to be a growing problem of trade union legitimacy. Declining legitimacy and growing distrust in unionism can only lead to declining affiliation and membership of trade unions.
In light of these developments in industrial relations and trade unionism, some have argued for a review of labour legislation to craft a different dispensation that is better able to deal with the challenges that have arisen over the past few years.
What then are the strategic and policy implications of the industrial conflict of 2012? The first implication is that the problems in labour relations cannot be resolved simply by further amendments to labour legislation. Some would argue that the legislative framework is not suited to current dynamics, especially when it comes to assisting low-paid, vulnerable workers and nor does it assist in regulating competition for resources between the employed and unemployed, as labour legislation supports collective bargaining structures that create barriers to entry into the labour market and excludes minority unions and outsiders. Such arguments tend to over-emphasise the role of law in resolving conflicts relating to socioeconomic conditions. As outlined above, the LRA clearly supports collective bargaining arrangements, in particular between strong bargaining partners. But the LRA does not compel parties to enter into specific arrangements, including arrangements relating to majority unions and the rights that they may enjoy. The LRA also does not prescribe what agency shop agreements employers and unions should enter, and nor does it set down hard and fast criteria for thresholds of representivity and access to organisational rights and collective bargaining arrangements. A distinction should be drawn between the statutory framework and the labour relations frameworks and practices that are adopted by employers and trade unions in workplaces and in bargaining structures, including bargaining and statutory councils. As Van Niekerk argues (2012: 5): ‘It is not necessary in these circumstances to rewrite the LRA, nor is it necessary to reconvene another Wiehahn-like commission to consider alternative legislative models. What is required is for both unions and employers to revisit their agreements to determine whether they are grounded in historical circumstances that are no longer part of workplace reality, and to make the necessary changes.’
Placing the responsibility for change on business and organised labour, and not the state, does however run the risk of stalemate, as the parties resort to a power play that will inevitably inhibit innovation and change. If unions are to continue to grow in the face of the labour market and socioeconomic challenges that face workers it will be necessary to re-build democracy within trade union structures and also to restore legitimacy in trade unionism, particularly in the eyes of those who remain as prospective union members. Revisiting employer and trade union agreements in workplaces will also be necessary to craft a more inclusive trade union regime in the workplace so as to avoid conflict and encourage more inter-union cooperation.
As key elements of the LRA’s vision for trade unionism and collective bargaining have not been realised over the past twenty years, the prospects for change in the future are not encouraging. In the light of increased labour market fragmentation, a weakening of organisational power of some of the largest trade unions and an increased politicisation of trade unionism, union growth in the future is likely to be limited, uneven across sectors and occupational groups, and constrained by the responsiveness of union organisation to changing labour market conditions.
CONCLUSION
The two competing theses about trade union growth and influence alluded to at the beginning of this chapter can be approached by recognising the many dimensions of power that may be exercised by trade unions. Trade unions exercise power through numbers – not only absolute membership, but also membership as a proportion of potential membership, that is, the degree of union density. At roughly 30 per cent, South African trade unions have retained a relatively high density across sectors and have demonstrated very substantial membership in sectors such as mining, energy and the public service. The stable growth of trade unions has continued despite adverse economic conditions over the past five years and a decline in real wages of workers, although negotiated increases have continued to outpace inflation.
To assume that trade unions are in crisis on the basis of a loss of membership by one union is misleading and underestimates the resilience of trade unions as organisations that further the interests of workers. The NUM may be facing particular challenges, but that does not mean that the whole of Cosatu or the union movement is weakening. This review of trade union growth after apartheid suggests that the numerical strength of the South African union movement has been relatively stable and that Cosatu has become even more dominant within the union movement as a whole.
Trade unions also exercise institutional power – that is, the ability to shape decision making in order to serve their members’ interests. Cosatu’s role in the Alliance and its relationship to the ANC clearly places it in a position of considerable power to influence national politics. This power has arguably grown during the past few years, although not without considerable risk to the cohesiveness of the federation and in individual affiliates, as witnessed by the investigation into the role of the general secretary, Zwelinzima Vavi, during 2013. The union movement’s influence on government – and that of Cosatu in particular – has also ensured the continuation of a supportive legal and policy environment.
A critical dimension to trade union power is clearly its organisational strength, not only in a numerical sense, but in relation to the degree of unity and cohesion within union structures and their ability to represent the interests of members democratically and coherently, including their administrative capacity. In his analysis of the 2012 mining strike wave, Hartford (op. cit.: 6) summed up the dilemma facing the NUM and other large unions as follows:
The union like any social organisation, is not a static, monolithic entity. It’s a complex entity whose most constant feature is change – change in both its internal processes and a change in its external processes as a social actor and change agent itself. But the change that happens at the very bottom of the union, at the interface of the union shop steward with the member, is the key driver which determines much of the strategic change processes in any union. To understand what is happening in any union, one must investigate this relationship between the member and the shop floor leader in particular. Because if a union loses its capacity to democratically account and promote the views of members, it loses the capacity to hold the loyalty of those members.
This same challenge of ensuring democratic worker control will face new unions such as Amcu who will, over time, have to find ways of responding to these pressures if they are to sustain themselves organisationally. Similarly, trade unions whose internal operations have not been characterised by democratic practices and worker control may well find themselves having to adapt and to ensure greater accountability to members where members demand this as a condition for loyalty and trust.
While trade unions operate along different dimensions of power, it is perhaps this dimension, the organisational power of trade unions, that has been exposed as the Achilles heel of a number of trade unions. After almost two decades of survival and growth in post-apartheid South Africa, continued growth will be significantly affected by the ability of unions to strengthen their day-to-day operations and their representation of their members’ interests.
REFERENCES
Alexander P, T Lekgowa, B Mmope, L Sinwell and B Xezwi (2012) Marikana A View From the Mountain and a Case to Answer. Auckland Park: Jacana.
Baskin J and V Satgar (1995) South Africa’s new Labour Relations Act: A critical assessment and challenges for labour. National Labour Economic and Development Institute (Naledi), Johannesburg.
Budlender D (2012) Key issues in the South African Labour Market. Unpublished paper prepared for the Department of Labour and the Economic Development
