulsion method, looking into black powder (used by Sander and Unge), other solids, then gases and liquids. The stability of the rocket would also form a major investigation, with ‘firework’ rods, wings and ailerons, rotation, wireless control and gyroscopes all being considered. A civilian research into fuels and jets had been instituted, and Siemens (who had devised wartime wire guided rockets to attack British ships) would be approached about controls. The army was also to set up its own research facility at Kummersdorf, near Berlin. A sum of 200,000 reichsmarks was allotted for the first year’s research, in which Lt.Col Karlewski considered ‘revolutionary discoveries may one day be made, [Karlewski also mentioned ultra violet and infra red rays, and remote control], discoveries of the kind for which Germany is longing’ in order to ‘achieve rapid liberation.’ ‘We must keep in touch with rockets, so as to be as far ahead of the other powers as possible’, reported Karlewski; ‘the rocket offers great possibilities for area shoot with gas or HE [high explosive].’
Becker commented that the rocket was intended first as a gas weapon. Karlewski asked that the whole question be kept strictly secret, both at home and abroad.10
A follow up meeting of the Heereswaffenamt (the Army Ordnance Directorate) on January 30th 1932 heard that Unge’s son had made such ‘vast’ financial demands that it was decided to proceed with their own black powder rocket. Paul Heylandt’s liquid fuel rocket was described as taking 75 times the weight of propellant as black powder for the same performance, and Heylandt had therefore been commissioned to try to improve its performance. Gyro stabilised, remote control rockets had to be ‘left in abeyance for want of an economical propulsion unit with adequate burning time.’
Nevertheless, the grant was renewed, the enthusiastic Karlewski envisaging hundreds of rockets being launched simultaneously by electricity. Karlewski saw the rocket as ‘a good supplementary [my italics] weapon to air bombardment.’ A good working basis for further development having been established, ‘we must therefore make rocket development our main effort,’ he concluded.
Dornberger hoped to utilise the results of the liquid fuel rocket research already carried out at the Raketenflugplatz, but he was unable to secure any chart or log of performance and consumption. He did, however, secure the services of the most talented members of that organisation and the Heylandt company, Wernher Von Braun, Klaus Riedel and Arthur Rudolph. Liquid fuel development had not advanced a great deal, but on August 1st 1932 Dornberger, the enthusiast for this method of propulsion, was put in charge of research at the new testing ground at Kummersdorf, some 17 miles west of Berlin, assisted by Von Braun, Riedel and Rudolph, with the help of five mechanics. Dornberger’s work on powder rockets continued in Berlin.
But the Weimar republic, which had survived the immediate aftermath of the Great War and which, for all its bitter divisions, was entering the modern world in seemingly growing prosperity, was doomed. The great crash of 1929, and the slide into economic ruin which followed, inflicted mortal wounds. Borrowed American money, on which the growing prosperity had been based, was withdrawn. Extremist, radical parties, which appeared to offer a complete solution to the utter woe of the people, prospered. By 1932 the Nazis, amazingly, were the largest single party in the Reichstag, the German parliament, having cleverly secured the support of Germany’s devastated agriculture, as well as of a fair proportion of industry. The communists also made large gains. The German conservatives, again fearing the extreme left, invited Hitler to the chancellorship, despite the beginnings of a decline in his electoral support, believing him to be a usable ‘solution to the government crisis’.11 It was like a fly seeking the co-operation of the spider to secure its release. Within months they were entangled irrecoverably, and the left consumed.
Now came a change! Giant hatreds and resentments became cold policy. Rearmament for vengeance was begun, although it was a little circumspect at first, since even the antiquated Polish army appeared to threaten a preventive war. But a Polish – German non-aggression treaty quieted the Poles, and as Hitler became more certain that the victorious western powers would not intervene, rearmament became more open, and its pace quickened. There followed ‘the most rigorous rejection of cultural modernism that the century has witnessed.’12
But rocket research continued and expanded. In 1934, following the machtergreifung, the Nazi seizure of power, all rocket research work was conducted by the army itself in the utmost secrecy. All discussion was banned. The Racketenflugplatz and other rocket groups were shut down, and the most brilliant of its members were now employed by the army. The rocket would be an instrument of war, not of Weimar modernism and space travel. Strange paradox, that the weapon which would be most associated with Nazi revenge had its origin in the Weimar modernism which they hated.