was not a common tourist destination. A short time later, we strolled into the center of the city and recognized a number of blue UN sentry boxes strung out along an ancient wall. The wall, we were told, separated the Turkish Cypriot enclave from the surrounding Greek Cypriot sector of the city. The UN contingent included a small marching band that played at sunset, but it did little to lift the tension we felt. We departed the island several days later and, with a sense of relief, headed back to Tehran.
Eastern Mediterranean region
Cyprus, 1983
2
Killing America’s Children
The Heroin Crisis
Conditions on Cyprus did not cause the next crisis in US-Turkey relations. Rather, it was American concern about the renewed cultivation of the opium poppy that set the two nations on a collision course. For many members of Congress, this threat outweighed all others.
The United States experienced an epidemic of illegal drug use in the late 1960s. Chief among these drugs was heroin, a derivative of opium. This proved to be a serious problem, especially in the poorer areas of major urban centers. One of the worst affected locations was Harlem in New York City, dubbed the “drug-trafficking center of the nation.” Drug sales there, it was reported, constituted the major economic activity. In New York City as a whole, it has been estimated that there were 160,000 heroin users in the early 1970s.
It was widely but erroneously assumed that most of the heroin entering the United States came from the poppy fields of Turkey. Repeatedly, authorities claimed that 80 percent of the American supply originated from that source via the French connection in Marseilles, a major processing center. Despite the lack of official confirmation, this figure appeared prominently in the speeches and warnings of community leaders and politicians. No one seemed to question its accuracy. According to a US diplomat with long experience in Turkey, “every American official … became a walking encyclopedia on the subject and both socially and professionally their Turkish contacts heard about little else.”1
Hollywood bookended this period with two blockbuster films about drugs, displaying Turkey in the worst possible light. The French Connection (1971), winner of the best-picture Oscar, showcased two New York City detectives determined to intercept a large shipment of heroin from Marseilles before it reached the streets. Filmgoers likely suspected that most of the raw material came from Turkey. Midnight Express (1978) detailed the harrowing experience of American Billy Hayes, who was imprisoned in Turkey under horrendous conditions for attempting to smuggle hashish out of the country. During his trial, he makes an impassioned attack on the Turkish people in general. In his review of the film in October 1978, well-known critic Roger Ebert argued that it was hard to feel much pity for Hayes, who took his chances and lost. But then Ebert went on to say, “It is possible, however, to discover the irony in the fact that Turkey, whose economy is richened by an opium poppy crop that supplies much of the world’s heroin, should have such draconian drug laws at home.”2 All this illustrates the difficulty of abandoning long-held (mis)understandings.
The Nixon administration wanted a victory in the war on drugs, and the president’s Ad Hoc Committee on Narcotics focused its attention on Turkey because, of all the opium producers in the world, including Mexico, the Golden Crescent (Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran), and the Golden Triangle (Burma, Laos, and Thailand), it seemed the most susceptible to US pressure. As a member of NATO, Turkey received large amounts of American military equipment and economic aid, and there was much talk in Washington in 1969–1971 of using a carrot-and-stick approach to obtain the desired result: the banning of poppy cultivation. The area in Turkey where the poppies grew was relatively compact and easily accessible, unlike the mountainous and isolated areas of Afghanistan, Pakistan, Southeast Asia, and even neighboring Mexico. In addition, the government in Ankara had better control over its countryside than did any of the other producing nations’ governments. Thus, the campaign continued despite the fact that, at the time, there was no reliable way of identifying the foreign source of American heroin. Nevertheless, committee members claimed publicly that Turkey supplied most of the heroin in the United States, and the media and politicians, including congressmen representing poor urban districts, repeated this statement. The crusade continued through 1970. Washington constantly urged US Ambassador William J. Handley (1969–1973) in Ankara to take a more forceful approach with the civilian government, which continued to resist American efforts to end opium production.3
After the Turkish military took control in March 1971 in the so-called coup by memorandum, Washington found it easier to work out an agreement. The Nixon administration, which would soon establish the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), negotiated with the Turkish generals and worked out a complete ban on cultivation of the opium poppy in return for a $35 million subsidy for Turkish farmers. Urban leaders in the United States applauded. It would be easier, they thought, to restrict foreign supply than to control domestic demand.
The ban lasted three years, or until the Turkish military withdrew from power and called for democratic elections. The new civilian government became subject to increasing pressure, especially from rural areas, to allow poppy cultivation again, which had a long history in Turkey. Peasant farmers found many culinary uses for the plant; especially prized was oil from the seeds, which was used for cooking. They fed their cattle the harvested stalks and other leftovers, making for very contented cows. Opponents of the ban argued that no foreign country should tell Turkish farmers what they could grow. The issue assumed nationalistic overtones.4
By the spring of 1974, rumors abounded that the government of Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit was preparing to rescind the ban, raising concerns in both houses of Congress. Representatives from major cities welcomed the decline in the availability of heroin in their districts since 1971 and warned of dire consequences for America’s urban youth should production be resumed.5 Among these congressmen were Lester Wolff, representing New York’s Sixth Congressional District and chair of the Subcommittee on International Narcotics Control of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, and Charles Rangel, also of New York City, who represented Harlem and served as chair of the Congressional Black Caucus (1974–1976). Rangel and Wolff, both Democrats, undertook a junket to Turkey in March 1974 to familiarize themselves with the local situation and to express their concerns directly to the Turkish government.
On their return, Rangel spoke out about the likelihood of this issue leading to a confrontation between Turkey and the United States, and he criticized the State Department for ignoring rumors rather than seeking to negotiate a better arrangement that would satisfy Turkish demands. Rangel explained that the Turks did not consider the poppy a poison, and the idea of its misuse was foreign to them. For centuries, farmers had grown the poppy as a staple. Thus, if the ban continued, the State Department would have to devise a program to improve the quality of life for Turkish poppy growers. The two congressmen declared their intention to meet with President Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger to discuss this very serious issue.6
The thirteen members of the Congressional Black Caucus, all of whom represented poor, urban districts, supported their colleagues’ complaints, as did other big-city congressmen such as Joseph Addabbo (D-NY) of Queens, Edward Roybal (D-CA) of Los Angeles, and Morgan F. Murphy of Chicago (D-IL). More surprising, perhaps, was the attitude of Otto Passman of Louisiana, the powerful Democratic chair of the House Foreign Aid Appropriations Subcommittee. He recommended taking a hard line with Ankara, reminding the Turks that they owed their independence to US assistance following World War II and threatening to cut off military aid “if Turkey violated its understanding with the United States over poppies.”7
In
