156) If God had been under an obligation of justice to provide an atonement for sinners it must be on account of his law. For, surely if the law of the holy, just and good, is so far from requiring God to provide an atonement, strict, distributive justice requires the actual punishment due to the violation of the law. Since, therefore, the law is thus holy, just and good, as is evident from the nature of it, and the declarations of God’s word, if an atonement be made for the violation of it, it must proceed not from justice, but the goodness, mercy and grace of God.
There are two rather interesting elements to this answer, chief among which is Gelston’s introduction of the concept of distributive justice. This category often assumes two other (sub)species of divine justice: remunerative justice—having to do with rewards, and retributive justice—having to do with punishment.73 As we have already seen, the penal substitution model of atonement is mostly often directly associated with overcoming the problem of divine retribution. That Gelston speaks here of distributive justice, makes at least some logical room for our thinking that the aspect of remunerative justice must play into the way he conceived of Christ’s work. How it factors in is the question. What is clear from the previous section is that functional role played by Gelston’s affirmation of remunerative justice puts him at an increased distance from penal substitution. The second point of interest here is Gelston’s seemingly intentional link between divine mercy and divine justice. That atonement is made by virtue of God’s mercy rather than by some judicial precedent lends support to idea that God has some notion of substitution in mind. What is substituted? is the question. Is this a substitution of one for particular individuals, as in the case of penal substitution? We might well think so, especially in view of his answer to question 156. Perhaps this is merely a nod to the notion of suitable equivalence. It is not entirely clear.
Without really supplying us with answer, Gelston moves on to question 157, where he asks “Does the appointment of a Mediator prove that God is already reconciled to men?”
(Answer 157) If the appointment of Mediator prove[s] that God is already reconciled to men, then it will prove that he is so without the execution of the office as Mediator. If so, then, there was no necessity of Mediator. But surely a God of infinite goodness and compassion would never require any thing of this kind, unless absolutely necessary. The design of the Mediator is to lay a foundation, so that he may become reconciled to mankind in a consistency with his law and moral government. But to say that reconciliation takes place previous to the undertaking and accomplishment of the Mediator’s work is to place the effect before the cause.
Besides, none are interested in the benefits of the atonement until they are possessed of those qualifications which are made the necessary prerequisites. Nor are any sinners reconciled to God until they are interested in the benefits of this atonement.
Here we see that Gelston has in mind that the design of the atonement is such that it makes restitution between humanity and the divine according to both his moral law and moral governance; something we saw in answer 156. Notice his appeal to the necessity of the atonement. His suggestion that the Mediator “is to lay a foundation” hints at some interesting points. What is this foundation? Whatever it is, it appears that it is something definitive, that is, something from which God is able then to execute his retributive and/or remunerative justice. It also appears that by this work of mediation, God is able to deal in an effective way with both believers and non-believers. Notice, finally, that reconciliation to God, as Gelston sees it, is not something which those prior to Christ’s work enjoyed the true privilege of.
In question 158, Gelston asks whether “Christ redeemed all men alike, elect and non-elect?” To this he responds:
(Answer 158) The atonement of Christ is sufficient for all mankind would day, but accept of it upon the terms proposed. The invitation of the gospel is in universal terms, “whosoever will, let him take the water of life freely.” Revelation 22.17. So far, the elect and non-elect are alike. But the application of this redemption will be made to the elect alone. Nor was it the design of God. From eternity that any but the elect should actually accept of the proposed atonement and enjoyed the happiness of the redeemed. It is the elect who are chosen of God in Christ before the foundation of the world. Ephesians 1.14. It is the elect who are “Justified by his grace freely through the redemption that is in Jesus Christ.” Romans 3.24. It is the elect who are redeemed from the curse of the law. Galatians 3.13. And it is the elect who “seen a new song, saying, Thou art worthy to take the book, and to open the seals thereof: for thou wast slain, and hast redeemed us to God by thy blood.” Revelation 5.9.
Redemption, when used with reference to Christ, seems to mean the application of the benefits and blessings which he has procured to believers in this world, and the actual introduction of them to happiness in the world to come. But this is a happiness which none but the elect experience.
Had the atonement of Christ been designed to be extinguished, the guilds of a certain number of sins, as a man liquidates a debt of a certain fixed and determinant sum of money, he doubtless would have had the sins of the elect in view, and would have extinguished the guilt of these, but this does not appear to have been the object of the atonement. Strictly speaking, the atonement has extinguished. Neither the seems of the elect nor of the non-elect. But it has laid a foundation so that the punishment due to the sins of those who are interested in it, may as completely be removed as if they never had been guilty. Here, then, lies, the distinction: the elect will experience this. But the non-elect, in consequences of their neglect, will not experience it.
Here Gelston seems, rather strangely, to affirm something like hypothetical universalism, which more naturally fits with either Moral Government or Anselmian satisfaction, and echoes Crisp’s notion of doctrinal development. Gelston’s reference to the sufficiency-efficiency distinction of Christ’s work hints in this direction. That said, such thinking also might fit with a version of penal substitution, provided he construe the payment as one for sin, corporately construed, rather than individually construed where Christ pays a debt of punishment for the consequences of sin. It is not entirely clear to this point that this is what he has in view.
In question 171, Gelston asks: “Did Christ suffer and die in the stead as well as for the benefit of his people?” His answer is as follows.
(Answer 171) Christ suffered a punishment which would fully support the honor of the divine law and the dignity of the divine government, though his people be released from the punishment they personally deserve. Indeed, the object of his atonement was that they might thus be released. Still, however, it does not appear that they can demand this release as a debtor might insist upon a discharge when a third person had fully paid the demand of his creditor. Christ, therefore, did not suffer and die in the stead of his people so as to lay God under obligation to accept of the atonement, whether he chose or not. He, however, suffered and died so far in their stead. That day will not actually experience that punishment, which otherwise, they would have experienced. By his sufferings and death. He completely atoned for the sins of his people. They will not, therefore, be required to undergo any farther punishment.
Here Gelston raises the question as to whether Christ suffered in “instead” and as a “benefit” for his people. His answer is interesting, but, once again not entirely clear. In fact, the following may be the most confusing aspect of Gelston’s thinking. “Christ suffered a punishment which would fully support the honor of the divine law and the dignity of the divine government, though his people be released from the punishment they personally deserve.” However, Gelston does not clearly articulate penal substitution. Gelston supports the notion of Christ bearing the penal demands of the law, but this does not necessarily suggest a substitutionary act, even more, a substitutionary act for individuals. In other words, it is not apparent that Christ absorbs the penalty for individuals. Gelston states, “therefore, did not suffer and die in the stead of his people so as to lay God under obligation to accept of the atonement.” He proceeds immediately to say something seemingly contradictory, namely, that “He, however, suffered and died so far in their
