Classical Sociological Theory. Sinisa Malesevic
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Just as a craftworker gives a piece of wood form by making a table according to a plan, or an aim or end, so too does nature work according to a plan or end. Aristotle posits, however, a fundamental difference between the change in artificial objects, which comes from outside the objects themselves, and the change in nature, which comes from within. Nature (phusis) not only is complex and highly efficient, but also works towards an end, that is towards a purpose or telos. For example, an acorn has a natural and constant tendency to become an oak, a lamb to become a sheep, a puppy to become a dog. In each case what is actual – a puppy – will change according to a inherent potentiality – becoming a dog. All things not only move towards ends but also have a purpose that they are designed to serve. A chair has the purpose to allow us to sit, a cup to drink from, a house to provide shelter. By knowing a thing’s purpose, we can understand it in terms of how good or bad it is in terms of its function – a good chair is comfortable, a bad cup leaks, a warm house provides shelter, etc. This allows us to move from description to making judgements or normative explanation about a thing in terms of its excellence in fulfilling the function for which it was designed.
Teleology – the study of the ends or purpose of a thing or entity – plays a central role in all of Aristotle’s thinking, especially as part of his explanation of causality. Everything in the world is explained by four major causes that account for why a thing exists. These are: (1) the material cause, what a thing is made of; (2) the formal cause, the arrangement or shape of a thing; (3) the efficient cause, how a thing is brought into being; and (4) the final cause, the function or purpose of a thing. In the example of constructing a house, the material cause would be the materials needed to build the house, the formal cause would be the plan or design of the house, the efficient cause would be building the house and the final cause would be to provide shelter or a home to live in.
On the basis of classifying according to observed shared characteristics and marked differences, on what makes a thing unique, Aristotle undertakes a complete classification of things from the simplest organisms to complex human beings, including objects and processes in the world – from literature and poetry to the organisation of states. The essential quality or distinctive function that differentiates humans from plants and makes them unique among animals is the fact that they have reason. That is, they are reasoning creatures for whom rationality underpins their actions. This places them at the top of the animal hierarchy.
The Nicomachean Ethics
Aristotle conceives ethics as part of what he calls the ‘practical sciences’ – which also include politics. These are separated from the theoretical and productive sciences in terms of their ends and objects. His aim in the Nicomachean Ethics is not to teach for the sake of knowing, which is the aim of the theoretical sciences, but a practical aim, so that men can lead good, happy, lives. It is to tell people how to act in the world, akin to providing a skill as in artistic production. The methodology and approach used in the practical arts must be also commensurate with the subject matter being dealt with. Here scientific precision and exact knowledge are, for Aristotle, impossible since ‘noble and just actions’ exhibit ‘much variety and fluctuation’ so that one can only ‘speak about things which “are only for the most part true” that is roughly and in outline’ (Aristotle, 2014: 1094b).
It was noted earlier how the principle of self-sufficiency was a central value in Greece. Drawing on his principle of hierarchy, Aristotle argues that the highest good must be wanted for itself, and not as a means to something else; it must be self-sufficient, and lack nothing. Although all actions aim at some purpose or good, some goods or ends are means for seeking higher goods or ends, of which one is the final chief good, ‘that for whose sake of everything else is done’ (Aristotle, 2014: 1097b).
It is, he argues, generally agreed by both ‘the general run of men and people of superior refinement’, including Plato, that the ultimate goal of all our actions is happiness so that people identify ‘living well and faring well with being happy’ (Aristotle, 2014: 1095a19). In Greek the term eudaimonia has a much broader objective connotation than the modern subjective notion of happiness, and can also be translated as flourishing, blessedness, living well (eu zên) or fulfilment, which imply behaving well and faring well in terms of physical, material and psychological well-being. Happiness is the supreme good because it is chosen for its own sake and not for the sake of something else, and all other goods are chosen to achieve it. It is in other words a first principle, for it is for the sake of happiness that we do everything else.
Humans need to fulfil their ‘rational element’ to its maximum ‘since man is born for citizenship, he is a politikon zoon (political animal)’ (Aristotle, 2014: 1097b). Here Aristotle introduces a crucial sociological concept: of humans as fundamentally social and political beings. The terms ‘born for citizenship’ can also be translated as ‘is a political animal’ and the term ‘political’ also encapsulates what in modern societies we would refer to as ‘social’. Humans also possess the capacity for language, which allows them to communicate and reflect on what is just and unjust.
The importance of happiness and virtue does not reside in the state of mind of the individual, but in his or her activity or practice, since virtue in the mind can produce no ‘good result’; it is akin to a man being asleep or inactive. It is only by doing just acts that someone can become just, and temperate acts become temperate. For Aristotle the life of those who lead a virtuous life will also be a pleasant life since pleasure is a state of the soul.
Aristotle, while acknowledging happiness as ‘ a virtuous activity of soul, of a certain kind’ (2014: 1099b), does, however, presuppose the existence of a certain amount of sufficient resources which he refers to as ‘proper equipment’ or ‘external goods’ – instruments for carrying out noble actions. These include material goods and wealth, power and friendship. Moreover, the absence of certain things or qualities diminishes one’s happiness; this includes good birth, goodly children and beauty. Happiness, though it requires a degree of ‘study and care’, also requires an element of chance and good fortune in life.
According to Aristotle, individuals need to act ‘in accordance with correct reason’, more specifically, than they do so by choosing to act in accordance with a mean, rather than incorrect or inappropriate feelings. The ‘mean’ refers to a rule or principle of choosing actions appropriately in different situations based on a criterion that avoids two opposite extremes: one of deficiency and the other of excess. For example, courage constitutes the virtuous mean between cowardice and rashness. This emotionally laden social skill of acting according to the mean, that is the ability to do the right or the appropriate thing in each different circumstance, is generally acquired through habit, upbringing and practice rather than learned through explicit teaching. Having devoted a large part of the book to discussing the importance of moral virtues and the importance of practical wisdom in realising these, Aristotle concludes, perhaps as a result of countervailing political reasons, by arguing that the happiest life is not one centred on an ethical life of practice and activity, as found in democracy, but on a life devoted to contemplation and study (theorie). It is in fact the life of a philosopher.
The Politics
Aristotle begins The Politics by discussing the state as the highest form of association, aiming at the highest of all goods. He offers a hypothetical theory of state formation rooted in nature and teleological explanation, as the final and highest form of association that is self-sufficient. The private counterpart to the public association of citizens – the polis – that aims at securing the good life, is the household – oikos – which meets daily needs, and a collection of which constitutes a village. In the household, the man as master naturally dominates the women as he does the slave and children. This contrasts with the domination in