of their ID to prospective tenants, something that genuine landlords never do.
And then there are the deceptive marketing practices of ‘legal’ businesses. To take just one of many studies, a 2019 crawl of 11K shopping websites by Arunesh Mathur and colleagues found 1,818 instances of ‘dark patterns’ – manipulative marketing practices such as hidden subscriptions, hidden costs, pressure selling, sneak-into-basket tactics and forced account opening. Of these at least 183 were clearly deceptive [1244]. What's more, the bad websites were among the most popular; perhaps a quarter to a third of websites you visit, weighted by traffic, try to hustle you. This constant pressure from scams that lie just short of the threshold for a fraud prosecution has a chilling effect on trust generally. People are less likely to believe security warnings if they are mixed with marketing, or smack of marketing in any way. And we even see some loss of trust in software updates; people say in surveys that they're less likely to apply a security-plus-features upgrade than a security patch, though the field data on upgrades don't (yet) show any difference [1594].
3.3.2 Social engineering
Hacking systems through the people who operate them is not new. Military and intelligence organisations have always targeted each other's staff; most of the intelligence successes of the old Soviet Union were of this kind [119]. Private investigation agencies have not been far behind.
Investigative journalists, private detectives and fraudsters developed the false-pretext phone call into something between an industrial process and an art form in the latter half of the 20th century. An example of the industrial process was how private detectives tracked people in Britain. Given that the country has a National Health Service with which everyone's registered, the trick was to phone up someone with access to the administrative systems in the area you thought the target was, pretend to be someone else in the health service, and ask. Colleagues of mine did an experiment in England in 1996 where they trained the staff at a local health authority to identify and report such calls1. They detected about 30 false-pretext calls a week, which would scale to 6000 a week or 300,000 a year for the whole of Britain. That eventually got sort-of fixed but it took over a decade. The real fix wasn't the enforcement of privacy law, but that administrators simply stopped answering the phone.
Another old scam from the 20th century is to steal someone's ATM card and then phone them up pretending to be from the bank asking whether their card's been stolen. On hearing that it has, the conman says ‘We thought so. Please just tell me your PIN now so I can go into the system and cancel your card.’ The most rapidly growing recent variety is the ‘authorised push payment’, where the conman again pretends to be from the bank, and persuades the customer to make a transfer to another account, typically by confusing the customer about the bank's authentication procedures, which most customers find rather mysterious anyway2.
As for art form, one of the most disturbing security books ever published is Kevin Mitnick's ‘Art of Deception’. Mitnick, who was arrested and convicted for breaking into US phone systems, related after his release from prison how almost all of his exploits had involved social engineering. His typical hack was to pretend to a phone company employee that he was a colleague, and solicit ‘help’ such as a password. Ways of getting past a company's switchboard and winning its people's trust are a staple of sales-training courses, and hackers apply these directly. A harassed system administrator is called once or twice on trivial matters by someone claiming to be the CEO's personal assistant; once this idea has been accepted, the caller demands a new password for the boss. Mitnick became an expert at using such tricks to defeat company security procedures, and his book recounts a fascinating range of exploits [1327].
Social engineering became world headline news in September 2006 when it emerged that Hewlett-Packard chairwoman Patricia Dunn had hired private investigators who used pretexting to obtain the phone records of other board members of whom she was suspicious, and of journalists she considered hostile. She was forced to resign. The detectives were convicted of fraudulent wire communications and sentenced to do community service [139]. In the same year, the UK privacy authorities prosecuted a private detective agency that did pretexting jobs for top law firms [1140].
Amid growing publicity about social engineering, there was an audit of the IRS in 2007 by the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration, whose staff called 102 IRS employees at all levels, asked for their user IDs, and told them to change their passwords to a known value; 62 did so. What's worse, this happened despite similar audit tests in 2001 and 2004 [1676]. Since then, a number of audit firms have offered social engineering as a service; they phish their audit clients to show how easy it is. Since the mid-2010s, opinion has shifted against this practice, as it causes a lot of distress to staff without changing behaviour very much.
Social engineering isn't limited to stealing private information. It can also be about getting people to believe bogus public information. The quote from Bruce Schneier at the head of this chapter appeared in a report of a stock scam, where a bogus press release said that a company's CEO had resigned and its earnings would be restated. Several wire services passed this on, and the stock dropped 61% until the hoax was exposed [1673]. Fake news of this kind has been around forever, but the Internet has made it easier to promote and social media seem to be making it ubiquitous. We'll revisit this issue when I discuss censorship in section 26.4.
3.3.3 Phishing
While phone-based social engineering was the favoured tactic of the 20th century, online phishing seems to have replaced it as the main tactic of the 21st. The operators include both criminals and intelligence agencies, while the targets are both your staff and your customers. It is difficult enough to train your staff; training the average customer is even harder. They'll assume you're trying to hustle them, ignore your warnings and just figure out the easiest way to get what they want from your system. And you can't design simply for the average. If your systems are not safe to use by people who don't speak English well, or who are dyslexic, or who have learning difficulties, you are asking for serious legal trouble. So the easiest way to use your system had better be the safest.
The word ‘phishing’ appeared in 1996 in the context of the theft of AOL passwords. By then, attempts to crack email accounts to send spam had become common enough for AOL to have a ‘report password solicitation’ button on its web page; and the first reference to ‘password fishing’ is in 1990, in the context of people altering terminal firmware to collect Unix logon passwords [445]. Also in 1996, Tony Greening reported a systematic experimental study: 336 computer science students at the University of Sydney were sent an email message asking them to supply their password on the pretext that it was required to ‘validate’ the password database after a suspected break-in. 138 of them returned a valid password. Some were suspicious: 30 returned a plausible looking but invalid password, while over 200 changed their passwords without official prompting. But very few of them reported the email to authority [813].
Phishing attacks against banks started seven years later in 2003, with half-a-dozen attempts reported [443]. The early attacks imitated bank websites, but were both crude and greedy; the attackers asked for all sorts of information such as ATM PINs, and their emails were also written in poor English. Most customers smelt a rat. By about 2008, the attackers learned to use better psychology; they often reused genuine bank emails, with just the URLs changed, or sent an email saying something like ‘Thank you for adding a new email address to your PayPal account’ to provoke the customer to log on to complain that they hadn't. Of course, customers who used the provided link rather than typing in www.paypal.com or using an existing bookmark would get their accounts emptied. By then phishing was being used by state actors too; I described in section 2.2.2 how Chinese intelligence compromised the Dalai Lama's private office during the 2008 Olympic games. They used crimeware tools that were originally used by Russian fraud gangs,
