all the animals, a beautiful horse or cock or quail and all utensils and land vehicles, and on the sea freight-ships and ships of war; and all instruments in music and in the other arts, and, if you like, customs and laws also—pretty well all these we call beautiful in the same way looking at each of them—how it is formed by nature, how it is wrought, how it has been enacted—the useful we call beautiful, and beautiful in the way in which it is useful, and for the purpose for which it is useful, and at the time when it is useful; [295e] and that which is in all these aspects useless we say is ugly. Now is not this your opinion also, Hippias?
Hippias: It is.
Socrates: Then are we right in saying that the useful rather than everything else is beautiful?
Hippias: We are right, surely, Socrates.
Socrates: Now that which has power to accomplish anything is useful for that for which it has power, but that which is powerless is useless, is it not?
Hippias: Certainly.
Socrates: Power, then, is beautiful, and want of power is disgraceful or ugly.
Hippias: Decidedly. Now other things, Socrates, [296a] testify for us that this is so, but especially political affairs; for in political affairs and in one’s own state to be powerful is the most beautiful of all things, but to be powerless is the most disgraceful of all.
Socrates: Good! Then, for Heaven’s sake, Hippias, is wisdom also for this reason the most beautiful of all things and ignorance the most disgraceful of all things?
Hippias: Well, what do you suppose, Socrates?
Socrates: Just keep quiet, my dear friend; I am so afraid and wondering what in the world we are saying again.
[296b] Hippias: What are you afraid of again, Socrates, since now your discussion has gone ahead most beautifully?
Socrates: I wish that might be the case; but consider this point with me: could a person do what he did not know how and was utterly powerless to do?
Hippias: By no means; for how could he do what he was powerless to do?
Socrates: Then those who commit errors and accomplish and do bad things involuntarily, if they were powerless to do those things, would not do them?
[296c] Hippias: Evidently not.
Socrates: But yet it is by power that those are powerful who are powerful for surely it is not by powerlessness.
Hippias: Certainly not.
Socrates: And all who do, have power to do what they do?
Hippias: Yes.
Socrates: Men do many more bad things than good, from childhood up, and commit many errors involuntarily.
Hippias: That is true.
Socrates: Well, then, this power and these useful things, which are useful for accomplishing something bad—shall we say that they are beautiful, or far from it?
[296d] Hippias: Far from it, in my opinion, Socrates.
Socrates: Then, Hippias, the powerful and the useful are not, as it seems, our beautiful.
Hippias: They are, Socrates, if they are powerful and useful for good.
Socrates: Then that assertion, that the powerful and useful are beautiful without qualification, is gone; but was this, Hippias, what our soul wished to say, that the useful and the powerful for doing something good is the beautiful?
[296e] Hippias: Yes, in my opinion.
Socrates: But surely this is beneficial; or is it not?
Hippias: Certainly.
Socrates: So by this argument the beautiful persons and beautiful customs and all that we mentioned just now are beautiful because they are beneficial.
Hippias: Evidently.
Socrates: Then the beneficial seems to us to be the beautiful, Hippias.
Hippias: Yes, certainly, Socrates.
Socrates: But the beneficial is that which creates good.
Hippias: Yes, it is.
Socrates: But that which creates is nothing else than the cause; am I right?
Hippias: It is so.
Socrates: Then the beautiful is the cause of the good.
[297a] Hippias: Yes, it is.
Socrates: But surely, Hippias, the cause and that of which the cause is the cause are different; for the cause could not well be the cause of the cause. But look at it in this way was not the cause seen to be creating?
Hippias: Yes, certainly.
Socrates: By that which creates, then, only that is created which comes into being, but not that which creates. Is not that true?
Hippias: That is true.
Socrates: The cause, then, is not the cause of the cause, but of that which comes into being through it.
[297b] Hippias: Certainly.
Socrates: If, then, the beautiful is the cause of good, the good would come into being through the beautiful; and this is why we are eager for wisdom and all the other beautiful things, because their offspring, the good, is worthy of eagerness, and, from what we are finding, it looks as if the beautiful were a sort of father of the good.
Hippias: Certainly for what you say is well said, Socrates.
Socrates: Then is this well said, too, that the father is not the son, and the son not father?
[297c] Hippias: To be sure it is well said.
Socrates: And neither is the cause that which comes into being, nor is that which comes into being the cause.
Hippias: True.
Socrates: By Zeus, my good friend, then neither is the beautiful good, nor the good beautiful; or does it seem to you possible, after what has been said?
Hippias: No, by Zeus, it does not appear so to me.
Socrates: Does it please us, and should we be willing to say that the beautiful is not good, and the good not beautiful?
Hippias: No, by Zeus, it does not please me at all.
Socrates: Right, by Zeus, Hippias! [297d] And it pleases me least of all the things we have said.
Hippias: Yes, that is likely.
Socrates: Then there is a good chance that the statement that the beneficial and the useful and the powerful to create something good are beautiful, is not, as it appeared to be, the most beautiful of of statements, but, if that be possible, is even more ridiculous than those first ones in which we thought the maiden was the beautiful, and each of the various other things we spoke of before.
