however, has little positive to say about SADC. He argues that, geographically, it is too large and amorphous ‘for there to be close ties between all its states or even for them to agree on common policies’. Two key members of its most important project, the crafting of a Free Trade Agreement – Angola and the Democratic Republic of Congo – have failed to come on board. But it is not merely its cumbersome size, its inefficiency, and its poor public relations that have rendered SADC ineffective. The larger factor is that collectively it is politically impotent, unable and unwilling to take any of its members to task for flagrant political misbehaviour. Saunders discusses, as a case in point, the failure of SADC to enforce the rulings of its tribunal on land expropriations in Zimbabwe. But it is not the only example. Saunders notes the lack of action by SADC, and bilaterally by the South African government, over Swaziland and correctly describes post-apartheid South Africa’s continued collaboration and cosseting of the deeply corrupt Swazi monarchy as a ‘betrayal’ of principle.
Saunders’s conclusion is that SADC is so diverse and supine a body that South Africa’s regional interests would be better served if it focused its attention on an inner core of southern African states comprising the Sacu members Zimbabwe, Zambia, Angola and Mozambique. He adds that the prospect of a more effective and enlightened regional arrangement has been enhanced by President Zuma’s appointment of Robert Davies as minister of Trade and Industry. Davies has vast experience and knowledge of the region and an enlightened perspective of what needs to be done. On his watch, South Africa is unlikely to pursue policies which put its narrow self-interests first.
South African democracy and its political and economic role in Africa and the world face short- and long-term challenges. Whether an ANC government constrained by internal factionalism and weak leadership can rise to meet the challenge is an open question. While it was once fashionable to be optimistic about post-apartheid South Africa, the reality is that most South Africans are concerned, no longer believing in the inevitability of a happy ever after.
CHAPTER 1
The Tripartite Alliance and its discontents: Contesting the ‘National Democratic Revolution’ in the Zuma era
Devan Pillay
Despite increasingly shrill public spats between alliance partners since the 2009 elections, was John Kane-Berman, head of the South African Institute of Race Relations, correct to suggest that ‘staying in the alliance was the better strategy to push the political centre of gravity of the African National Congress (ANC) further to the left’ (Business Day, 31 January 2011)? Kane-Berman was lamenting the influence of the Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu) over impending labour legislation, but his fears chimed with broader concerns from within the business community regarding future economic policy. Government’s New Growth Path, launched in October 2010, suggests greater state intervention in the economy, and calls for the nationalisation of sectors of the economy are growing within the ANC.
Left critics, by contrast, argue that the alliance, through its National Democratic Revolution (NDR) ideological discourse, fulfils an important legitimating function. It glues together disparate social classes under the hegemony of conservative class interests – a coalition of white and emerging comprador black capital (enmeshed in ever-expanding networks of patronage and corruption), and a professional black middle class that has done rather well out of the post-apartheid dispensation. In other words, the organised working class are being deceived – by their leadership, also implicated in patronage politics – into supporting the ANC against their own class interests, and some believe that the time has come to build a ‘left opposition’ outside the alliance.
The alliance left, however, insist that since Jacob Zuma assumed the leadership of the ANC at the December 2007 Polokwane conference, space has opened for further contestation within the ANC and the government. To leave the alliance and build a left opposition outside it would, on the one hand, abandon that space to predatory right-wing forces and, on the other, relegate the left to the political fringe, no more than what ANC general secretary and SA Communist Party (SACP) chair-person Gwede Mantashe calls a ‘debating society’.1
Alliance supporters also argue that, despite slow progress towards reducing inequality and eradicating poverty, the alliance remains essential to holding the centre together by preserving national coherence through an increasingly tension-ridden but nevertheless persistent ‘nonracial’ discourse, and preventing South Africa from splitting into a dangerously fractious contest over resources. The working class understand that this is in their interests and are influencing their leadership in the unions and SACP, as much as leadership is influencing them.
In other words, despite its class biases and its acknowledged ‘sins of incumbency’, is the ANC Alliance the only hope for setting the country on an inclusive developmental path? Or does there need to be greater political uncertainty, credible electoral challenges from the left (or, for liberal pluralists, from the right as well) to prevent the ruling party from taking citizens for granted? Indeed, are the two mutually exclusive?
This chapter examines the state of the alliance since the 2007 Polokwane national congress of the ANC, but within the context of the movement’s powerful discourse on the national democratic revolution which first emerged in the 1920s. It then considers the various events since the 2007 Polokwane conference that seemingly threaten the stability of the alliance, a recent survey of Cosatu members’ political attitudes and, briefly, an attempt by ousted SACP officials and independent socialists to build an alternative pole of attraction outside the alliance.
THE NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION (NDR)
There has been a long history of alliance-building between the nationalist liberation movement and working-class formations. From 1924, the Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA) theorised that the overthrow of capitalism could not occur through a ‘pure’ class struggle between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. The pivotal 1922 white mineworkers strike disabused them of the hope that white workers could be in the vanguard of the class struggle against capitalism because the white mine-workers were too racist, and saw their salvation in white nationalism and the job colour bar (Simons and Simons, 1983). While class exploitation was the ‘primary’ or ‘fundamental’ contradiction, the ‘dominant’ contradiction in the colonial context was that between the colonised people and the white supremacist state. In other words, colonial oppression provoked an anti-colonial and nationalist consciousness within the majority of the population.
The task of communists was to play a leading role in the black nationalist movement to bring about national democracy in the ‘first stage’ through a multiclass alliance against white rule, and to proceed to socialism in the ‘second stage’, which would be ensured by building working-class power at the point of production through strong industrial unions and in communities (through various kinds of working-class civic formations). The CPSA did not abandon hope of building a nonracial working-class movement, and continued to organise among white workers, but on the whole their activities during the 1930s and 1940s increasingly involved organising black workers and working within the ANC. Communists wanted to ensure that African nationalism would, at worst, not be anti-communist and would, at best, be modernist, be increasingly nonracial, be anti-imperialist, and have a working-class bias. It would not, however, be explicitly socialist, as this would detract from its broad appeal.
This ‘two-stage’ character of the NDR attracted much criticism from those to the left of the CPSA, who felt that it owed too much to Joseph Stalin’s ‘bastardisation’ of revolutionary Marxism-Leninism, unlike the Leninist-Trotskyist notion of ‘permanent revolution’, one ‘uninterrupted’ socialist revolution led by an independent working class party that was not subordinated to nationalism
