Whether to Kill. Stephanie Dornschneider
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All these things can be addressed by the propositional contents of beliefs. The following are some examples:
B1 “I believe that a man is shooting the prime minister.”
B2 “I believe that a group of people is planting a bomb in the Ministry of Interior.”
B3 “I believe that a person is beating up a policeman.”
These examples show that beliefs can represent various things belonging to the mentioned types. They also show that belief systems representing certain things of the same type might at first sight appear very different from each other—for example, systems with beliefs about planting a bomb versus systems with beliefs about hitting, or systems about shooting versus systems about throwing stones. This indicates that the typology allows the researcher to generalize these seemingly different things and to identify belief systems about violent and nonviolent activism that are comparable (Chapter 4 is dedicated to this task).
Table 6 gives an overview of the configuration of the types and examples of things that can be generalized into violent and nonviolent activism. It is moreover possible that beliefs address violent and nonviolent activism as types, rather than as things or configuration of types. Type in this sense adds a level of abstraction to the terminology used above (so that things → subtypes [formerly types] → types [political violence, nonviolent activism]) and indicates that it is also immediately possible for humans to abstract from the things they see to identify belief systems about “political violence” and “nonviolent activism.” Some examples of beliefs that address political violence or nonviolent activism as types are
Table 6: Beliefs Representing Violent and Nonviolent Activism
B4 “I believe that there is political violence.”
B5 “I believe that Ahmed engages in nonviolent activism.”
B6 “I believe that some people engage in violent and nonviolent activism.”
Since types are abstractions of things, the beliefs that address violent or nonviolent activism as types are beliefs that address abstract ideas (beliefs of Type 3).16
Belief Contexts Related to Beliefs About Violent and Nonviolent Activism
Belief systems also allow the study of the belief contexts17 connected with the beliefs addressing violent and nonviolent activism.18 The following is an example of a belief chain addressing political violence in a certain context:
B1 I believe that Peter is facing a person in a state uniform.
B2 I believe that Peter is shouting at the person.
B3 I believe that the person is shouting back at Peter.
B4 I believe that Peter is hitting the person in the state uniform.
The belief context is represented by B1, B2, B3, which represent a situation in which a civilian has a quarrel with a state employee. This is recognizable from the following “things” that can be abstracted into types:
1. thing: “Peter” (B1, B2, B3, B4) | type: civilian |
2. thing: “shouting” (B2) and “shouting back” (B3) | type: quarrel |
3. thing: “person in state uniform” (B1) | type: state employee |
This belief context moreover has a particular structure: the belief connections between B1, B2, and B3 are directed. Specifically, B3 can be considered logically prior to B2, because the person’s shouting back at Peter can be considered to indicate that Peter shouted at the person first; and B2 can be considered logically prior to B1, because Peter’s shouting at the person presupposes he is faced with a particular person, as indicated by B1. These belief connections can be expressed as B1 → B2 → B3. B4 indicates something that can be considered to represent political violence. In particular, it addresses the following things that can be abstracted into the configuration of types that can be called political violence:
1. thing: “is hitting” | type: application of physical force |
2. thing: “Peter” | type: civil perpetrator |
3. thing: “the person in state uniform” | type: state target |
With the exception of “is hitting,” B1, B2, and B3 address the same things as B4, which indicates that B1, B2, and B3 can be considered a belief context of B4. At the same time “is hitting” (B4) allows the generalization of “Peter” and “the person in state uniform” into slightly different types: civil perpetrator (rather than “civilian”) and state target (rather than “state employee”). B1, B2, and B3 can moreover be considered directed toward B4. Specifically, B3 describes something that can be considered to encourage Peter to hit the state employee—“shouting back.” This relation between B3 and B4 can be expressed as B3 → B4. Since B3 is in turn the logical consequence of B2, which is in turn the logical consequence of B1, the entire chain can be expressed as B1 → B2 → B3 → B4.
Since these beliefs address things that have a material existence in the external world, belief systems about violent and nonviolent activism may appear to consist of true beliefs, and to be intersubjective. However, it is important to note that the belief contexts of violent and nonviolent activism may not consist of true or intersubjective beliefs, and instead include religious beliefs, moral beliefs, or even incorrect beliefs. For instance, the example above could contain additional beliefs B1* “I believe that a witch told Peter to shout at the person in state uniform,” B1** “I believe that the person in state uniform is afraid,” or B1*** “I believe that the person in the state uniform believes that it is wrong to hit somebody.”
Belief systems about violent and nonviolent activism may therefore not entirely consist of true beliefs or intersubjective beliefs. However, they must include the mentioned true beliefs addressing violent and nonviolent activism. In general, belief systems have an ultimately subjective dimension by being held by particular individuals. On the other hand, what is addressed by them has an ultimately objective dimension if it includes things that have material existence in the world.19
Decisions
In the previous section, I have shown that political violence can be represented by beliefs. In particular, I have explained that political violence can be addressed as beliefs of Type 1 that can be generalized, or, on a more abstract level, as beliefs of Type 3. Throughout the discussion,