he supported the group’s stand on issues and oppose him when he opposed its position. While some saw Hayden’s assessment of the ideal relationship between social activist organizations and elected Officials as simply designed to bring CED more power, this ideal is the best model for tactical activists in dealing with elected Officials.
The ideal of supporting candidates only when they support your positions may seem obvious; the difficulty lies in the implementation. Elected Officials value personal loyalty above all else; because tactical activists must place their constituency’s agenda over the politician’s, the potential for conflict always exists. The strains of this tension are most severe when a self-styled neighborhood activist or progressive is elected to office. These Officials, feeling entitled to the unwavering loyalty of neighborhood and progressive organizations, argue that any criticism from the political left lends comfort to their conservative enemies. Adopting a “tough love” stance toward such Officials thus makes many activists feel disloyal or, even worse in the current political world, “unreasonable” or “too idealistic.” Nevertheless, for tactical activists striving to accomplish social change, an independent stance brings both power and respect; to succeed, they must accept the credo that, in regard to elected Officials, it is better to be feared than loved.
Let us recall what Texas organizer Ernesto Cortes, Jr., said: “We got where we are because [politicians] fear and loathe us.” Cortes arrived at this conclusion not after years of battling exclusively with conservatives who refused to deal fairly with his Latino constituency, but rather after dealing with his many political allies. Among COPS’s closest allies was then–San Antonio mayor Henry Cisneros, later Clinton’s secretary of housing and urban development. Rather than revel in Cisneros’s historic victory as the city’s first Latino mayor and then sit meekly by as promises were broken and commitments left unfulfilled, COPS demanded performance. When Cisneros failed to perform, COPS publicly attacked him for ignoring his constituency’s concerns. Unlike far too many progressive groups, Cortes says, COPS does not endeavor to be liked by politicians: “When we start worrying whether or not politicians like us . . . then we’ll be just like everybody else.”3
I wish I could say that Cortes is wrong and that fear need not be used to motivate elected Officials. It would be so much easier if progressive constituencies were treated with the same respect as large financial donors. It would also be great if activists could relate on some basis other than intimidation to politicians they have supported. Cortes’s comments, however, mirror my own experiences with many politicians. Far too many take the low-income constituencies whose votes help elect them for granted. Activists who put their constituencies’ needs ahead of the politician’s agenda must be willing to sacrifice friendship with the Official in order to achieve their goals.
Tactical activists must let Officials know when they are right and when they are wrong. Politicians deserve public credit when they fight hard for fairness and social justice. The favorable publicity they receive will prompt similar conduct in the future. But there is virtually never an excuse for silently allowing a supposed ally to act against your constituency. Particular members of an organization or constituency may have personal reasons not to protest, publicly or privately, a wayward vote, but tactical activism requires that some element of the constituency take such action. Organizations that engage in the necessary strategic and tactical discussions in formulating a proactive agenda will have determined in advance when and how to respond to betrayal by a supposed political friend.
This chapter offers both local and national case studies of political accountability. I begin with my personal experience dealing with San Francisco mayors, and go on to discuss how the lessons that national environmental groups learned about “fear and loathing” early in the Clinton administration helped the movement strengthen the Clean Air Act in his second term and delay and potentially defeat construction of the Keystone XL oil pipeline during the Obama administration. I then describe how immigrant rights’ and gay rights’ groups initially took contrasting approaches toward holding President Obama’s feet to the fire on key campaign commitments. A less experienced immigrant rights movement failed to hold Obama accountable for inaction on comprehensive immigration reform, and was quiet too long as the administration increased the number of deportations. It was not until young DREAM Activists applied a fear-and-loathing approach to the president that progress was made on immigrant rights. In contrast, gay rights activists took a fear-and-loathing approach from the outset toward Obama’s failure to promptly repeal “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” (DADT) and to take legal action against the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA). Their success not only advanced the movement but greatly helped President Obama politically.
FOCUS ON RESULTS, NOT PROMISES
I witnessed firsthand the damaging consequences of going easy on progressive Officials during Art Agnos’s tenure as mayor of San Francisco. Agnos ran for mayor in 1987 as a self-identified progressive. His eagerness to wear this label, coupled with his excellent record as a state legislator, brought him broad support among social change constituencies. Activists saw the race as their big chance to win City Hall after enduring nearly ten years under Dianne Feinstein, a centrist who had failed to identify herself with any of the powerful movements—gay liberation, anti-development/neighborhood preservation, or rent control—sweeping San Francisco during the 1980s. There was a general feeling that the city had undergone great changes but the person in charge hadn’t grown with it. By 1987 the gay community had built its own political organization and wanted a mayor who would support “domestic partners” legislation and appoint more gays and lesbians to city commissions. Anti-development forces, which had won a critical battle to restrict high-rise development through a 1986 ballot measure, wanted a mayor who would appoint a Planning Commission favoring the preservation and development of affordable housing. Rent-control activists particularly felt the need for a new mayor. The key issue on their agenda—the imposition of rent control on vacant units—had twice passed the Board of Supervisors, only to be vetoed by Mayor Feinstein. Rent-control advocates felt it essential to elect a mayor committed to signing a vacancy control law; Agnos’s promise to do just that gave him the nearly unanimous support of tenant groups.
Agnos and his tacticians created a grassroots campaign organization unprecedented in the city’s history. The campaign included more than five hundred precinct leaders, many of them motivated primarily by the candidate’s support for stronger rent control. I was extremely enthusiastic about Agnos; my wife and I spent most of our nonworking time contacting voters for the campaign. My own interest centered on Agnos’s commitment to enact a new homeless policy, his personal interest in improving the Tenderloin, and his support of various measures to preserve and expand low-cost housing. I never had great expectations that Agnos would back strong vacancy control legislation, but I believed political factors would force him to sign whatever measure his tenant supporters passed through the Board of Supervisors.
Agnos was elected with a staggering 70 percent of the vote. Rentcontrol activists should have had no problem quickly cashing in. However, they violated the fundamental rule of dealing with elected Officials: demand results.
Soon after taking office, Agnos met with rent-control activists to discuss a strategy for enacting vacancy control. After establishing a clear tone of friendship, Agnos explained that he had promised real estate industry representatives that he would at least “sit down with them” prior to moving forward with vacancy control. He requested that tenants meet with landlords in his presence to see if a “win-win” compromise on vacancy control could be reached. Agnos emphasized his continued support for rent control but felt he must first attempt to mediate a settlement.
Rent-control activists expressed virtually no protest against Agnos’s plan. A few pointed out that dialogue with landlords on the issue had already been tried and had failed, and others argued against wasting time on such a charade. Nobody asked Agnos why he never expressed a desire to mediate between landlords and tenants during a campaign in which he consistently identified tenants as his allies. Neither did anyone question his sudden concern for a constituency that
