president, and the appointment of SACP general secretary Blade Nzimande as Higher Education minister and his deputy Jeremy Cronin as deputy minister of Transport, turbulence within the alliance increased significantly. While government dared not talk about labour market flexibility, it became clear that macroeconomic policy was not going to change, for the ANC was too beholden to the minerals-energy-financial complex and its perceived need to attract foreign investment (Mohamed, 2010).
CONTESTATION FROM WITHIN
Cosatu soon realised that there was more continuity with the past than change (Cosatu, 2010a). Indeed, there were ominous signs of creeping social conservatism under Zuma (Butler, 2010), as well as threats to the liberal constitutional order (which Cosatu, in fighting Zuma’s corner against corruption charges, assisted by casting doubt on the judicial system, and supporting the closure of the anti-corruption unit, the Scorpions (Pillay, 2007)).
Cosatu, in its September 2010 analysis of the post-Polokwane era, identified three phases of its relationship with the ruling party. First, there was the ‘honeymoon’ phase from December 2007 to mid-2009, when two ‘successful’ alliance summits were held; the alliance produced a ‘progressive’ election manifesto; and Cosatu and the SACP were ‘consulted’ on the appointment of the new cabinet and won the new post of Economic Development, to ‘coordinate economic policy’. There were, however, ‘clear signs that the old bureaucracy and leaders of the 96-class project’ continued to hold sway in both the ANC and government (Cosatu, 2010a: 20).
Second, there was the ‘fight back and contestation’ phase from mid-2009 to 2010, when, soon after the national elections which brought Zuma to power, it became clear that conservative class forces were still ascendant in the ANC, particularly around macroeconomic policy, and the ANC rejected calls for the alliance to be the political centre. Third, Cosatu identified the current ‘political paralysis’ phase, in which the ANC allegedly refused to honour all the policy commitments made at Polokwane. For our purposes, the last two phases may be merged into one.
The August–September 2010 public sector strikes stretched tensions considerably. Cosatu embarked on an extended nationwide strike that saw union members hurling insults at the president, questioning his sexual morality and his government’s perceived imperviousness to the pain of public sector workers. The strike followed the equally massive 2007 public sector strike, when Mbeki was still at the helm. The Zuma-led ANC had, in its 2009 election manifesto, promised an expanded public sector and ‘improvements in working conditions and the provision of decent wages for workers’ (Hassen, 2010: 4) but, instead, workers have seen high pay increases and excess among the elite. Rising inequality and the conspicuous consumptions of the old and new elite fuelled workers’ resolve to demand more out of a government that promised much, but only delivered an eroding real wage and high unemployment. Employed workers (particularly black workers) have stretched their wages to clothe and feed an extended family that includes the large army of unemployed and under-employed.
Although the public potentially had much sympathy for the low pay of public sector workers – particularly health professionals and teachers – there was no attempt to build alliances between striking workers and poor communities and, instead, poor communities bore the brunt of the strike action through neglected essential services in hospitals and schools (particularly in townships). Public sector workers often gave the impression that they were only interested in their own narrow wage and working conditions, and cared little about building a broader working-class unity. This was an opportunity lost for Cosatu to re-ignite its social movement unionism, and build broader solidarity. Eventually, after three weeks of bitter industrial action, a settlement was reached, but not all workers were satisfied (Bekker and Van der Walt, 2010; Hassen, 2010; Ceruti, 2011). While Cosatu’s South African Democratic Teachers’ Union (Sadtu) felt that it did not go far enough, the Treasury feared the fiscal consequences of the settlement and the government felt that above-inflation increases should be linked to performance improvements within a public service not known for its efficiency. New rounds of discord between public sector workers and government are pencilled in for the future (Hassen, 2011a).
Cosatu and the ANC were eager to calm things down before the crucial National General Council (NGC) of the ANC in September 2010. By all accounts, the NGC allowed diverse views to be aired, and the ANC came out of it relatively calm and focused (Turok, 2010a). The ANC once again showed skill at orchestrating a wide range of discordant voices into one palatable tune, only for the fragile unity to unravel soon afterwards. Of most concern to the ANC leadership is the issue of nationalisation, supported for different reasons and in different ways by both Cosatu and the ANC Youth League (ANCYL).11 The ANCYL was particularly irked by the manner in which nationalisation was deflected into a two-year research investigation, and has since ensured that the issue remains on the public agenda.
In September 2010, Cosatu published its own redistributive economic policy proposals, which urged greater state intervention in the economy in order to transform its industrial structure within the context of ‘sustainable development’ and regional integration (Cosatu, 2010b). These were meant to influence the final New Growth Path (NGP) eagerly awaited from the new ministry of Economic Development (amid fears that this department was being sidelined in government and preference given to the more conservative Treasury).
When the NGP was finally released in late October 2010, calling inter alia for an incomes pact between business and labour, and greater attention to increasing green jobs, its reception by Cosatu was lukewarm (although the SACP endorsed it as a good starting point, as it emphasised massive job creation and a greater seriousness about implementing an aggressive industrial policy (Cronin, 2011a))
Despite agreements between the ANC Alliance partners not to criticise each other in public, there has been little resolve within the ruling party to take decisive action against powerful dissenters, notably Cosatu’s Zwelinzima Vavi. Indeed, Cosatu has won broad public support for its principled stance against corruption and the rise of a ‘predatory elite’ in the ANC, as well as to threats to the civil liberties protected under the constitution.
Unlike the SACP, Cosatu added its voice to that of the media and groups such as the Freedom of Expression Institute, the Right2Know campaign and SOS: Support Public Broadcasting when government was seen to be tampering with civil liberties: meddling in the affairs of the SABC; proposing a media appeals tribunal; and, most worryingly, proposing a Protection of Information Bill that threatened to restrict access to information deemed critical to the public interest. Ominous voices within the ANC, SACP and ANCYL seemed bent on muzzling the media and preventing ANC politicians from being publicly scrutinised; legitimate concerns raised by community media groups about media concentration and often poor reporting standards were consequently drowned out in a climate of acrimony.
Eventually, after much public criticism, Zuma dismissed Siphiwe Nyanda as Communications minister. His replacement, Roy Padayachie, calmed fears that the SABC was about to lose its status as a public broadcaster, and become a state broadcaster (see Skinner in this volume). Hopes rose that
