rather than intersubjective or purely subjective beliefs, because true beliefs identify factors that can be verified from an external perspective. As I elaborate in Chapters 4 and 5, the major beliefs identified by this study are true beliefs. These show that violent individuals are neither mentally ill nor driven by religious beliefs. More specifically, they show that both violent and nonviolent activism are primarily motivated by state aggression. Whether beliefs are true, intersubjective, or subjective is indicated by what the beliefs address and is called propositional content.5 The form of propositional content is (I believe) that X. For example, the propositional content of my belief that there is a car in front of my house is “that there is a car in front of my house”; the propositional content of my belief that tables can talk is “that tables can talk”; and the propositional content of my belief that lying is wrong is “that lying is wrong.”
Different propositional contents may identify different types of beliefs, and the following paragraphs identify six types of beliefs. Rather than being exhaustive, these types show that beliefs can be used to study various types of factors, such as observations, abstract ideas, social norms, and feelings.
The first type addresses observable things that can be verified in the external world by one’s senses (sight, hearing, taste, smell, touch). Examples of such beliefs are “I believe that dogs have four legs,” “I believe that there is a desk in my office,” or “I believe that fish live in water.” Since these beliefs are verifiable from a perspective external to the subjects holding them, they can be called true beliefs.6
The second type addresses something that logically contradicts an observable thing. Some examples are “I believe that tigers are pink,” “I believe that trees can fly,” or “I believe that the world is flat.” Based on verification in the external world, beliefs that address such propositions can be called false beliefs. Although what is addressed by their propositional contents is false from empirical evidence, people may nevertheless hold such beliefs, for example when they dream, when they deny certain things, or when they hallucinate.
The third type addresses abstract ideas. Abstract in this sense means that what is described by this type of belief cannot be perceived by one’s senses. Some examples are nationality, time, or religion. Nevertheless, abstract ideas may be verifiable in the external world by certain things or words. For example, it is possible to verify my belief that I am Australian by checking my passport; it is possible to verify my belief that I am unpopular by asking people who know me what they think about me; and it is possible to verify my belief that it is the year 2060 by looking at a calendar. Thus, beliefs of this type may be true beliefs or false beliefs.
Nevertheless, some beliefs of this type cannot be verified in the external world. Such beliefs cannot be true beliefs or false beliefs. Examples are beliefs about religion, such as “I believe that Jesus rose from the dead,” or “I believe that Mohammad is the prophet of God.” Nonreligious examples include “I believe that everybody has human dignity,” or “I believe that I am destined to become a lawyer.” Although such beliefs cannot be verified in the external world, it is possible that they are held by several people. Therefore, they may be intersubjective.
The fourth type addresses something that has not been observed but that may be observable in the future. An example is “I believe that aliens exist.” Although these beliefs do not contradict anything that has been observed, they cannot be verified (yet) by observation. They can consequently not be called true beliefs or false beliefs. Nevertheless, they may be intersubjective.
The fifth type addresses emotions. Examples of such beliefs are “I believe he is very angry,” or “I believe that I cannot bear this any longer.” Since they address something that is felt by human beings, these beliefs have a strong subjective dimension. However, like beliefs themselves, feelings may be shared, and different individuals may hold the same feelings about the same things. For example, a lot of people felt fear after 9/11. Beliefs about feelings may therefore be intersubjective. Moreover, they may be verifiable in the external world: “I believe that he is very angry,” for instance, may be verifiable by an observation in which the person addressed by “he” actually shouts out “I am so angry.”7
Table 5: Typology of Beliefs
The sixth type addresses moral norms. Examples of such beliefs are “I believe that it is wrong to kill somebody,” or “I believe that nobody should lie.” Moral norms cannot be perceived with one’s senses, but like feelings they may manifest themselves in observable behavior, for example in telling the truth.8 Because of this, they may be true beliefs. Moreover, they can be intersubjective. Referring to the example above, it is possible that more than one person believes that “it is wrong to kill somebody.”
Table 5 provides an overview. Recall that the main purpose of this typology is not to be exhaustive but to show that beliefs can be used to study different types of factors, and that the most important distinction indicated by this typology is that between true beliefs and all other beliefs. The findings of the following analysis show that the most significant beliefs underlying political violence are true beliefs, rather than intersubjective or purely subjective beliefs. This shows that political violence is a response to things that exist in the world, rather than to religious beliefs, or even false beliefs. It shows that political violence is not cultural or a form of mental illness, and that the reasoning processes connected to it are surprisingly similar to those underlying mainstream political behavior.
Belief Connections
Another major component of cognitive maps are the connections between beliefs, also called inferences. These connections reveal the complex mechanisms by which certain factors, represented as beliefs, motivate humans to engage in certain behavior. In this study, belief connections identify the microlevel mechanisms motivating individuals to take up arms, or to refrain from doing so (see Chapters 4–6).
Belief connections indicate people’s subjective probability that an object has a particular characteristic in relation to the particular characteristic of another object, or in relation to another characteristic of the same object. Belief connections further indicate the logical order of this relation. In the words of Stenning and van Lambalgen: “the psychology of reasoning and logic are in a sense about the same subject” (2008: 3). More specifically, belief connections consist of beliefs that are coherent or directed within certain belief contexts.9
Coherence
Coherent connections address objects whose characteristics are logically consistent. Take the example of B1 “I believe that dogs have wings” and B2 “I believe that dogs can fly.” Both beliefs describe the same object (dogs). Moreover, B1 offers information about what dogs can do with wings (fly), and B2 about how dogs can fly (by using their wings). B1 and B2 can therefore be considered coherent (see Figure 3).
As a contrast, consider the example of B2 “I believe that dogs can fly” and B3 “I believe that dogs cannot fly.” The propositional contents of these beliefs also address the same object (dogs) and may therefore appear to be connected in a similar way. However, B2 and B3 also address particular characteristics of dogs that are contradictory: “can fly” versus “cannot fly.” This contradiction indicates that B2 and B3 cannot be considered coherent (see Figure
