a State, it is safer to temporize with it than to meet it with violence
XXXIV. That the authority of the Dictator did good and not harm to the Roman Republic; and that it is, not those powers which are given by the free suffrages of the People, but those which ambitious Citizens usurp for themselves that are pernicious to a State
XXXV. Why the creation of the Decemvirate in Rome, although brought about by the free and open suffrage of the Citizens, was hurtful to the liberties of that Republic
XXXVI. That Citizens who have held the higher offices of a Commonwealth should not disdain the lower
XXXVII. Of the mischief bred in Rome by the Agrarian Law: and how it is a great source of disorder in a Commonwealth to pass a law opposed to ancient usage with stringent retrospective effect
XXXVIII. That weak Republics are irresolute and undecided; and that the course they may take depends more on Necessity than Choice
XXXIX. That often the same accidents are seen to befall different
Nations
XL. Of the creation of the Decemvirate in Rome, and what therein is to be noted. Wherein among other matters it is shown how the same causes may lead to the safety or to the ruin of a Commonwealth
XLI. That it is unwise to pass at a bound from leniency to severity, or to a haughty bearing from a humble
XLII. How easily men become corrupted
XLIII. That men fighting in their own cause make good and resolute
Soldiers
XLIV. That the Multitude is helpless without a head: and that we should not with the same breath threaten and ask leave
XLV. That it is of evil example, especially in the maker of a law, not to observe the law when made: and that daily to renew acts of severity in a City is most hurtful to the Governor
XLVI. That men climb from one step of ambition to another, seeking at first to escape injury, and then to injure others
XLVII. That though men deceive themselves in generalities, in particulars they judge truly
XLVIII. He who would not have an office bestowed on some worthless or wicked person, should contrive that it be solicited by one who is utterly worthless and wicked, or else by one who is in the highest degree noble and good
XLIX. That if Cities which, like Rome, had their beginning in freedom, have had difficulty in framing such laws as would preserve their freedom, Cities which at the first have been in subjection will find this almost impossible
L. That neither any Council nor any Magistrate should have power to bring the Government of a City to a stay
LI. What a Prince or Republic does of necessity, should seem to be done by choice
LII. That to check the arrogance of a Citizen who is growing too powerful in a State, there is no safer method, nor less open to objection, than to forestall him in those ways whereby he seeks to advance himself
LIII. That the People, deceived by a false show of advantage, often desire what would be their ruin; and that large hopes and brave promises easily move them
LIV. Of the boundless authority which a great man may use to restrain an excited Multitude
LV. That the Government is easily carried on in a City wherein the body of the People is not corrupted: and that a Princedom is impossible where equality prevails, and a Republic where it does not
LVI. That when great calamities are about to befall a City or Country, signs are seen to presage, and seers arise who foretell them
LVII. That the People are strong collectively, but individually weak
LVIII. That a People is wiser and more constant than a Prince
LIX. To what Leagues or Alliances we may most trust, whether those we make with Commonwealths or those we make with Princes
LX. That the Consulship and all the other Magistracies in Rome were given without respect to Age
BOOK II.
PREFACE
I. Whether the Empire acquired by the Romans was more due to Valour or to Fortune
II. With what Nations the Romans had to contend, and how stubborn these were in defending their Freedom
III. That Rome became great by destroying the Cities which lay round about her, and by readily admitting Strangers to the rights of Citizenship
IV. That Commonwealths have followed three methods for extending their power
V. That changes in Sects and Tongues, and the happening of Floods and
Pestilences, obliterate the memory of the past
VI. Of the methods followed by the Romans in making War
VII. Of the quantity of land assigned by the Romans to each colonist
VIII. Why certain Nations leave their ancestral seats and overflow the
Countries of others
IX. Of the Causes which commonly give rise to wars between States
X. That contrary to the vulgar opinion, Money is not the sinews of War
XI. That it were unwise to ally yourself with a Prince who has reputation rather than strength
XII. Whether when Invasion is imminent it is better to anticipate or to await it
XIII. That Men rise from humble to high fortunes rather by Fraud than by
Force
XIV. That Men often err in thinking they can subdue Pride by Humility
XV. That weak States are always dubious in their resolves; and that tardy resolves are always hurtful
XVI. That the Soldiers of our days depart widely from the methods of ancient Warfare
XVII. What importance the Armies of the present day should allow to Artillery; and whether the commonly received opinion concerning it be just
XVIII. That the authority of the Romans and the example of ancient warfare should make us hold Foot Soldiers of more account than Horse
XIX. That conquests made by ill governed States and such as follow not the valiant methods of the Romans, lend rather to their ruin than to their aggrandizement
XX. Of the dangers incurred by Princes or Republics who resort to
Auxiliary or Mercenary Arms
XXI. That Capua was the first City to which the Romans sent a Prætor; nor there, until four hundred years after they began to make war
XXII. That in matters
