they joined Bijāya, these urban elites showed that they did not favor a regional configuration in principle—only if they were the ones behind it. Such regional politics would have to wait until the late fourteenth century. Once Abū Zakariyā Yaḥyā died, his son Abū al-Baqā’ (r. 1301–9) briefly unified Ifrīqiyā from Bijāya, but his feat was quickly undone in a rebellion led by his own brother, Abū Yaḥyā Abū Bakr, the emir of Qasanṭīna (1310/11).35 Abū Bakr defeated Abū al-Baqā’ and his supporters among the Ṣanhāja and took over Bijāya in 1312, but he stayed there only long enough to appoint the Andalusi Ibn Ghamr ḥājib and then leave the city to him. At this point, Bijāya was nominally ruled from Qasantīna rather than Tunis, but it was functionally as independent as it had been before—a Ḥafṣid emirate under Ibn Ghamr’s rule.36
Here again, the strength of the Bedouins came into play. The ascendance of Andalusis like Ibn Ghamr displeased powerful Bedouins near Bijāya since their power rested on the Ḥafṣid emirs’ military dependence on them. As Ibn Khaldūn put it:
Ya‘qūb b. Khulūf was known as Abū ‘Abd al-Raḥmān, the leader of Ṣanhāja. Ṣanhāja [soldiers constituted] the army of the sultan and were settled near Bijāya. [Ibn Khulūf] had an important position in the government and [obtained] wealth from wars and [from] defending [the city] against its enemies. Both the emir Abū Zakariyā and his son [Abū al-Baqā’] used to leave him in charge of Bijāya when they traveled…. So Ibn Khulūf demanded that the sultan [Abū Yaḥyā Abū Bakr] dismiss Ibn Ghamr.37
Ibn Khulūf and other Bedouin chiefs were crucial to the maintenance of local Ḥafṣid emirates such as that of Bijāya. Deriving strength from their military contribution, they made political demands that the Ḥafṣid emirs had to consider. Although Abū Bakr did not accede to Ibn Khulūf’s demands, Bedouins were clearly not alien to the urban scene and its politics. Unlike those over which the Ḥafṣids had little or no control and, who often raided villages and towns under Ḥafṣid rule, these Bedouins formulated political demands within the boundaries of Ḥafṣid power. They were allies and their support was politically crucial.
Until his death in 1319, Ibn Ghamr was the effective ruler of Bijāya, even if he governed in the name of Ḥafṣid legitimacy. But challenges to his influence did not abate, and many came from Bedouins. Ibn Talīlan, the chief of the Kutāma, and Ḥasan b. Ibrāhīm b. Thābit, chief of the Banū Thābit, both led battles against him. Ibn Ghamr was successful in eliminating his opponents, only to see them run to the ‘Abd al-Wādid ruler of Tilimsān urging him to invade Ifrīqiyā. The ‘Abd al-Wādids’ two campaigns in 1313 and 1315 against Ifrīqiyā penetrated deep, through the lands of the Banū Thābit south of Bijāya and around Qasanṭīna, and even reached Būna. They were incapable, however, of taking any of the important cities and had to retreat to Tilimsān.38
A year before Ibn Ghamr’s death, in 1318, Abū Yaḥyā Abū Bakr became ruler in Tunis and began imposing the unification of Ifrīqiyā. When Ibn Ghamr died in 1319, Abū Bakr appointed the younger of his own sons, Abū Zakariyā Yaḥyā, as governor of Bijāya, and chose a certain Ibn al-Qālūn as his ḥājib.39 Soon after, this ḥājib was replaced by another, also named Ibn Sayyid al-Nās.40 So successful was this Ibn Sayyid al-Nās in ingratiating himself with the Ḥafṣid ruler of Tunis that he was then called on to assume the same post in the capital. Treating the office of ḥājib like his property, before he left for Tunis Ibn Sayyid al-Nās appointed his successor in Bijāya. Although there were others like them, Ibn Ghamr and Ibn Sayyid al-Nās exemplified the powerful ḥājibs who were the effective rulers of Ifrīqiyā’s local emirates.41 The emergence of such individuals, many of whom were Andalusi, was the other side of the multiplication of independent capitals in Ifrīqiyā.
The Emergence of a Regional Elite
There was something deeply unstable about the independent emirate of Bijāya. The high-level officials were mercenaries who were unattached to city or country. They did not have ties to an ancestral home nearby and were not related to the powerful Bedouins that supported the local emirate—although on occasion ḥājibs formed politically motivated marriage alliances with Bedouins. The alliances they built were not long-lasting and, ultimately, their influence was never routinized. The death of a ḥājib or his elimination from the political scene was the chance for new contests and the formation of new coalitions that often rejuvenated old enmities and created new ones. No party or faction had overwhelming political advantage, and this led to a high turnover of officials. High turnover, in turn, not only produced discontinuity in the management of the government’s affairs, it fostered a whole class of functionaries who worked a few years in Bijāya, then in Qasanṭīna, then in Tilimsān or Granada. Instead of having the sons of Bijāya run the independent government of their city, the ḥājibs relied on politically less threatening outsiders. The result was the emergence of a group of administrators, jurists, and tax collectors who could find employment in any city, but who believed Tunis to be the real capital. Even when they belonged to the old families of Bijāya, like the Ghubrīnīs, they attempted to appoint their sons and grandsons to judgeships and other official positions in Tunis.
Conflicts between Ḥafṣid emirs, ḥājibs, members of the urban elite, and Bedouins undermined the autonomy of the Ḥafṣid emirate of Bijāya. The perceived weakness of the ruler of the city undoubtedly encouraged the expansionist aspirations of the ‘Abd al-Wādids, Marīnids, and Catalans who saw in his weakness a political opportunity. But they, too, were unable to do more than pick favorites among the major local players. The possibilities were becoming narrower with every conspiracy that ended in blood, every costly and wasteful siege, and every battle that saw loss of life and treasure. No Ḥafṣid emir in Ifrīqiyā seemed to be able to rally a strong enough coalition to eliminate all the others and bring back a regional emirate. The situation was ripe for a political earthquake, and since it did not come from within, it had to come from outside.
Elite Rule Challenged (1346–64)
Commoners and the Rule of the Elite
In 1346, the aging Abū Bakr (r. 1318–46) learned that his son Abū Zakariyā, who was the emir of Bijāya, had died. He decided to send his other son Abū Ḥafṣ ‘Umar to replace him. When Abū Ḥafṣ arrived in the city, he quickly realized he was not welcome there. Popular opposition to his appointment was fierce and led to the appointment of the people’s favorite instead. Ibn Khaldūn describes the situation as follows:
The scoundrels (awghād) of the court forced Abū Ḥafṣ to use violence.42 The people (al-nās) feared the consequences and consulted one another. Then there were days of great fear in which a great number of [people among the] populace (kāffa) [tried to] force their [will] on the incoming emir. They marched around the Kasbah bearing arms calling for the rule of their [deceased] emir’s son. Then they scaled the [Kasbah’s] walls and assailed [Abū Ḥafṣ ‘Umar’s] house, and captured him. They then proceeded to take him out [of the Kasbah] after they had pillaged all his possessions and took him to the home of the emir Abū ‘Abd Allāh Muḥammad, their [deceased] emir’s son and their lord, who was ready to break from them and join the caliph [Abū Bakr], his grandfather.
His uncle permitted [Abū ‘Abd Allāh to accept their offer] and they pledged allegiance to him in his house. The following day, they took him to his palace in the Kasbah and made him their ruler. He appointed his client Fāriḥ as his ḥājib….43 The sultan became aware of the affairs of Bijāya and he sent them Abū ‘Abd Allāh b. Sulaymān, a most pious sheikh from the Almohads, to placate them. He sent with him a letter investing his grandson Abū ‘Abd Allāh Muḥammad, son of the emir Abū Zakariyā, [with the office] following their desires. [After that] they were relieved and enjoyed
