across the Eastern Sahel, while the warming of the Atlantic Ocean and Gulf of Guinea have exacerbated droughts in the Western Sahel. Climate change has dried up lakes and rivers and destroyed crops, herds, fish, and game. It has threatened food production, drinking water, and hydroelectric capabilities. Residents in drought-ravaged areas, in search of fuel, have denuded hills of trees; when rains finally come, they wash away the topsoil. Malnutrition and tropical diseases associated with high temperatures and humidity have grown more severe. The rapidly expanding desert has encroached on arable land. All of these factors have led to human migration on an unprecedented scale.15 Massive population displacements caused by climate change have resulted in competition for increasingly scarce arable land and water, which in turn has generated conflict between farmers and herders and between members of different ethnic groups, clans, and lineages.16 The confluence of these factors has provided fertile ground for extremist ideologies that have harnessed local discontent and mobilized populations with few alternatives for channeling their grievances.
Environmental Destruction and Plunder of Resources by Outsiders
Environmental destruction resulting from climate change has contributed to several of the regional conflicts investigated in this study. Foreign interest in African resources to mitigate the effects of climate change and population growth on other continents may be an important factor in future conflicts. The global food crisis and the search for new sources of fuel have led to substantial African land grabs by emerging economic powers, which are producing food and biofuels in Africa for consumption elsewhere. Former imperial powers that continue to hold land in their old colonies have been joined by China, India, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Singapore, and Malaysia, which have taken over major land assets in Cameroon, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Madagascar, Morocco, the Republic of Congo, Sudan, Tanzania, and elsewhere. Foreign investors, primarily from Singapore and Malaysia, control virtually all of Liberia’s arable land, while 86 percent of Gabon’s arable land is under foreign contract, most of it held by Singapore. African citizens have had little if any say in these arrangements, which include no provisions for African food security or for environmental controls to protect the land, water, and air from pollution. Competition for arable land and clean water, already a factor in contemporary conflicts, is likely to contribute to future conflicts as well.
Environmental destruction as a by-product of foreign ventures is also the source of considerable conflict in Africa. Pollution of land, water, and air by foreign oil and gas companies, deforestation by foreign timber interests, and the destruction of wildlife habitats and toxic waste dumping by other external interests have jeopardized lives and livelihoods across the continent. Pollution by foreign oil companies has destroyed the fishing and agricultural industries of the Niger Delta and led to civil unrest, military crackdowns, and the emergence of criminal gangs that engage in illegal oil tapping, piracy, and kidnapping for ransom as alternative sources of subsistence. Similarly, unauthorized fishing and toxic waste dumping by foreign concerns have devastated the local fishing industry in northeastern Somalia, while climate change–induced droughts have decimated food crops and pastureland. Unemployed men have turned to piracy, first demanding fees from South Korean, Indian, and Taiwanese fishing fleets, then attacking oil tankers and container ships and holding their crews for ransom. Individual ventures have been transformed into sophisticated criminal rackets led by warlords who at times have controlled thousands of gunmen.
Economic growth and technological development outside of Africa have sparked a new scramble for African resources, which has fueled repressive governments, separatist movements, and broader regional conflicts. Corrupt politicians, military personnel, and warlords have contracted with foreign interests to extract and export valuable resources for enormous profits. “Conflict diamonds” were the object of wars in Angola, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and also helped fund those wars. In the DRC, control over coltan, tin, tungsten, gold, and cobalt was also at stake, while the Liberian war was financed by timber as well as diamonds, and cocoa bankrolled the war in Côte d’Ivoire. Competition for Africa’s vast and largely unexploited oil and natural gas reserves is likely to be at the root of future conflicts involving both internal and external interests.
China’s Growing Presence
The expanding role of China on the African continent has been the focus of considerable attention, both in Africa and in the West. The United States and Western Europe have seen their African trade and investments eclipsed by those of the Asian giant. Their leaders have warned that Beijing is exploiting African resources, taking African jobs, supporting African dictators, and demonstrating disregard for human rights, good governance, and sound environmental practices on the continent. African civil society organizations have frequently leveled the same criticisms—although many note the irony in the concerns of former imperial and Cold War powers, which historically have engaged in similar practices. Chinese involvement is primarily economic, rather than political or military, and thus falls outside the scope of this study. However, because Beijing’s practices may be laying the groundwork for future conflicts, a brief description of China’s impact on the continent is warranted.
The People’s Republic of China developed an interest in Africa during the Cold War, when it supported African liberation movements and governments that strove to build socialist societies—as well as others that opposed Beijing’s Cold War rivals. Seeking allies in the global arena, China was motivated principally by politics rather than economics. Its attitude shifted in the mid-1990s, after a massive program of industrialization and economic development transformed the Chinese economy into one of the world’s most powerful. Africa was no longer viewed as an ideological proving ground, but rather as a source of raw materials and a market for Chinese manufactured goods. By the first decade of the twenty-first century, China had surpassed the United States as Africa’s largest trading partner, and it had become the third-largest source of the continent’s direct foreign investment. In exchange for guaranteed access to energy resources, agricultural land, and other strategic materials, China spent billions of dollars on African infrastructure—developing and rehabilitating roads, railroads, dams, bridges, ports, oil pipelines and refineries, power plants, water systems, and telecommunications networks. Chinese concerns also constructed hospitals and schools and invested in clothing and food processing industries, agriculture, fisheries, commercial real estate, retail, and tourism.
Unlike the Western powers and the international financial institutions they dominated, Beijing did not impose political and economic prescriptions as conditions for its loans, investments, aid, and trade. Although it mandated that infrastructure contracts be awarded to Chinese companies and that Chinese supplies be used, the agreements did not require economic restructuring, adherence to democratic principles, respect for human rights, or the implementation of labor and environmental protections. While Beijing’s noninterference policies were often popular in ruling circles, civil society organizations frequently criticized them. African labor, business, civic, and human rights organizations noted that Chinese firms drove African-owned enterprises out of business and often employed Chinese workers rather than providing local populations with jobs. When they hired African labor, Chinese concerns paid poverty-level wages and engaged in practices that endangered worker health and safety. Most importantly, Beijing backed corrupt African elites in exchange for unfettered access to resources and markets, strengthening regimes that stole the people’s patrimony, engaged in domestic repression, and waged wars of aggression against neighboring states. Like the Western-backed autocrats who preceded them, China’s clients are likely to face popular discontent in the future.
Although China’s involvement in Africa is principally economic, the country’s economic clout has been accompanied by growing political and military influence. Beijing’s decades-long policy of noninterference in host country affairs has shifted noticeably in recent years, motivated by its desire to protect Chinese economic interests and citizens living abroad. In the early 2000s, Beijing joined multinational mediation efforts and UN peacekeeping operations for the first time, focusing on countries and regions where it had valuable investments and export markets. In 2006, for instance, China pressed Sudan, an important oil partner, to accept an AU-UN
