in 761[1359–6O]…. He appointed his son [Abū ‘Abd Allāh, emir of Bijāya] and the Almohad sheikh Abū Muḥammad ‘Abd al-Wahhāb b. Muḥammad from Akmāzīr as his ḥājib.”56 The Ḥafṣids were back in power in Bijāya, or so it seems, because according to Ibn Khaldūn, who is our only source of information on the subject, “the leader of the men of the ghawghā’ was ‘Alī b. Ṣālih, who was among the [inhabitants] of low quality in Bijāya and their most contemptible. Around him had gathered the evil [ones] and the criminals.57 And with the power he had over them he was able to overpower the dawla.”58 In other words, ‘Alī b. Ṣāliḥ, the thug, was the effective ruler of Bijāya, not Abū Isḥāq or his son.59
When Abū ‘Abd Allāh, the former emir of Bijāya, was “freed” by Abū ‘Inān, he headed to his former capital in the company of Awlād Sibā‘ sheikhs, who jockeyed for position in the new situation. According to Ibn Khaldūn, he attempted to unseat “his uncle” for four years, without much success.60 During the fifth year, he persuaded the much more powerful Dawāwida and the Sadwīkish to help him, and so he entered the city in 1364. He was helped by sedition among the rebels.
When the ghawghā’ were certain that the emir [Abū ‘Abd Allāh] was going to break their hold [on the city], and they became tired of the rule of ‘Alī b. Ṣālih, their leader (‘arīf), they revolted against him and reneged on their oath to him.61 They left his cause and firmly joined the emir Abū ‘Abd Allāh…. Then they brought to him his uncle Abū Isḥāq, and [Abū ‘Abd Allāh] was benevolent with him. [Abū Isḥāq] left [Bijāya] for his capital [Tunis]. Abū ‘Abd Allāh took control of Bijāya, the seat of his emirate, in 765 [1364] from ‘Alī b. Ṣāliḥ and those with him among the leaders of the mob (‘urafā’ al-ghawghā’) who were [responsible] for the rebellion (fitna). He took all their possessions and then accomplished God’s decree by killing them.62
The leader of the ghawghā’ in Bijāya did not claim to rule on behalf of an emir, Ḥafṣid or Marīnid—even if the Ḥafṣid Abū Isḥāq was in Bijāya. ‘Alī b. Sāliḥ does not seem to have pledged allegiance to Abū Isḥāq. At the same time, he did not receive the oath of allegiance from either the city’s notables or the ‘āmma, but only from the ‘urafā’ who supported him. He was primus inter pares of an alliance of men who did not belong to notable families and who took over the reins of power.
The Effects of Elite Jockeying for Power
When in the early 1280s, the tailor Ibn Abī ‘Umāra came to power, he had been backed by powerful Bedouins and urban elites. His usurpation of the Ḥafṣid name would have been impossible without their support. But the ghawghā’ seized a political opportunity afforded by the post-Marīnid invasions and the high level of contentiousness between elite factions. While it is easy to make too much of this episode, it illustrates well the decomposition of the political bloc behind the local emirate. The Marīnid invasions demonstrated that in the largest cities of Ifrīqiyā, elite rule was not the only possibility. The local option could easily lead to the autonomy of cities without the need for the dynasty or its elite supporters. The question was whether anyone else would pursue this option or elite groups would form an alliance strong enough to eliminate it as a possibility. Over the next four decades, the elites would succeed in banding together over Ifrīqiyā.
The Coming of the Regional Emirate (1364–1400s)
Taking Bijāya Back
After four years of rule by the ghawghā’ in Bijāya, Ḥafṣid rule was restored in 1364. The emir Abū ‘Abd Allāh took over the city and employed the son of an influential Tunisan Andalusi family as his ḥājib. A few months later, he replaced him with his infinitely more famous brother, the historian ‘Abd al-Rahmān b. Khaldūn.63 Ibn Khaldūn remembered receiving a very warm welcome when he arrived in Bijāya from Granada, where he had served the Naṣrid Muḥammad V (r. 1354–59; 1362–91).64 But the celebrations did not last long. The political situation in Bijāya was grave and Ibn Khaldūn quickly realized that the odds were not in Abū ‘Abd Allāh’s favor. For his emir to survive politically, he had to gain the support of the Bijāyan notables and defeat the ruler of Qasanṭīna, Abū al-‘Abbās. He did neither. The Bijāyans called on Abū al-‘Abbās to rid them of Abū ‘Abd Allāh and his administration.65 Recognizing his party had no chance of defeating Abū al-‘Abbās, Ibn Khaldūn begged for his life and safety. Abū al-‘Abbās allowed Ibn Khaldūn safe passage but then killed Abū ‘Abd Allāh and took over Bijāya in 1365/6.
Abū al-‘Abbās appointed the son of Abū ‘Abd Allāh as emir over Bijāya and then “advised [the new emir] to turn to Muḥammad b. Abī Mahdī, the leader of the city (za‘īm al-balad), the commander of the navy, and foremost among the wily and manly (ahl al-shaṭāra wa-al-rujūla) among the city’s men and its archers.” Ultimately, “Ibn Abī Mahdī [was] regent and spoliator of [the emir’s] rule (mustabiddan ‘alayhi).”66
Once more, Ibn Khaldūn describes a set of novel political relations but does not elaborate. The commander of the navy, backed by armed young men, was the effective ruler of Bijāya. The restoration of Ḥafṣid rule in Bijāya brought about a weak emir maintained in place by armed men. Shedding some light on the identity of these young men, Ibn Khaldūn comments:
The people of Bijāya started [committing acts of piracy] thirty years prior [to the Franco-Genoese expedition against al-Mahdiya in 1390]. They gathered a faction from among the pirates (ghuzāt al-baḥr), built a navy, and chose the best men for it. These would arrive at the European coasts and islands by surprise and kidnap however many [people] they could and take away however many ships they found, and return with booty, slaves and hostages. [This was so] until the western coastal towns of the [province of] Bijāya were filled with their hostages, who made the country’s roads overflow with the noise of their chains and shackles when they went about doing their business and seeking their release…. This was painful to the European nations … and they [sought] revenge on the Muslims.67
In Ibn Khaldūn’s treatment of the ghawghā’ and the pirates, one notices a clear preference for the latter. The pirates were tied to the Ḥafṣid dynasty since their leader had an official position as commander of the navy. It is reasonable to believe that he wielded a great deal of power because of the importance of his function to the Ḥafṣids, both as the leader of the navy and as provider of revenue. Furthermore, the pirates’ activities were inscribed in the logic of Crusade/counter-Crusade. That alone conferred upon them an ideological veneer not available to the ghawghā’. In the eyes of Ibn Khaldūn, the power that the leader of the navy had over the Ḥafṣid ruler was similar to the preeminence of the various ḥājibs and thus clearly distinct from the actions of the ghawghā’. Pirates were the armed hand of dynastic restoration.
Toward a New Regional Emirate
In 1369, the old ruler of Tunis, Abū Isḥāq, died. The emir of Qasanṭīna and Bijāya, Abū al-‘Abbās, quickly moved on the capital and took it over in 1370. For the first time in several decades, he brought the Ḥafṣid dynasty under a sole ruler. For the following twenty years, he worked tirelessly to consolidate his power and pacify the region. He fought countless battles against rebellious Bedouins, persuaded many others to accept him as ruler, and did the same with urban elites. During his reign, Bijāya lost some of its political significance because both Marīnids and ‘Abd al-Wādids were too weak to help support any independent city. As he rebuilt the sociopolitical foundations of a new Ḥafṣid dominion, Abū al-‘Abbās privileged Qasantīna and Būna at the expense of Bijāya.
Abū
