product is the same – the creation of conditions ripe for splits and splinter unions.
The fact that the NUM became the victim of widespread member dissatisfaction in the platinum mining sector is perhaps instructive of the range of challenges that have been facing many Cosatu affiliates. In the case of unions such as the NUM, its sheer size and scale has presented it with the challenge of maintaining a balance between worker control and shop-floor democracy on the one hand, and maintaining an effective union administration and level of service to its members on the other. In the face of a high outflow of experienced unionists to the public service, political office and other pursuits, maintaining an effective organisational machinery would clearly be difficult – as it has been in many other institutional and organisational settings in the country.
The first significant change in union organisation highlighted by the 2012 conflicts has therefore been a gradual but systematic weakening of the organisational power vested in the tradition of shop-floor democracy and worker control. This is not to suggest that organisational weakness spans the entire union movement – but the fact that some of the largest and most influential trade unions have suffered setbacks highlights the significance of the problem and the potential for greater instability in union developments in the future.
A second key feature of 2012 that relates to problems of union organisation was the upsurge in independent and often uncoordinated worker action in the mining and agricultural sectors. In the mining sector, the relationship between the action by workers and trade unions was complex. On the one hand, workers engaged in industrial action after communication between the NUM, management and workers broke down (Alexander et al. 2012: 119). On the other hand, worker committees were established on some mines, and although they seemed to be independent it is possible that rival unions such as Amcu played a role in the formation and operation of certain committees. On the mines, independent worker action could therefore be viewed in the context of disillusionment with management, dissatisfaction with the established majority union, and a response to the emergence of a militant, rival union trying to gain a foothold among workers. Dissatisfaction with levels of pay, particularly among rock drill operators, was also a driving factor in the mining unrest from its inception at Anglo American Platinum in January 2012.
The upsurge of worker action in the Western Cape agricultural sector in September 2012, starting in De Doorns and spreading to Ceres, Robertson, Prince Alfred and Somerset West, saw worker action, independently of any union formation in the area, demanding a minimum wage of R150 per day. Within a short space of time, a number of trade unions established a presence among workers in areas such as De Doorns and engaged with government and employers in the talks that followed and that were aimed at reviewing the minimum wage contained in the sectoral determination. As was the case in the platinum mines, the underlying cause of worker action was dissatisfaction with existing levels of pay. Poor working and living conditions were frequently cited as aggravating factors fuelling the strikes and protest action among these workers. As Hartford (2012: 7-8) states: ‘There is no doubt that the gross poverty and inequality in South Africa (amongst the worst in the world in respect of Gini coefficient measures) provides the social and economic context to heightened expectations of wage increases.’
The industrial action of 2012 in agriculture, in particular, was perhaps the first widespread expression of how socioeconomic pressures on workers, on income levels and on general living conditions have led directly to instability in industrial relations.
A third feature of 2012 was the persistence of violent action during industrial disputes. The tragic shooting of mineworkers on 16 August 2012 at Marikana served as a grim reminder of the repressive capability of the state, irrespective of political regime. The violence of Marikana was accompanied by violence during the farmworker protest and the strike during August 2012 in the road freight sector. In both, violence was accompanied by the burning of vineyards and trucks. In many ways, the violence that characterised industrial conflict during 2012 served also as a reminder of the persistence of violence in South Africa’s industrial relations system. Strikes, and violence during strikes, has been a recurring theme from the early part of the twentieth century to the present.
The implications of recurring strike violence by unionised and non-unionised workers are twofold. On the one hand, violent action serves as a reminder of the limits to institutionalisation of industrial relations; irrespective of the legitimacy of industrial relations, the exercise of class power remains a possibility. On the other hand, the use of violence reminds one of the ways in which workers will exercise power – with violence an extreme form, but one frequently resorted to in South Africa. As Von Holdt (2008: 17) argues:
It is clear from this that industrial conflict is only partially institutionalised in postapartheid South Africa. On the one hand, trade unions and employers make regular, indeed daily, use of the institutions and procedures for resolving conflict between individual employees and employers, as well as for collective dispute resolution and collective-bargaining. On the other hand, procedures may be disputed or regarded as unfair, and collective action not infrequently involves violence and intimidation, including violence by the police. Explaining the partial quality of institutionalisation needs to take account both of the industrial relations factors as well as the factors located in the broader society.
What are the likely implications of these features of the 2012 industrial conflict for the future of trade unionism? The weakening of internal union organisation and the ability of trade unions to rely on organisational power is likely to have three consequences. First, the chances of fragmentation through the formation of new, breakaway unions is increased. Fragmentation may lead to a short- term decline in overall union membership as some workers give up their union affiliation. Over time, workers may well join other unions or re-join the union to which they originally belonged, and the overall effect on aggregate union membership may be minimal. A second consequence of the weakening of union organisation is that it lays a basis for greater instability in workplace labour relations and may lead to a weakening of collective bargaining. The risk of instability is clearly heightened where unions compete for recognition and organisational rights, or where new unions adopt a militant stance in pursuit of organisational rights, which has been seen in the platinum mining and transport sectors. A third consequence is that trade unions turn to the state to support them in retaining their workplace influence – either through legislative change or through intervention with management. Such a strategy is not only contrary to the rationale underlying the current legal dispensation but is also likely to be the most damaging to the long-term prospects of strong, democratic trade union organisation.
The use of industrial protest action to deal with socioeconomic pressures experienced by workers can have many consequences. The obvious effects are instability in workplaces, with associated risks of deterioration in existing relations between management and workers and in such collective bargaining arrangements as may exist. It may be tempting to view spontaneous industrial action as an opportunity for trade union organisation, but such opportunities are complicated by a lack of familiarity with trade unionism on the part of workers, who are often in vulnerable positions, as are farmworkers, and for whom trade union subscriptions are not always affordable. The fact that workers who engage in industrial protest may be seasonal or contract workers, as was the case in the farmworker protests, also makes union membership an unlikely prospect. As has been pointed out in relation to obstacles to effective collective bargaining for non-standard workers, ‘a fragmented workforce implies that there are different segments of workers in the same workplace with diverse interests and different contractual status, which can trigger and intensify conflicts among workers themselves instead of labour-management conflict, thereby hindering solidarity among workers’ (Ebisui 2012: 5).
Finally, the consequence (apart from legal consequences) of violence during strikes and
