way of knowing just how to decide things.
As Derrida claims, following Socrates, we can only make
decisions over the abyss of indecidability because things are
so complex that we never know the total big picture with certainty.
Because we live in a world about which we are always learning more
we should have the best of intentions but given that the future
might reveal all sorts of things of which we were ignorant.
When Derrida thinks about Levinas’s ethics he appreciates
the infinity of things so much that he is skeptical about totality.
We may think we know a totality but we never really can.
In following the Socratic aporetic ethics Derrida begins
to deconstruct Levinas’s non-skeptical logic of exclusive opposites.
As Derrida develops his aporetic ethics in which deconstruction is
justice he opts for a metaphysics of excess and a logic of mixed opposites.
II,2.3 And Levinas’s Deconstruction of Buber’s I and Thou
Buber’s theory of the I-thou relation is strongly criticized by
Levinas for four reasons: (1) it is reciprocal (2) it is a private
relation between two (3) it is a reality that can change into its opposite
and (4) it makes ethics depend upon theory so it is not first philosophy.
The four characteristics that make the I-thou relation different
from the I-it relation are each critically destructed by Levinas.
Buber’s mutual, exclusive, direct and present I-thou relation
is not at all like the ethical responsibility of Levinas for the
face of the other who teaches me his paradoxical destitute-height
demands of me to give to him and others the bread out of my mouth.
Derrida mentions Buber on page 105 of his essay and shows
how Levinas is opposed to Buber because Buber has his
intimate reciprocity and does not start with any ethical relation.
Derrida is doing a very careful reading of Levinas looking
at him from many angels and helping his readers read Levinas.
Derrida takes up Levinas’ thinking about the face of the other
which calls me before I think and by page 108 he is thinking
the face of God or the face of Yahweh who is never named in
Totality and Infinity and Derrida discusses the face of Yahweh
that is hidden from Moses and quoting Jabes on page 109
Derrida wonders what Levinas would think:
“All faces are His; this is why He has no face.”
Buber’s I-thou always reveals the eternal Thou but
Levinas’ infinite face of the other does not reveal the Face of God.
So are there some insights of Buber that might help us in
questioning Levinas as Derrida seems to be questioning him?
Levinas with his destruction of metaphysics which is like
Heidegger’s leads Derrida’s to a deconstructive reading
instead which comes out of Derrida’s aporetic first ethics which
does not simply treat Buber as right or wrong but lets Buber
by way of Jabes help us with a better reading of Levinas.
II,2.4 And Levinas’ Deconstruction of Husserl’s Phenomenology
As Derrida treats Levinas’ use of Husserl’s phenomenology
he primarily concentrates on three main points: (1) It is
a theory of consciousness which sees all consciousness as being
intentional. (2) It is an attitude of respect for the concrete.
(3) It is a method of description. Husserl’s first philosophy
was to go to the things themselves and to describe them in their
great variety of relationships with the sciences and philosophy.
Husserl saw all consciousness as consciousness of something.
As Levinas used phenomenology to develop his ethics as first
philosophy he saw consciousness not as intending an object
but rather as being intended by a subject whose face is
calling out to me and teaching me of the one who needs my care.
In the Preface to Totality and Infinity Levinas writes on page 27:
This book will present subjectivity
as welcoming the Other, as hospitality;
in it the idea of infinity is consummated.
Hence intentionality, where thought remains
an adequation with the object, does not
define consciousness at is fundamental level.
All knowing qua intentionality
already presupposes the idea of infinity,
which is preeminently non-adequation.
Derrida discusses Levinas’ critique of Husserl and on page 87
of Violence and Metaphysics writes:
In his critique of Husserl,
Levinas retains two Heideggerian themes . . .
Husserl perhaps was wrong to see
in this concrete world,
a world of perceived objects, after all.
As we will now see in looking at Derrida’s treatment of Levinas
on Husserl and Heidegger Derrida will try to be non-violent.
