against a possible end to the opium poppy ban. Senators Walter Mondale (D-MN) and William Buckley (R-NY) introduced a concurrent resolution, calling on the administration to enter into immediate negotiations with the Turkish government. If they failed to reach an agreement, the president should terminate all economic assistance to Turkey. At a press conference called by concerned congressmen and senators, Wolff charged that Turkish officials had ties to organized crime, and Rangel noted that their own House resolution to cut off aid to Turkey already had thirty-two cosponsors.8
The US embassy in Ankara quickly recognized the seriousness of the issue. Writing to provide background information for the secretary of state’s upcoming meeting with Turkish foreign minister Turan Gunes, Ambassador William Macomber (1973–1977) counseled, “While we have a range of US-Turkish bilateral problems to deal with here, only one, the Turkish threat to rescind the ban on the growing of opium poppies, is of sufficient potential consequence to require your personal attention in any depth at this time.”9 Three days later, at their meeting in New York City, Kissinger raised the thorny issue, indicating its importance “in terms of American public opinion.” Gunes replied that he was “fully aware of the implications of the opium problem” and firmly suggested that they must find a solution that satisfied both American and Turkish public opinion. As he so often did, Kissinger ended the discussion on a jocular note, observing that he had learned more about opium in recent weeks than he really wanted to know. “I may go into the business myself,” he remarked lightheartedly to the Turkish diplomat. Kissinger proved adept at using humor to relieve tension and increase the sense of collaboration with his opposite number.10
As these talks suggested, there was a good deal of pushback from Turkish officials. Gunes himself was noncommittal in his meeting with Kissinger. “I cannot say categorically,” he stated, “that we are not going to grow opium poppies.” Following this diplomatic double negative, Gunes assured the Americans that his government would exercise “the fullest control possible.”11
Barely three weeks later, Prime Minister Ecevit took a less evasive position, announcing to the Turkish press that “poppy cultivation is a domestic affair of Turkey. Turkey itself decides what to cultivate and what not to cultivate on its territory.” He made much of the fact that his was a democratically elected government and responsible to the people, unlike the military government that had signed the 1971 ban.12
The issue captured the attention of the American press, and major newspapers featured articles and editorials on the subject. A column in the New York Post advocated “bombing of the poppy fields by the United States Air Force.” On a more realistic note, a May 4 New York Times editorial called for a de-escalation of the confrontation between the United States and Turkey, its NATO ally, over this sensitive issue. The editorial suggested a revision of the poppy ban, with the United States providing small-scale industrial projects for families that had abandoned their poppy crops.13
It was too late, however, to apply such measures in the hope of resolving the crisis. On July 1 Prime Minister Ecevit publicly announced the end of the poppy ban. Turkish nationalism had won out over American threats.
Staff at the US embassy thought Ecevit had been moving toward the US position, and Ambassador Macomber expressed his “bitter disappointment.” In a midnight meeting with the prime minister, Macomber used some very undiplomatic language, barely managing to control his anger. He complained that American diplomats had learned of this key development through a public broadcast. He asked Ecevit to reconsider this decision, which would do enormous damage to the US-Turkish security relationship. This decision, he warned, would bring relations to their lowest point since World War II and increase the odds that “US military assistance to Turkey was finished.” Congress, rather than the executive branch, would take action now. In parting, Macomber revealed that his government was considering recalling him to Washington for consultation to show its concern.14
Confronted by the ambassador’s uncharacteristically strong language, Ecevit did not flinch. He stated boldly that “reconsideration was out of the question. He thought US-Turkish relations were deeper than the ambassador suggested. Although the decision was final, his government would be prepared to discuss effective methods of controlling the crop with the United States.” Turkish civilian leaders believed that a basic principle of Turkish independence was at stake, and they would take action regardless of the impact on their relations with the United States.15
In Washington, the legislative campaign to punish Ankara made progress, much to the dismay of the National Security Council (NSC) staff. In the Senate, Mondale hoped to bring to the floor his amendment cutting off aid to Turkey; in the House, hearings on the Wolff resolution, which also called for President Nixon to suspend aid to Turkey, were scheduled before the Committee on Foreign Affairs. The latter took place on July 16, and many of those testifying used the occasion not only to challenge the recent Turkish decision but also to raise broader questions about Turkey and the US-Turkish relationship. The sponsor of the resolution, Congressman Wolff, spoke first. He claimed that there would be “100 to 200 tons of excess production that will find its way into the veins of the kids of this Nation.” He went on to say, “Gentlemen, which is more important, our commitment to Turkey or your commitment to your constituents?”16
When asked why the United States had approved an increase in India’s opium production, committee member Robert Steele (R-CT) explained that India could control its production because of the British origin of its bureaucracy, which made it more efficient and effective than the Turkish bureaucracy, which was a legacy of the Ottoman Empire. He observed that Indian officials were eager to track down even the smallest amount of leakage into the illicit market, whereas Turkish officials just did not seem to care. No one questioned his superficial and misleading analysis, which fit prevailing stereotypes.17
Representative Rangel used the occasion to raise doubts about the entire US-Turkish relationship. He believed that the security benefit the United States derived from its bases in Turkey had been exaggerated. “We are doing them a favor by being there,” he argued. “The strategic value of Turkey to the United States is a myth,” especially when Turkey reciprocates by bringing “human suffering and misery upon the American people.” Rangel and his colleagues accused the Nixon administration of failing to respond adequately to this threat from Turkey. The New York City congressman then reflected on a recent meeting with Brent Scowcroft, Kissinger’s assistant at the NSC. Scowcroft, he remarked, appeared to be completely ignorant of the fact that Ankara was considering lifting the opium ban, even though “it was on the front page of all of our major newspapers.” The hearings allowed for all kinds of criticism, some of it well reasoned, but much of it misguided.18
In light of these developments, the NSC staff urged Kissinger to act immediately to forestall congressional action. Such punitive steps, they believed, would seriously weaken the ability to work with Turkey to prevent heroin smuggling into the United States. Senator Mondale agreed to revise his amendment to the DEA budget bill, calling not for an immediate cutoff of aid to Turkey but rather the suspension of aid after January 1975 unless the president could certify that the Turks had taken effective safeguard measures. This version of the amendment passed the Senate by a lopsided vote of 81 to 8.19
Thus, only days before the Cyprus crisis, key members of Congress were considering punishing the Turks for their unhelpful behavior. The groundwork had already been laid for a strong response. Ecevit’s decision to resume poppy cultivation had antagonized many in Congress, and it seemed likely that his critics would judge Ankara’s future actions with this most recent unpleasant experience clearly in mind.
Although historians have generally considered the opium issue a minor one in US-Turkey relations in the 1970s, one can reasonably argue that without it, the Turkish arms embargo would not have been imposed. A considerable number of legislators were willing to punish Turkey solely for its reckless and defiant policy on cultivation of the opium poppy. It required the twin issues of drugs
