On the threshold of the XXI century this foreign policy can be characterized as multidirectional and balanced.
Russia has come to the conclusion that in order to defend national security and to create favorable external environment for domestic reforms it must promote cooperation and partnership on an equal footing with the West, the East and the South. We should not tilt to any side or seek alliances with some foreign governments against others. The natural product of this philosophy is our concept of a multi-polar world. We reject attempts of the United States to turn the entire mankind into its own zone of inяuence, into so-called “Pax Americana”. Instead we propose to combine efforts of all nations to build an international system based on international law, diversity of cultures, democracy and common decisions made through the United Nations and other international organizations. To achieve this goal Russia is prepared to work together with interested parties everywhere.
The above-mentioned foreign policy doctrine of Russia is fully applicable to the Middle East. Due to its vast human and natural resources as well as geography the region has strategic importance for universal peace and world economy. For this reason alone it attracts close attention of Russia. The fact that the Middle East is located in Russia’s neighborhood increases its value in our eyes. Russia has various concrete interests in the Middle East:
First of all, security of our country depends on security of the Middle East. If peace and stability are broken here it may undermine security of Russia, suck us into destructive conяicts, damage our economic interests, disrupt transportation and communication lines utilized by us. We also have to make sure that states, movements and citizens of the Middle East maintain positive attitude towards Russian Federation and don’t take actions, threatening our territorial integrity, sovereignty and internal peace in general.
Second, Russia has political goals in the Middle East. We want to work closely with each and every state of this region in the pursuit of the universal peace and cooperation, solution of global problems and creation of a stable multipolar international system.
Third dimension of Russia’s policy in the Middle East is economic. We intend to actively participate in the excavation of the Caspian oil and its transportation to world markets. We need an access to energy resources of the Persian Gulf and other parts of the Middle East. We want to export technology and goods to the regional countries and at the same time to import their products as well as to receive their investments into Russian economy. As it was mentioned earlier, Russia utilizes transportation and communication lines of the Middle East. Moscow would also like to recover huge debts from such states as Iraq, Syria, Libya. It is enough to mention here that the UN sanctions against Iraq and Libya have brought about a loss to us of at least 20 billion US dollars.
Another aspect of Russia’s interest in the Middle East is cultural. Our Federation has large Moslem population, over 20 mln persons. Moscow’s obligation is to facilitate religious, spiritual and ethnic contacts between peoples of Russia and the Middle East and at the same time to make sure they don’t create negative political consequences.
To realize the above-mentioned interests Russia is keen on tackling the outstanding security threats in the Middle East.
1. The most long-standing and hard to overcome is probably the threat connected with Middle Eastern energy resources. The questions of oil excavation, transportation and marketing have been brewing tensions, conяicts and even wars among states, both regional and outside powers. The same questions have been undermining internal security of local states, their economies, social and ethnic peace.
What can be offered to at least ease struggle for oil and hopefully prevent new collisions? The following measures seem reasonable.
In the Persian Gulf we should strive for normalization of relations among all oil-producing states as well as between them and outside powers interested in oil. Regimes of oil transporting sealines must be strengthened.
In the Caspian subregion we need to work out a new status for the Caspian Sea, which will secure the political control of the area by the littoral states and will simultaneously allow outside capital to participate in oil exploration and excavation. Another requirement is establishment of an umbrella organization of all littoral states, which will coordinate and supervise construction of pipelines from the area to the world market.
Price policy for oil has to be determined by all oil-producing nations through existing (OPEC) and new, even broader mechanisms.
2. The Israeli-Arab conяict is another knot, which has to be untied if we really want to see lasting peace and stability in the Middle East.
Russia has been all along for a fair solution of the conяict. It must include return of occupied lands to Arab nations, creation of the Palestinian state and security guarantees for every participant of the conяict, including Israel.
Russia welcomes negotiating process at all levels and directions and is ready to serve as a peace broker and a venue for negotiations. To help the peace process all parties must be constructive, яexible and impartial.
The United States unfortunately is too much committed to support Israel. This commitment has become so much an integral part of American political culture that no US administration will sway from the pro-Israeli policies in the foreseeable future. Because of such deep-rooted commitment Washington continues to periodically succumb to Tel Aviv’s caprices and demands and to back it unreasonable positions.
There is a hope, however, that the new, more open-minded government of Israel will be forthcoming in the peace process. At the same time it is also important for other parties to make adjustments in their postures, to start accommodation with the opponents. From my personal point of view, this thesis applies, among other sides, to the Islamic Republic of Iran.
3. A separate threat in the Middle East derives from the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and missile capabilities. Russia considers this tendency as extremely dangerous not only to the regional stability and peace, but to itself. If local states possess WMD and medium to long range missiles, they may theoretically use them against Russia. Likewise, their missiles may яy to various targets (let’s say in Europe or America) over our territory and be attacked there by other belligerent parties.
Consequently, Moscow strongly insists on total elimination and prohibition of WMD in the Middle East. We are interested as well in limiting to the lowest level possible missile capabilities of the regional actors.
It would seem reasonable to start working without any further delay on turning the entire Middle East into a zone free of all WMD. It looks like a long-term and difёcult objective but this fact only increases urgency to act.
Simultaneously enforcement of existing anti-WMD measures should be continued in a reasonable and balanced manner. Some moves in this ёeld aggravate the threats of proliferation and conяicts rather than help to soothe them.
For instance, bombings by the USA and England of Iraq in December 1998 in disregard of position of the United Nations did nothing but intensiёed tensions in the Middle East and made local governments want to have own powerful defense capabilities.
It is not helpful as well when Israeli efforts to acquire WMD and missile capabilities are overlooked. As a result Israeli antagonists may feel compelled to seek similar capabilities. Among them are Syria, Libya, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iran and others.
Another inconsistency in the drive against WMD and missiles in the Middle East is growing export of conventional arms to this very region. The United States is the Middle East’s primary supplier, providing half of the regional arms purchases in the 1990s. Other big powers are also active. This export in itself promotes arms race, prompting local governments to constantly seek better,
