New England Dogmatics. Maltby Geltson
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II.3. A “Thicker” Reading of Edwards Jr on Atonement
Of the variety of theological writings that offer some additionally detailed insight into the development of his father’s legacy regarding the atonement, there are two works in particular that shed some help light on Edwards Jr’s thoughts about the work of Christ. It is here where we shall see that Crisp’s account of Dr. Edwards’ model of atonement is itself “thicker” than Crisp makes it out to be. The first work to shed more light on this matter is his Thoughts on the Atonement, echoes of which appear in a second piece by Edwards Jr, called “Remarks on the Improvements Made in Theology by His Father, President Edwards.” In both cases, the younger Edwards makes several curious statements that point in the direction of his ascent to something along the lines of a penal substitution model of atonement. Let us consider a few such statements from the good Doctor’s works, and then consider their significance to the larger account of his doctrine of atonement, after which we will turn out attention to Gelston. Dr. Edwards writes,
By atonement, I mean something done or suffered, which, to the purpose of supporting the honor and dignity of the divine law and government, shall be equivalent to the punishment of the sinner according to law. Therefore, the atonement made by Christ implies his substitution in the stead of the sinner, who is to be saved by him; or that he suffered that in the sinner’s stead, which as effectually tended to discourage, or prevent transgression, and excite to obedience, as the punishment of the transgressor himself, according to the letter of the law would have done.56
In another place he maintains,
The atonement is the substitute for the punishment threatened in the law; and was designed to answer the same ends of supporting the authority of the law, the dignity of the divine moral government, and the consistency of the divine conduct in legislation and execution. By the atonement it appears that God is determined that his law shall be supported; that it shall not be despised or transgressed with impunity; and that it is an evil and a bitter thing to sin against God. The very idea of an atonement or satisfaction for sin, is something which, to the purposes of supporting the authority of the divine law, the dignity and consistency of the divine government, is equivalent to the punishment of the sinner, according to the literal threatening of the law.57
From these statements, it is clear that the idea of substitution goes hand in hand with the legal/penal aspect of the atonement in the way Edwards Jr thinks about Christ’s work. The question for us is how Dr. Edwards can affirm both something that sounds quite like penal substitution and at the same time, the penal non-substitution model that Crisp labors (convincingly) to illumine. Part of the answer to this question has to do with the way that President Edwards and his son make sense of two aspects of the atonement. First, the nature of owing a debt versus owing a debt of punishment. Second, the direction of sins offense—whether it be an offense directed toward God or his moral law or both. So, before we turn our attention to Gelston’s account of atonement, let us briefly consider these two aspects, as they appear first in President Edwards’ works and then in the works of Edwards Jr.
II.3.1 Debts and Debts of Punishment
Penal substitution invites some of its greatest criticisms from the idea that Christ’s death is equivalent to his absorbing the penalty for the sin of humanity. Or to put it differently, that the work of Christ is a payment of humanity’s debt of punishment. This is quite a subtle and nevertheless critically important distinction from Christ’s work being construed as payment for a debt simpliciter. Not understanding the difference between the nature of a simple debt and a debt of punishment is to miss the substance of penal substitution altogether. And the difference is this: to owe God a debt of punishment is to owe a debt specifically for an offence that requires humanity (the debtor) suffer loss by suffering a punishment equivalent to their offence(s).58 This is the work of Christ on the penal substitution model, namely, to suffer loss by paying humanity’s debt of punishment to God’s retributive justice. To owe God a debt of any other sort is to owe God for something that requires that God (the creditor) not suffer loss. The work of Christ in this light fits more than one model of atonement. And it is in this distinction—between debts and debts of punishment—where the tension in Edwards’ and his son’s account of divine justice and atonement appears. This tension has two parts. The first tension we will see by way of a contrast between what a debt demands and what a debt of punishment demands and we will see the second by understanding the direction, as it were, of sins offence.
First, notice that a debt of punishment requires that transgressors (or more accurately, Christ) suffer loss. In this way, the penal substitution model is surprisingly anthropocentric in terms of its chief goal, in that the problem facing sinners is not a matter of their failed effort to restore anything to God, so much as it is with his exacting a penalty from them (or again, Christ). President Edwards says as much about this sort of judicial demand in several places throughout his work. For example, he argues that,
God declares that those sinners that are not forgiven shall pay the uttermost farthing, and the last mite, and that all the debt [of punishment] shall be exacted of them, etc. Now it seems unreasonable to suppose that God, in case of a surety, and his insisting on an atonement made by him, that he will show mercy by releasing the surety without a full atonement, anymore than that he will release it to the sinner that is punished, by not insisting on the complete punishment.59
In other words, in the same way that the full punitive demands of God’s retributive justice are to be exacted from sinners, Edwards says that they are exacted from Christ and this, because he is their representative and God should require no less from him despite his status as a divine person.60 Notice that Edwards says nothing in this context of what Christ’s work does positively, that is, positively for God. This is because restoring anything to God is not a problem that the penal substitution model endeavors to solve. Interestingly, in another place, Edwards argues that restoring to God the honor that is due him is precisely the work Christ undertook in making atonement, saying,
The sacrifice of Christ is a sweet savor, [first], because as such it was a great honor done to God’s majesty, holiness and law, and a glorious expression and testimony of Christ’s respect to that majesty etc.; that when he loved man and so greatly desired his salvation, he had yet so great respect to that majesty and holiness of God, that he had rather die than that salvation should be any injury or dishonor unto those attributes. And then secondly, it was a sweet savour, as it was a marvellous act of obedience, and so an expression of a wonderful respect to God’s authority. The value of Christ’s sacrifice was infinite, both as a propitiation and as an act of obedience; because he showed an infinite regard to the majesty, holiness, etc. of God, in being at infinite expense from regard to it. (See Nos. 451, 452).61
To make the distinction between owing a debt and a debt of punishment clear, consider the following analogy.
Imagine that you get a call one day from “Easy Eddy,” the notorious Chicago gangster Al Capone’s bookkeeper. Eddy calls to talk to you about some massive unpaid debt that you owe Capone after losing a few hands of poker to Capone a few weeks ago.62 Eddy reminds you that you owe Capone a hundred-grand and that if you don’t pay up soon, the next call you’ll be getting will be a “house call,” from none other than Capone’s