high-profile efforts in New York City to end police “stop and frisk” procedures used on 700,000 primarily African American and Latino men each year show that activists can reshape the debate on crime through proactive strategies. And when you see 47 percent of California voters vote to end the death penalty in the same November 2012 election—after support for such a policy was long considered politically essential for statewide candidates—using proactive strategies to roll back decades of crime-dominated politics is an opportunity to be seized.
2
Elected Officials
Inspiring Fear and Loathing
Ernesto Cortes, Jr., organizer of the Industrial Areas Foundation network in Texas and the San Antonio–based Communities Organized for Public Service (COPS), has plainly described activists’ necessary relationship to elected Officials: “It’s unfortunate that fear is the only way to get some politicians to respect your power. They refuse to give you respect. They don’t recognize your dignity. So we have to act in ways to get their attention. In some areas, what we have going is the amount of fear we can generate. We got where we are because people fear and loathe us.”1
This assessment by one of the United States’ premier community activists and tacticians is harsh but accurate. Today’s activists all too often work tirelessly to elect “progressive” politicians who then require strong prodding before trying to implement their progressive campaign goals. Without such pressure, self-identified progressive elected Officials frequently prefer to “broaden their base” rather than deliver for those responsible for their election.
The backgrounds typical of “progressive” officeholders explain much of the problem. Their career path no longer begins with years of grassroots activism; instead, one becomes an aide to a legislator, a job that provides access to funders and puts the aspirant in the position to be tapped for electoral openings. Today’s “progressive” Official rarely achieves power through a grassroots or democratic nominating process, and views politics as a career vehicle rather than a means for redressing social and economic injustice. He or she is not ideologically driven, takes pride in “pragmatic” problem solving, values personal loyalty over ideological consistency, and views social change activists as threatening because they place their constituency’s interests ahead of the official’s political needs.
When candidates from a neighborhood or other grassroots base do get elected, they often soon become like other politicians. Their drive for reelection or to attain higher office leads them to make new or stronger connections with a whole range of financial interests. After all, even grassroots field campaigns cost money, and progressive candidates require significant funding if they are to prevail in all but the smallest local races. The ever-growing power of money in politics has led most politicians to put their funders’ interests above those of their volunteer base. Raising money nationally through small online donations has helped restore some of the connection between politicians and their funders, but statewide or national races still require large donors. Even before Citizens United opened the floodgates to corporate donations, the best-intentioned, most progressive candidates still had to seek out potential funders who were more conservative than the candidate’s core supporters.
Once in office, grassroots politicians are contacted by representatives of financial interests who opposed their candidacy. These representatives soon ingratiate themselves by offering to help retire the inevitable campaign debt. Many local elected Officials receive low salaries, making them receptive to offers of the luxurious fund-raising events that are a regular part of political business. Like most other people, elected officials are awed by power and wealth. They don’t go home and report, “I met with some poor people from the Tenderloin, and it was exciting”; rather, they boast, “I met with the president of Wells Fargo!” The trappings of power and the social component of their new status easily excite them. The election-night celebration is often the last opportunity for meaningful personal contact between the candidate and the volunteers who sacrificed their personal lives to walk precincts, staff phone banks, and get out the vote on his or her behalf.
Although some progressive politicians help bring social change, far too many suppress activists’ agendas as effectively as clearly labeled enemies do. This occurs because progressive constituencies feel loyalty toward the politicians they help elect. This loyalty leads progressives to avoid holding politician “allies” accountable for their campaign commitments and to refrain from criticizing them for acts they would strongly oppose if undertaken by conservatives. Concerns over maintaining access, appearing “reasonable,” and fulfilling the personal ambitions of organizational leaders contribute to this pattern of nonaccountability. Progressive constituencies’ failure to demand accountability of the Officials their votes and volunteer labor put into office is a major obstacle to achieving social change. In fact, it might be the biggest obstacle, since it means that progressives do not produce the sweeping results from election victories that conservatives secure from their wins. Activists must understand that people feel betrayed when politicians fail to deliver on their campaign promises to support progressive change, and they respond with cynicism to subsequent social change efforts. Some join the ranks of nonvoters, impairing the election prospects of authentic progressive candidates. Without political accountability, working to elect candidates to office becomes a fool’s errand.
It seems obvious that activists would focus on results rather than promises when it comes to elected Officials. After all, this is how we evaluate performance in our workplaces, investments, and consumer choices. But in my experience, activists often view elected Officials as allies without their having done anything to earn the moniker. Politicians need only agree to take certain positions in the future to earn the support of many progressive organizations. This makes strategic sense for politicians but not for advocates of social change. Given the ease with which they can achieve progressive credentials, politicians have no incentive to actually do anything to serve progressive constituencies. As a result, few Officials feel it politically necessary to wage a major fight against the status quo on behalf of progressive reform. As a former leader of San Antonio’s COPS (Communities Organized for Public Services) puts it, “When politicians deliver, we applaud them. Not until then. . . . Politicians’ work is to do your work. When you’ve got somebody working for you, you don’t bow and scrape.”2
Adopting a “fear and loathing” approach toward elected Officials, particularly self-identified progressives, is essential for achieving social change. Activists must focus on results, not promises; they must pursue their agenda, not the politician’s. The Obama administration’s first term showed that many activists allow great speeches to substitute for concrete actions; only the latter bring progressive change. Political accountability is even more difficult when organizational leaders form close ties with politicians that subtly (or not so subtly) affect how the group deals with constituent issues. Progressive politicians understand the value of forming these relationships. They know that a union leader or progressive activist repeatedly invited to the White House or governor’s mansion is prone to become more protective of the politician that grants such access. Even when an organization wants to hold a supposedly friendly politician accountable, the politician has many tactics to delay, damage, or deny fulfillment of the organization’s agenda. Politicians employ highly paid consultants to develop strategies for achieving their goals; social change activists must employ their own strategies for using politicians to fulfill their agendas.
“WE’RE WITH YOU WHEN YOU’RE WITH US, AND AGAINST YOU WHEN YOU’RE NOT”
After Jerry Brown’s reelection as California governor in 1978, an unusual alliance developed between Brown and antiwar activists Tom Hayden and Jane Fonda. Hayden had formed a statewide citizens’ organization in the mid-1970s called the Campaign for Economic Democracy (CED) and had run a high-profile, though unsuccessful, challenge to California’s incumbent Democratic senator, John Tunney, in the 1976 primary.
When Hayden was challenged over his organization’s apparent alliance
