The Law of Higher Education. William A. Kaplin
Чтение книги онлайн.
Читать онлайн книгу The Law of Higher Education - William A. Kaplin страница 79
![The Law of Higher Education - William A. Kaplin The Law of Higher Education - William A. Kaplin](/cover_pre848286.jpg)
The clear implication, reading Monell and Quern together, is that local governments—such as school boards, cities, and counties—are persons suable under Section 1983 and are not immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment, whereas state governments and state agencies controlled by the state are not persons under Section 1983 and are immune under the Eleventh Amendment. The issue in any particular case, then, as phrased by the Court in another case decided the same day as Quern, is whether the entity in question “is to be regarded as a political subdivision” of the state (and thus not immune) or as “an arm of the state subject to its control” (and thus immune) (Lake County Estates v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 401–2 (1979)). See also Borrell v. Bloomsburg University, 63 F. Supp. 3d 418 (M.D. Pa. 2014) (holding that a health care services provider that operated a joint nurse anesthesia program with a university acted under color of state law, as did the program's director, in terminating the plaintiff from the program for refusing to submit to a drug test).
3.4.2 Eleventh Amendment immunity. The case law in Section 3.1.1 above adds clarity to what had been the confusing and uncertain status of postsecondary institutions under Section 1983 and the Eleventh Amendment. But courts continued to have difficulty determining whether to place particular institutions on the person (not immune) or nonperson (immune) side of the line when determining liability. Nevertheless, various courts have affirmed the proposition that the Eleventh Amendment and Section 1983 shield most state universities from damages liability in federal constitutional rights cases.
The courts have applied a variety of factors in resolving Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity issues. In Kashani v. Purdue University, 813 F.2d 843 (7th Cir. 1987), for example, in determining whether Purdue University was entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity, the court placed primary importance on the “extent of the entity's financial autonomy from the state.” The relevant considerations were “the extent of state funding, the state's oversight and control of the university's fiscal affairs, the university's ability independently to raise funds, whether the state taxes the university, and whether a judgment against the university would result in the state increasing its appropriations to the university.” Applying these considerations, the court dismissed the plaintiff's Section 1983 claim, concluding that Purdue was entitled to immunity because it “is dependent upon and functionally integrated with the state treasury.” The court also suggested that, although the states have structured their educational systems in many ways and courts review each case on its facts, “it would be an unusual state university that would not receive immunity” (813 F.2d at 845). The court did reaffirm, however, that under the doctrine of Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), the Eleventh Amendment does not bar claims against university officers in their official capacities for the injunctive relief of reinstatement.
Other courts have applied a more expansive set of factors known variously as the “Urbano factors,” the “Blake factors,” or, more recently, the “Fitchik factors,” to credit the cases from which they derived. (See, e.g., Urbano v. Board of Managers of New Jersey State Prison, 415 F.2d 247, 250–51 (3d Cir. 1969).) In Hall v. Medical College of Ohio at Toledo, 742 F.2d 299 (6th Cir. 1984), for example, a student who had been dismissed from medical school alleged racial discrimination. The district court granted immunity to the college, looking generally to the extent of the college's functional autonomy and fiscal independence. The appellate court affirmed the district court's ruling that the school was an “arm of the state” entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity, but it emphasized that the nine-part Urbano/Blake test “is the better approach for examining the ‘peculiar circumstances’ of the different colleges and universities.” Similarly, the court in Skehan v. State System of Higher Education, 815 F.2d 244 (3d Cir. 1987), used the Urbano/Blake test to determine that the defendant State System “is, effectively, a state agency and therefore entitled to the protection of the eleventh amendment.”
In contrast, the court in Kovats v. Rutgers, The State University, 822 F.2d 1303 (3d Cir. 1987), determined that Rutgers is not an arm of the state of New Jersey and thus is not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. The case involved Section 1983 claims of faculty members who had been dismissed. Focusing on two of the Urbano-Blake factors, the court considered whether a judgment against Rutgers would be paid by Rutgers or by the state and determined that Rutgers in its discretion could pay the judgment either with segregated non-state funds or with non-state funds that were commingled with state funds. Rutgers argued that, if it paid the judgment, the state would have to increase its appropriations to the university, thus affecting the state treasury. The court held that such an appropriations increase following a judgment would be in the legislature's discretion and that “[i]f the state structures an entity in such a way that the other relevant criteria indicate it to be an arm of the state, then immunity may be retained even where damage awards are funded by the state at the state's discretion.” Then, considering the other Urbano-Blake factors, the court determined that, although Rutgers “is now, at least in part, a state-created entity which serves a state purpose with a large degree of state financing, it remains under state law an independent entity able to direct its own actions and responsible on its own for judgments resulting from those actions.”
Later cases on the Eleventh Amendment immunity of state universities have generally upheld the universities' immunity claims, continuing to rely on a variety of factors to reach this result. In Sherman v. Curators of the University of Missouri, 16 F.3d 860 (8th Cir. 1994), on remand, 871 F. Supp. 344 (W.D. Mo. 1994), for instance, the appellate court focused on two factors: the university's degree of autonomy from the state and the university's fiscal dependence on state funds as the source for payments of damage awards against the university. Applying these factors on remand, the district court ruled that the university was immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment. In Rounds v. Oregon State Board of Higher Education, 166 F.3d 1032 (9th Cir. 1999), the court focused on two primary factors in granting immunity to the University of Oregon, looking, first, to the university's “nature as created by state law,” especially the extent to which the university is subject to the supervision of state officials or a state board of higher education; and, second, to the university functions, particularly whether the university “performs central governmental functions.” And in Bowers v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, 475 F.3d 524 (3d Cir. 2007), a case involving the University of Iowa, a court that had previously used the “Urbano factors” applied what it now called the “Fitchik factors.” These factors constitute a “three-part test” that “examines [these] three elements: (1) whether the payment of the judgment would come from the state; (2) what status the [university] has under state law; and (3) what degree of autonomy the [university] has” (475 F.3d at 546). Each factor is to be given equal weight. Applying the factors in “a fact-intensive review that calls for individualized determination,” the court concluded that “the first Fitchik factor weighed slightly against immunity, while the second and third factors weighed heavily in favor of immunity.” Accordingly, the court ruled that the University of Iowa came within the scope of Eleventh Amendment immunity.
When the Eleventh Amendment immunity of a community college, technical college, or junior college, rather than a state university, is at issue, courts have been more reluctant to grant immunity, since the various factors that courts use may indicate that community and