to such a large range of social relations as to make systematic study of it almost unthinkable.”
Second, much of the literature I have discussed relates physical force to civil perpetrators. This confirms the continuing relevance of the original use of the term political violence, which occurred in the 1960s (Gurr 2001) and only later started to include other perpetrators, such as the state, or no perpetrators, as in “structural violence” (Galtung 1990).
In spite of their common focus on civil perpetrators, the literature discussed above deals with these perpetrators from two different angles—groups and individuals. Given my attempt to differentiate individuals who take up arms from those who engage in nonviolent activism instead, this book emphasizes the role of individuals rather than collectives: focusing on groups does not allow a differentiation of the individuals who form, run, or break away from their groups. This does not mean, however, that I think political violence cannot be considered to belong to “the repertoires of collective actions” (della Porta 1995: 2; cf. Tilly 2003). Rather, my focus adds to existing studies by drawing attention to the individuals who are responsible for the exercise of physical force, although groups or larger collectives plan and claim responsibility for it.
Third, as suggested by their common focus on perpetrators, the majority of the works discussed above share a focus on a particular target: the state, defined as a polity that has a government that holds a monopoly of legitimate use of force over a certain territory (Weber 1992). State targets may be people who directly represent the government, such as the head of state, the prime minister, or other ministers. They may also be people who have especially close ties to the government, such as leading businessmen. They may moreover be people who are represented by governments, that is, citizens of the state, or people whose existence is closely connected to that of the government, such as tourists in states where tourism is a major source of income.5 Finally, state targets can be objects owned by the state, such as government buildings and highways. Some examples of political violence involving state targets are the assassination of President Sadat during a military parade in 1981; the murder of German police officer Franz Sippel when he wanted to check the passports of members of the Red Army Faction (1976); the kidnapping and shooting of the chairman of the German Employers’ Organization, Hanns-Martin Schleyer (1977); the kidnapping of the candidate for the mayoral elections in Berlin, Peter Lorenz (1975); or the attack on the building of the Law School in Berlin (1972).
Regardless of its theoretical background, most of the literature is dedicated to physical force applied against civilians living in a state. In spite of extensive criticism related to the term, this is usually referred to as “terrorism.” For the purpose of this study, it is important to emphasize that much of what is called terrorism goes beyond physical force targeting the state (although physical force targeting the state may be called “terrorism”). Quite frequently, for instance, “terrorism” is used to describe physical force targeting particular religious groups. For example, consider the attack on Copts, a religious minority in Egypt, in “The Saints Church” in Alexandria during the Coptic Christmas mass at the beginning of 2011. While the attack has been called “terrorism,” the religious background of the victims (Coptic), the location of the attack (a church), and its timing (during Christmas mass) suggest that the state was not the primary target. Rather, they suggest that this attack is an act of political violence against the Coptic community. This is the case, although one might add that, by exposing the Egyptian state’s inability to prevent the catastrophe, the attack also hurt the state. On the other hand, the massacre of tourists at the Temple of Hatshepsut in 1997, which has also been called terrorism, may be considered an attack against the state: the targeting of tourists is an attack on the Egyptian tourism industry—a major source of state income. Moreover, the perpetrators had a history of targeting state representatives, during which they stated they were indeed targeting the state (Peters 2006).
It might be objected that focusing on political violence against the targets mentioned appears to be somewhat arbitrary and rather narrow. However, the definitions provided in this section establish the basis for a rigorous comparison of violent and nonviolent activism that happens in the same environment—and not for exploring all forms of political violence. Focusing on a wider range of targets (including nonstate targets, for example) would have made it much more difficult to conduct this comparison, even if both violent and nonviolent activism happened in the same environment.
Fourth, physical force is widely considered a means rather than an end, and there is a consensus that the people who exercise physical force do so for a purpose beyond the mere application of physical force.6 Since goals exist prior to the performance of actions, political violence appears to be a planned rather than spontaneous type of behavior.7 Goals also indicate that political violence may involve deliberation, including alternative means—for example, about forcing the repeal of a new law by planting a bomb inside the Ministry of Justice rather than by demonstrating in front of it.
In spite of a more or less general consensus that political violence includes goals, the literature differs on the nature of these goals: cultural-psychological theories assume the goals are based on religious beliefs, and in particular on Islam. Environmental-psychological theories suggest that the goals are based on economic hardship and express people’s desire to improve their living conditions. Focusing on violent groups that absorb individuals who establish contact with them, group theories seem to equate goals with groups, suggesting that the group itself can be a goal. Finally, psychopathological theories imply that goals are subject to the personality of individuals.
This study supports the general consensus that political violence involves certain goals. Since the cognitive mapping approach does not specify particular factors in advance, I do not formulate particular types of goals at this stage. Rather, my construction of data provides insight into the goals related to political violence (see Chapter 4).
Nonviolent Activism and Borderline Behavior
At first sight, the literature discussed above offers little ground to develop a definition of nonviolent activism. This is due to its more general neglect of the absence of political violence8 as well as to the absence of control groups in existing studies of violence. To cope with this difficulty, I draw on the definition of political violence to define nonviolent activism.
Nonviolent activism is a behavior that involves a means that is not physical force. For examples of such activities, Gene Sharp’s famous article on nonviolence (1959) serves as a valuable source.9 In particular, Sharp mentions boycotts, strikes, or noncooperation movements exercised as passive or peaceful resistance in the context of conflicts with the goal of “achieving or thwarting of social, economic, or political change” (53). More specifically, he cites Mohandas Gandhi’s resistance campaign; the Montgomery, Alabama, Negro bus boycott in 1955–1956; the 1952 “Defy Unjust Laws” campaign in South Africa; and the 1942 Norwegian teachers’ resistance to Nazi use of Norwegian schools for indoctrination, which was among the “most important actions in halting Quisling’s plans for instituting the Corporate State in Norway.”
Further drawing on my definition of political violence, I consider nonviolent activism to involve civilian perpetrators and state targets. Such a common focus provides a rigorous basis for comparison—although it limits a wider exploration of violent and nonviolent activism, which may involve noncivil perpetrators and nonstate targets. As mentioned, it is nevertheless much more difficult to compare violent and nonviolent activism conducted by different perpetrators against different targets. It is also important to note that violent and nonviolent activism that involves civil perpetrators and state targets does occur; and that focusing on exactly these activities provides an especially rigorous basis to systematically differentiate between the two.
Following my definition of political violence, I further consider nonviolent activism to involve goals. By definition, violent
