words is Silbo Gomero, the whistled language of La Gomera in the Canary Islands, which is based on Spanish and used to communicate over long distances across ravines and through valleys. Other examples include the drum languages of Nigeria and Ghana, which are also used to communicate messages over long distances, and in which drum patterns follow spoken language, including the use of grammar.
Wittgenstein’s ideas about how language games are related—by means of a family resemblance—can shed light on similarities and relations in human-animal languages without presenting an a priori fixed truth about meaning. His emphasis on the strong relationship between meaning and use, and on the situated character of language—remember: we need to study language games by studying the practices in which they take place—are also relevant in thinking about non-human animals and language. Meaning is strongly interconnected with use for many non-human animals, as we will see in the following sections, and for humans the context in which other animals use language is very important in learning their meaning. Finally, instead of locating meaning in the relation between mind and world, Wittgenstein views language as essentially a public practice. He argues that meaning originates from the relation between language and world. Meaning is not a prefabricated entity that we can give or withhold from others, nor is it a property of words or minds; it is essentially social and tied to interactions between living beings. While, as we have seen, Wittgenstein focuses on human language—even though he writes that simple language games are also found in other animal species—this also applies to non-human animals and our interactions with them.
Thinking about language as language games in which human, non-human, and interspecies interactions can play a role allows us to get a better grasp on non-human and non-human/human linguistic practices without determining what language is for other animals. This can help us to study non-human animal language use. Non-human animals are co-creators of meaning in many different practices, and bringing this to light can help us to broaden our view of what language can entail. Similarities to humans can help humans to better understand other animals; differences require us to reformulate our own fixed ideas about language and meaning. In order to further explore this, I now turn to a discussion of different language games in relation to new ethological research, beginning with mimicry.
Parrots and Mimicry
Experiments in which non-human animals are taught to speak in human language can be seen as a specific set of language games. In the examples discussed above, human language is viewed as the only true language, which obscures forms of language use in non-human animals, but we can also find language games that involve using human language as a tool for interspecies communication in animal language research. A good example is to be found in psychologist Irene Pepperberg’s (1995) parrot language research. Parrots use human words. It was long thought that their use of language was restricted to simply repeating words without understanding their meaning; humans even use the word “parroting” to describe the mindless repetition of words. These views fail to do justice to parrot cognition and learning mechanisms, and obscure their capacity for understanding. Ethologist Konrad Lorenz (1949) had already described how parrots can learn to use words or phrases on the right occasion—for example, only saying “good morning” in the morning—and how they can teach themselves words, which is something that is usually connected to strong sensory impressions. In 1978, Pepperberg began the first serious experiment to investigate the linguistic capabilities of parrots. She soon found that for parrots, learning a language is strongly connected to acting. Parrots see words as tools, and their meaning is strongly connected with their use. Pepperberg made use of this in her work with her research partner Alex, an African grey parrot, by letting him choose his rewards. By using words, Alex gained more control over his environment. He could determine what kind of sweets he received as a reward, and could express when he wanted a break or to go outside. Using this method, Alex learned to use over 150 words and could recognize 50 objects. He understood questions about these objects and answered them appropriately. He also learned to recognize the colors, forms, materials, and functions of objects. He knew, for example, what a key was, and could also recognize new keys with different shapes and colors. Alex understood and used concepts such as “same,” “different,” “yes,” “no,” and “come here.” He would sometimes deliberately give the wrong answer if he thought a question was silly or boring. He could count, understood the number zero, used and understood syntax, and could form new words. Alex once asked Pepperberg what color he was, which is often cited as the only existential question ever asked by a non-human animal. Pepperberg did not claim that Alex spoke English, only that he was able to use English words and concepts and that he showed understanding and intelligence in doing so.
Biologist Joanna Burger (2002) describes a different type of relationship with a parrot. She adopted Tiko, a red-lored parrot, when he was thirty years old. Within a few months Tiko had changed from a hostile and dismissive bird to a loving companion. He saw Burger as his partner, and did not shy away from fighting her husband if he came too near to her during the mating season. Burger did not teach Tiko to speak in human language, and he had not learned it before she adopted him. Even though his use of human words was limited—he used some regular parrot words, like “hello” and “good boy”—they did develop a rich common language, which included the use of words, sounds, songs, eye contact, gestures, and many other expressions. Tiko liked to whistle, and he whistled duets with Burger’s husband, Mike. He instigated duets when Mike played the guitar or when he thought that Mike was angry at him, for example, because he had stolen or broken something. He sometimes spoke gibberish, and expressed his mood with his tone of voice and the intensity of his speech. He liked to speak along loudly when Burger was on the phone.
Alex and Pepperberg, and Tiko and Burger, show how different language games can come into being when humans and parrots interact. Some of these interspecies language games resemble the language games that take place between humans, while others are very different. They can be instigated by the human, or by the parrot; in all of them, animals of both species actively create meaning. Vinciane Despret (2008) describes Pepperberg’s work as “rendering capable,” or enabling the animal to speak. Donna Haraway (Azeredo 2011) rightly argues that this “rendering capable” is mutual. Alex and Pepperberg show that language games are indeed open-ended; that new language games can come into being when individuals of different species interact. While there are, of course, topics that cannot be discussed between animals of different species, there are many subjects which can. Language is limited, even when it is used between humans; there are always things that cannot be said.
One of the language games that Pepperberg and Burger describe is mimicry: imitation of the behavior of others. Wild parrots often use mimicry (Burger 2002). Recordings of two wild African grey parrots demonstrate that they used over two hundred different motifs in one night, of which twenty-three were imitations of other bird species, and one of a bat species. Imitating other animals’ call notes and alarm notes is a tool in manipulating their behavior: it can be used to steal their food, attract them, or scare them away. Mimicry is not just vocal; it can involve using gestures, facial expressions, and so on. In human social psychology, the term “mimicry” is used to describe unconscious imitation of someone else’s movements or posture. Humans often spontaneously mirror each other’s behavior, for example, by smiling, yawning, or crossing their legs. This mirroring often stops abruptly when a human becomes aware of it. Humans who feel connected to someone will imitate that person more often, and mimicry can also excite connectedness: humans who imitate each other more understand each other better, and their emotions become more attuned to one another (Stel and Vonk 2010). Mimicry has a neurological basis in mirror neurons, neurons that light up when an animal performs a movement or sees someone else perform the same movement (Van Baaren et al. 2004). Neuroscientists argue that these neurons—which are also found in other primates, and similar neurological structures are found in birds—help humans to understand the actions and intentions of others and are at the basis of empathy. The human ability to imitate is also said to be the foundation for our form of language use and learning.8
As the examples above show, mimicry also plays
