cannot be drawn around meanings. According to Wittgenstein, we cannot give a single definition of language: there are many different ways in which we use language that are related but do not share one characteristic, so there is therefore no one way to describe them. Here he draws a parallel with the concept “game.” This word can refer to many different games that do not have one common characteristic, even though many games resemble each other and have overlapping similarities; something Wittgenstein describes as having a “family resemblance.” The same applies to the structure of other concepts and to the concept of language itself. This led Wittgenstein to develop the concept of “language games.”
Language as Language Games
Wittgenstein proposes viewing “language” differently, and offers a new way of studying it: instead of defining language, we should find out how it works. This approach is very useful, both in method and in content, for thinking about non-human animal languages and interspecies languages. For empirical and political reasons we cannot yet define what “language” means for all animals; as humans, we do not know enough about non-human animal languages, and it is not up to us alone to decide what counts as language. At the same time, new research forces us to broaden our view of what language is and which species use it. If we follow Wittgenstein’s ideas about language, we see that because of the nature of language, or rather because of how language works, we can never define “language” as such. It is always tied to social practices, and meaning is generated by use. In what follows I will use Wittgenstein’s idea of language as a starting point for understanding how we can conceptualize non-human animal languages as language, finding new ways of studying them, and exploring how non-human animal languages can contribute to how we view language.
Wittgenstein does not give a definition of language games, but he uses this concept to refer to the whole of our natural language as consisting of a collection of language games, as well as for simple examples of language use (PI§7). He also uses it for the most primitive forms of language (PI§7), which are not only available to humans (PI§25). Because of the close connection between meaning and use, Wittgenstein compares language games to tools (PI§11). He emphasizes the importance of gestures and non-linguistic communication in language games (PI§7, see also Wittgenstein 1969). Wittgenstein stresses that language games are open-ended: there is always the possibility of the realization of new language games and there are many language games we do not even recognize as such because the “clothes of our language” (PI, II xi, 224) make everything look the same. To grasp what language is, we should study language games by examining the practices in which they take place.
In language games, different types of act—such as gestures, facial expressions, and so on—play a role. These are often specific to cultures, and therefore learning about cultural habits and rituals is necessary for an understanding of what words mean. In a famous and often misunderstood statement, Wittgenstein writes that if a lion could speak, we would not understand him (PI, II xi, 224). This is often interpreted as a statement about the otherness of non-human animals (Leahy 1994; DeGrazia 1994), but that interpretation is incorrect (see also Hearne [1986] 2007). Wittgenstein rarely discusses actual animals in his work, but he does often use them as metaphors. In this particular quotation, he uses the image of a lion as a metaphor for someone who is from a completely different cultural background. This becomes clear if we read what precedes it:
We also say of some people that they are transparent to us. It is, however, important as regards this observation that one human being can be a complete enigma to another. We learn this when we come into a strange country with entirely strange traditions; and, what is more, even given a mastery of the country’s language. We do not understand the people. (And not because of not knowing what they are saying to themselves.) We cannot find our feet with them.
“I cannot know what is going on in him” is above all a picture. It is the convincing expression of a conviction. It does not give the reasons for the conviction. They are not readily accessible.
If a lion could talk, we could not understand him. (PI, II xi, 224)
Wittgenstein here connects the otherness of others with not knowing their practices, not being able to “find our feet with them.” If all we have is a dictionary, we will not understand humans in a strange country; for understanding, we need knowledge of practices. It is telling that he chooses a lion as the illustration for these remarks. There were few lions in England when he wrote these words, and in the rest of his work he more usually refers to dogs or cats.
Wittgenstein’s views about non-human animals do not reflect close attention to them. They often function as an illustration of a claim about humans, as in the case of the lion above. Another example can be found in this statement about squirrels: “The squirrel does not infer by induction that it is going to need stores next winter as well. And no more do we need a law of induction to justify our actions or our predictions” (1969, §287). Here Wittgenstein does not attempt to understand squirrels or say anything definite about their capacities; he only uses them as an example to say something about humans. Similarly, when he writes that “a dog cannot be a hypocrite, but neither can he be sincere” (PI, Iixi, 229), he does not draw on his experience with actual dogs or aim to shed light on the sincerity of dogs (who can and do deceive humans—see Heberlein et al. 2017 and Gaita 2002 for a discussion4), but simply illustrates a series of thoughts about pretending and imponderable evidence in the case of humans (see LaCroix 2014, 66–67, for a similar argument). This ties in with his method in Philosophical Investigations, in which he often begins with (seemingly) common sense remarks and then responds to them in order to question our ways of thinking, continuously returning to the ways in which we use language. Examples about non-human animals are usually used in building arguments in this manner as an introduction to a question about human language use (LaCroix 2014),5 or as a way of bringing out specifically human attributes.
Many commentators (see, for example, DeGrazia 1994, 129–30; Diamond 1978; Gaita 2002; Lynch 1996) draw on these and other examples to argue that Wittgenstein did not see non-human animals as language-users, something that is often used as a stepping stone in determining the moral implications of his work for thinking about non-human animals (Diamond 1978; Leahy 1994; Pleasants 2006).6 The relevance of his work for thinking about non-human animal languages is underexplored. This is unfortunate, because while Wittgenstein’s remarks about non-human animals merely repeat stereotypical views about them, and while he did not seriously consider non-human animals as language-users,7 his views about human language are valuable for thinking about non-human animal languages and interspecies interactions for several reasons.
In conceptualizing and studying non-human animal languages, we need to pay attention to the practices in which they gain meaning that are similar to the way in which this works in the case of humans; Wittgenstein’s plea to study language games by studying the practices in which they are used is relevant in the case of non-human animal language as well. Secondly, we need to look beyond words and understand language as embodied (chapter 3). Human words play a role in some, but not all, language games, and Wittgenstein emphasizes the importance of gestures and other non-linguistic expressions in creating meaning (PI§7). Here we can think of “greeting,” for example. This can involve saying “hello,” waving, nodding, calling someone’s name, and so on. In his discussion of the aesthetic judgments that he considers to be complex and refined, he points to the importance of gestures (1978). A slight move of the head or a nod might be a better expression of a judgment than a word such as “beautiful.” Gestures, movements, and other non-verbal expressions play an important role in the languages of other animals. Thinking of language as more than words or sounds is crucial to thinking about animals and language, because humans and other animals have so many different relationships and encounters and because non-human animals express themselves in so many different ways. It is also important to note
