How Sentiment Matters in International Relations: China and the South China Sea Dispute. David Groten

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How Sentiment Matters in International Relations: China and the South China Sea Dispute - David Groten International and Security Studies

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marine seismic activities in the Spratly Islands. 2005, January 8 Hainan Island incident: Chinese ships attack two Vietnamese fishing boats (China insists that they are pirates who have attacked first). 2002, November 4 China and ASEAN agree on a Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea in which all parties pledge to seek peaceful solutions to disputes in the South China Sea. Since 2011, negotiations on a legally binding Code of Conduct for all [73] parties have been ongoing. 1999 The Sierra Madre, a Philippine vessel, strands at Ren’ai Reef. The PRC argues that the vessel is deliberatively drawn to the area by the Philippines. 1995 China occupies the Mischief Reef (Eastern parts of Spratlys) (previously claimed by the Philippines, Vietnam and Taiwan). 1987–88 Conflict between China and Vietnam over Spratlys (real clash in March 1988). 1982 The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is concluded (entering into force in 1994). EEZ regime officially set up for the first time. Since the mid-1980s For the first time, China starts to match its long-standing historical claims to SCS features and elevations with a physical presence (occupation). Other nations have already occupied maritime SCS features in the past. 1974, January Battle of the Paracel Islands (Prelude to the Sino-Vietnamese War in 1979). 1973 Third U.N. Conference On the Law of the Sea is convened. Among others, several proposals by 56 states on the legal status of EEZs are debated on. 1971 Oil Crisis. 1972, September, 29 The PRC declares that “in the interest of the friendship between the Chinese and the Japanese peoples, it renounces its demand for war reparation from Japan” in Art. 5 of the Joint Communique of the Government of Japan and the Government of the PRC (PRC Gvt., 1972). 1969 The UN Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East publishes a report mentioning the high probability that vast oil reserves may be found in the Yellow Sea and the South China Sea. 1951 (entered into force in 1952) The San Francisco Peace Treaty is signed. At the peace conference, the disposition of those territories conquered by Japan is decided upon. Japan loses all rights and claims to the SCS. Zhou Enlai (former Chinese Foreign Minister) is not invited to attend this conference (due to the ongoing Chinese Civil war and unclear Chinese governmental legitimacy), denounces the treaty and instead declares Chinese sovereignty over the Paracel Islands, the Spratly Islands, and Pratas Islands. (August 15). Vietnam, at the conference, claims that both the Spratlys and Paracels are territories of Vietnam. This claim is left unchallenged by any other party (China is not present, neither is Taiwan).

      Source: Own representation

      Against the backdrop of this brief introduction into and overview of the SCS and a number of core developments in its recent history, this section sets out the PRC’s official position toward the SCS, with regard to both maritime and territorial rights. To start with, Chinese territorial sovereignty claims encompass all features within its so-called ‘u-shaped nine-dash-line’ (chapter 4.3). This basically comprises each of the SCS’s four major archipelagoes: the Spratlys, the Paracels, Macclesfield and Pratas (Table 13). These claims conflict and overlap with those by other SCS claimant parties.

Spratlys (occupied) Paracels (occupied) Claimed
Taiping Dao (Itu Aba) (by Taiwan) Zhongzhou-Riff (Central Reef) (by Taiwan) Yongshu Jiao (Fiery Cross Reef)Meiji Jiao (Mischief Reef)Zhubi Jiao (Subi Reef)Chigua Jiao (Johnson South Reef) Dongmen Jiao (Hughes Reef)Nanxun Jiao (Gaven Reefs)Huayang Jiao/Cuarteron Reef)Huangyan Dao (Scarborough Shoal) All features Entire Spratlys and Paracels and roughly 80 percent of the SCS waters

      Source: Own representation

      To be specific, the PRC stipulated its claims in numerous pieces of legislation and declarations. In its declaration ‘on China’s Territorial Sea’, issued September 4, 1958, the government in Beijing stated:

      “1. The breadth of the territorial sea of the People’s Republic of China shall be twelve nautical miles. This provision applies to all territories of the People’s Republic of China, including the Chinese mainland and its coastal islands, as well as Taiwan and its surrounding islands, the Penghu Islands, the Dongsha Islands, the Xisha Islands, the Zhongsha Islands, the Nansha Islands and all other islands belonging to China which are separated from the mainland and its coastal islands by the high seas.

      2. […] the water area extending twelve nautical miles outward from this baseline is China’s territorial sea. The water areas inside the baseline, including Bohai Bay and the Chiungchow Straits, are Chinese inland waters. The islands inside the baseline, including Tungyin Island, Kaoteng Island, the Matsu Islands, the Paichuan Islands, Wuchiu Island, the Greater and Lesser Quemoy Islands, Tatan Island, Erhtan Island and Tungting Island, are islands of the Chinese inland waters.

      [75] 4. The principles provided in paragraphs (2) and (3) likewise apply to Taiwan and its surrounding Islands, the Penghu Islands, the Dongsha Islands, the Xisha Islands, the Zhongsha Islands, the Nansha Islands, and all other islands belonging to China“ (PRC Gvt., 1958).

      Accordingly, Art. 4 set out China’s sovereignty claims (‘islands of the Chinese inland waters’) over the Paracel Archipelago (Chinese: Xisha) and the Spratly Archipelago (Chinese: Nansha). A 12 nm mile territorial sea as measured from these features was derived. According to the official Chinese position, all SCS features mentioned qualify as islands. Subsequently, in 1992, China passed its law on the ‘Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone’ (PRC Gvt., 1992). The crucial paragraphs read as follows:

      “Article 2: The territorial sea of the People’s Republic of China is the sea belt adjacent to the land territory and the internal waters of the People’s Republic of China. The land territory of the People’s Republic of China includes the mainland of the People’s Republic of China and its coastal islands; Taiwan and all islands appertaining thereto including the Diaoyu Islands; the Penghu Islands; the Dongsha Islands; the Xisha Islands; the Zhongsha Islands and the Nansha Islands; as well as all the other islands belonging to the People’s Republic of China. The waters on the landward side of the baselines of the territorial sea of the People’s Republic of China constitute the internal waters of the People’s Republic of China.

      Article 5: The sovereignty of the People’s Republic of China over its territorial

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