Discourses on the First Decade of Titus Livius. Niccolò Machiavelli

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XXIX.— Whether a People or a Prince is the more ungrateful.

       CHAPTER XXX.— How Princes and Commonwealths may avoid the vice of. Ingratitude; and how a Captain or Citizen may escape being undone by. it.

       CHAPTER XXXI.— That the Roman Captains were never punished with extreme. severity for Misconduct; and where loss resulted to the Republic merely. through their Ignorance or Want of Judgment, were not punished at all .

       CHAPTER XXXII.— That a Prince or Commonwealth should not delay. conferring Benefits until they are themselves in difficulties.

       CHAPTER XXXIII.— When a Mischief has grown up in, or against a State,. it is safer to temporize with than to meet it with Violence .

       CHAPTER XXXIV.— That the authority of the Dictator did good and not. harm to the Roman Republic: and that it is not those Powers which are. given by the free suffrages of the People, but those which ambitious. Citizens usurp for themselves, that are pernicious to a State.

       CHAPTER XXXV— Why the Creation of the Decemvirate in Rome, although. brought about by the free and open Suffrage of the Citizens, was hurtful. to the Liberties of that Republic

       CHAPTER XXXVI.— That Citizens who have held the higher Offices of a. Commonwealth should not disdain the lower .

       CHAPTER XXXVII.— Of the Mischief bred in Rome by the Agrarian Law: and. how it is a great source of disorder in a Commonwealth to pass a Law. opposed to ancient Usage and with stringent retrospective Effect.

       CHAPTER XXXVIII.— That weak Republics are irresolute and undecided; and. that the course they may take depends more on Necessity than Choice.

       CHAPTER XXXIX.— That often the same Accidents are seen to befall. different Nations.

       CHAPTER XL.— Of the creation of the Decemvirate in Rome, and what. therein is to be noted. Wherein among other Matters is shown how the. same Causes may lead to the Safety or to the Ruin of a Commonwealth.

       CHAPTER XLI.— That it is unwise to pass at a bound from leniency to. severity, or to a haughty bearing from a humble.

       CHAPTER XLII.— How easily Men become corrupted.

       CHAPTER XLIII.— That Men fighting in their own Cause make good and. resolute Soldiers.

       CHAPTER XLIV.— That the Multitude is helpless without a Head: and that. we should not with the same breath threaten and ask leave.

       CHAPTER XLV.— That it is of evil example, especially in the Maker of a. Law, not to observe the Law when made: and that daily to renew acts of. injustice in a City is most hurtful to the Governor.

       CHAPTER XLVI.— That Men climb from one step of Ambition to another,. seeking at first to escape Injury and then to injure others.

       CHAPTER XLVII.— That though Men deceive themselves in Generalities, in. Particulars they judge truly.

       CHAPTER XLVIII.— He who would not have an Office bestowed on some. worthless or wicked Person, should contrive that it be solicited by. one who is utterly worthless and wicked, or else by one who is in the. highest degree noble and good.

       CHAPTER XLIX.— That if Cities which, like Rome, had their beginning. in Freedom, have had difficulty in framing such Laws as would preserve. their Freedom, Cities which at the first have been in Subjection will. find this almost impossible.

       CHAPTER L.— That neither any Council nor any Magistrate should have. power to bring the Government of a City to a stay.

       CHAPTER LI.— What a Prince or Republic does of Necessity, should seem. to be done by Choice .

       CHAPTER LII.— That to check the arrogance of a Citizen who is growing. too powerful in a State, there is no safer Method, or less open to. objection, than to forestall him in those Ways whereby he seeks to. advance himself .

       CHAPTER LIII.— That the People, deceived by a false show of Advantage,. often desire what would be their Ruin; and that large Hopes and brave. Promises easily move them .

       CHAPTER LIV.— Of the boundless Authority which a great Man may use to. restrain an excited Multitude .

       CHAPTER LV.— That Government is easily carried on in a City wherein the. body of the People is not corrupted: and that a Princedom is impossible. where Equality prevails, and a Republic where it does not .

       CHAPTER LVI.— That when great Calamities are about to befall a City or. Country, Signs are seen to presage, and Seers arise who foretell them .

       CHAPTER LVII.— That the People are strong collectively, but. individually weak .

       CHAPTER LVIII.— That a People is wiser and more constant than a Prince

       CHAPTER LIX.— To what Leagues or Alliances we may most trust; whether. those we make with Commonwealths or those we make with Princes .

       CHAPTER

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