foreign intervention in neighboring Zaire/Democratic Republic of Congo from 1994 to 2017.19 In both cases, France exercised its presumed right as the world’s dominant francophone power, intervening unilaterally or pushing the UN Security Council to act. Neighboring states also promoted their own interests, sometimes backing existing governments and at other times supporting rebel movements. UN peacekeeping missions, weakened by conflicts inside the Security Council, were ineffectual and marred by controversy. In Rwanda, France sustained the genocidal regime, while Uganda supported the rebel movement that ousted it. As the genocide unfolded, powerful members of the Security Council terminated a peacekeeping operation and refused to authorize an intervention to halt the killing. When Rwandan refugees streamed into Zaire, that country became a new battleground. Regional powers took sides, with some supporting the ruling regime and others backing rebel proxies. All parties fought over Zaire’s riches, while the UN made futile efforts to reestablish peace. The response to instability/responsibility to protect paradigm applies to both Rwanda and the DRC during the period under consideration. The war on terror did not play a role in international response to the crisis in either country.
West Africa, Part 1: Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Côte d’Ivoire
Chapter 8 explores foreign intervention in the West African countries of Liberia (1990–2003) and Sierra Leone (1991–2002), while chapter 9 considers external involvement in Côte d’Ivoire (2002–11). In each case, war and plunder took an enormous toll after the Cold War. A West African subregional body interceded in all three conflicts, purportedly to reestablish peace and security, but sometimes to further member states’ political and economic interests. Liberia promoted a proxy war in Sierra Leone, and this in turn stimulated intervention by the UN, foreign mercenaries, and the UK, which asserted its prerogative as the former colonial power. France claimed a similar prerogative in Côte d’Ivoire. Neighboring states meanwhile pursued their own interests, either through the subregional body or unilaterally. The AU provided mediators, and the UN sent a peacekeeping mission. In all three cases, the response to instability/responsibility to protect paradigm was paramount; the war on terror was not a factor.
North Africa: Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya
Chapter 10 considers the role of foreign intervention in North Africa from 2011 to 2017. This period encompasses the Arab Spring (2011–13), a series of popular uprisings that challenged authoritarian regimes and transformed the political landscape in North Africa and the Middle East. It also considers the uprisings’ aftermath (2013–17), when old regime remnants and other armed groups vied with prodemocracy forces for control. The chapter gives special consideration to Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya—the three African countries involved in the movement for social and political change. France, the United States, the European Union (EU), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates were the most consequential foreign actors. They intervened first in response to instability and, in the case of Libya, to protect civilian lives. In Libya, regime change was also the goal of several external powers. After the old regimes fell and international terrorist networks joined the fight, the war on terror paradigm was used to justify further foreign involvement.
West Africa, Part 2: Mali, Nigeria, and the Western Sahel
Chapter 11 examines foreign intervention in the Western Sahel states of Mali and Nigeria during the period 2009 to 2017.20 Regime change in Libya provoked an influx of fighters and weapons into the Western Sahel, where they destabilized weak governments. In Mali, these developments bolstered a secessionist movement and stimulated a military coup, an insurgency linked to al-Qaeda, and another round of foreign intervention that had ripple effects across the region. The most significant external actors included the UN, the AU, the EU, a West African subregional body, France, and the United States. In Nigeria, militants who had trained in Mali’s al-Qaeda-linked camps returned home with weapons from Libyan arsenals, which they used to strengthen a growing insurgency in the northeast. The Nigerian conflict spilled into neighboring Niger and Cameroon and attracted fighters from Mali, Mauritania, and Algeria. It also garnered support from the Islamic State and sparked another wave of intervention by foreign governments and institutions. Neighboring states joined forces with the Nigerian military to respond to regional instability, while Western nations, worried by the presence of al-Qaeda and the Islamic State and motivated by the war on terror, provided military training, technical, and financial support.
The United States and Africa
Chapter 12 investigates the evolution of US Africa policy from 1991 through 2017, focusing especially on the Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack Obama administrations. As the dominant world actor after the Cold War, the United States used its political, economic, and military clout to sway international bodies and influence world events. In Africa, the United States supported initiatives that improved health and promoted economic development—prerequisites for social stability. It also strengthened the military capabilities of African states and intervened with force when its perceived interests were deemed threatened. During the 1990s, US actions were most often justified by the response to instability/responsibility to protect paradigm. However, after the September 2001 attacks, the US counterterrorism agenda took increasing precedence. Washington provided money, training, hardware, and equipment to dozens of countries that were considered vulnerable to terrorist activity. It provided air support in conventional military actions and engaged in a growing number of covert military operations. The increasing securitization of US Africa policy shifted attention and resources from health and development to counterterrorism and favored countries that were rich in resources or strategically located over other countries that may have had more pressing needs.
Chapter 13, focusing on 2017, surveys the first year of Donald Trump’s presidency and suggests how his administration’s policies and perspectives are likely to affect Africa. Based on statements made during the presidential campaign and evidence from Trump’s first year in office, the chapter explores continuities and discontinuities with policies of past administrations. It foresees the continued militarization of US Africa policy and a diminished emphasis on public health, economic development, good governance, and human rights. Although the counterterrorism agenda gained precedence in the Bush and Obama administrations, officials in those administrations regarded physical well-being, economic prosperity, and accountable governance as critical components of the counterterrorism toolkit. Trump, in contrast, sees little value in diplomacy and foreign aid. He opposes US support for UN peacekeeping efforts and for postconflict nation building. Although early renditions of Trump’s “America First” foreign policy hinted at a rollback of US intervention, his subsequent actions in Yemen, Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Somalia suggest an intensification of US military involvement in global trouble spots. In Africa, such interventions are likely to be justified by the war on terror paradigm.
THE NEXT CHAPTER advances the book’s agenda in three ways. First, it offers an overview of Africa in the 1990s, when political and economic crises opened the door to a new round of external involvement. Second, it develops more fully the paradigms used to justify foreign invention, providing historical context for the constituent ideas and examining their evolution. Finally, the chapter discusses common misunderstandings about Islam that have influenced the execution of the Western war on terror and that continue to influence government actions.
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The Post–Cold War Context
Shifting Paradigms and Misconceptions
THIS CHAPTER PROVIDES historical context for foreign intervention
