v. Bull (1798), a case examining whether the Connecticut legislature violated the rights of heirs (Calder and his wife) when it passed a law ordering a new hearing in a probate court. After the new hearing, the probate court ruled in favor of other heirs (Bull and his wife). The Calders argued that the Connecticut legislature’s act of ordering a new hearing in probate court constituted an ex post facto law. An ex post facto law is one that makes conduct a crime even though the conduct was not a crime when it originally occurred. In other words, an ex post facto law criminalizes conduct retroactively.
The U.S. Supreme Court unanimously ruled 4–0 that the Connecticut law was not an ex post facto law because it affected only civil law, not criminal law. Ex post facto laws, according to the justices, referred to laws that retroactively increased punishment for crimes or made certain innocent conduct a crime.
CourtSpeak: Hylton v. United States Tax Case (1796)
Justice Samuel Chase (unanimous ruling): “I think, an annual tax on carriages for the conveyance of persons, may be considered as within the power granted to Congress to lay duties…. It seems to me, that a tax on expence is an indirect tax; and I think, an annual tax on a carriage for the conveyance of persons, is of that kind; because a carriage is a consumeable commodity; and such annual tax on it, is on the expence of the owner.”
Justice William Paterson: “A tax on carriages, if apportioned, would be oppressive and pernicious. How would it work? In some states there are many carriages, and in others but few. Shall the whole sum fall on one or two individuals in a state, who may happen to own and possess carriages? The thing would be absurd, and inequitable.”
Justice James Iredell: “I am clearly of opinion, this is not a direct tax in the sense of the Constitution, and, therefore, that the judgment ought to be affirmed.”
The four justices hearing the case—Samuel Chase, William Paterson, James Iredell, and William Cushing—all wrote separate opinions, though Cushing’s was very short. This conformed with the Court’s existing practice of issuing seriatim opinions, or a series of opinions—each justice issuing his own separate opinion. Chief Justice Oliver Ellsworth and James Wilson did not participate. In the late 1790s, Wilson was beset with financial problems, including being jailed twice for his debts.
In what decision did the Court address direct and indirect taxes?
The Court unanimously ruled 3–0 in Hylton v. United States (1796) that Congress had the power to tax carriages without apportioning the taxes among the various states. Daniel Hylton was cited for not paying taxes on his 125 stipulated carriages. He contended that the tax was unconstitutional because Article II, Section 9, of the U.S. Constitution provides that no direct taxes “shall be laid, unless in Proportion to the Census or Enumeration herein before directed to be taken.” This provision means that direct taxes could not be imposed unless they were apportioned among the states based on population. Interestingly, at the Constitutional Convention of 1787, a delegate had asked for a definition of a direct tax and no one answered. This meant that the definition of a direct tax was unclear. The Supreme Court reasoned that the tax on carriages was an indirect tax not subject to the apportionment requirement. The Court reasoned that if a tax could not easily be apportioned among the states, then it was most likely an indirect tax. Because the Court held that a tax on carriages was not a direct tax, it concluded that the tax could be imposed lawfully.
CourtSpeak: Ware v. Hylton State Law vs. U.S. Treaty Case (1796)
Justice Samuel Chase (unanimous ruling): “It is the declared will of the people of the United States that every treaty made, by the authority of the United States, shall be superior to the Constitution and laws of any individual State; and their will alone is to decide. If a law of a State, contrary to a treaty, is not void, but voidable only by a repeal, or nullification by a State Legislature, this certain consequence follows, that the will of a small part of the United States may controul or defeat the will of the whole. The people of America have been pleased to declare, that all treaties made before the establishment of the National Constitution, or laws of any of the States, contrary to a treaty, shall be disregarded.”
Justice William Paterson: “No act of any state legislature, and no payment made under such act into the public coffers, shall obstruct the creditor in his course of recovery against his debtor. The act itself is a lawful impediment, and therefore is repealed; the payment under the act is also a lawful impediment, and therefore is made void.”
Justice James Wilson: “But even if Virginia had the power to confiscate, the treaty annuls the confiscation. The fourth article is well expressed to meet the very case: it is not confined to debts existing at the time of making the treaty; but is extended to debts heretofore contracted. It is impossible by any glossary, or argument, to make the words more perspicuous, more conclusive, than by a bare recital.”
Justice William Cushing: “A State may make what rules it pleases; and those rules must necessarily have place within itself. But here is a treaty, the supreme law, which overrules all State laws upon the subject, to all intents and purposes; and that makes the difference.”
What did the Court say about the power of the Court to strike down unconstitutional federal law?
Justice Samuel Chase addressed the question of whether the Court could strike down an unconstitutional federal law. He intimated that the Court had the power to strike down such laws but that it would be done very rarely. Referring to Hylton v. United States, Chase explained: “As I do not think the tax on carriages is a direct tax, it is unnecessary, at this time, for me to determine, whether this court, constitutionally possesses the power to declare an act of Congress void, on the ground of its being made contrary to, and in violation of, the Constitution; but if the court have such power, I am free to declare, that I will never exercise it, but in a very clear case.”
In what case did the Court rule that Virginia law had to take a backseat to a treaty?
The U.S. Supreme Court ruled 4–0 in Ware v. Hylton (1796) that a 1777 Virginia law allowing Revolutionary War–era debtors to pay a reduced amount of money to the state treasury rather than paying British creditors was invalid because it conflicted with a treaty signed by the United States with Great Britain in 1783. This so-called Treaty of Paris provided that British creditors should be able to recover the debts that were owed to them before and during the war. The treaty provided: “It is agreed, that creditors on either side, shall meet with no legal impediment to the recovery of the full value in sterling money, of all bona fide debts heretofore contracted.”
U.S. Supreme Court justice William Cushing joined his fellow justices in ruling unanimously that a U.S. treaty takes precedent over a state law. “Here is a treaty, the supreme law, which overrules all State laws,” said Cushing. Hulton Archive/Getty Images.
The Court determined that this treaty trumped the Virginia state law. Justice Samuel Chase explained that “it is the declared duty of the State Judges to determine any Constitution, or laws of any State, contrary to that treaty (or any other) made under the authority of the United States, null and void. National or Federal Judges are bound by duty and oath to the same conduct.”
In Ware v. Hylton and Hylton v. United States, is Hylton the same person?
Yes, Daniel Lawrence Hylton, a prosperous Virginia merchant, is the same person who was a litigant in both famous cases. The U.S. government wanted a test case on the carriage tax law and agreed to
