4.26 26. For a detailed description of the reorganization of companies and changes in working conditions, see Luc Boltanski and Ève Chiapello, The New Spirit of Capitalism, trans. Gregory Elliott (London: Verso, [1999] 2005).
27 27. This devaluation of diplomas, which began in the 1980s, became particularly significant starting in the 1990s, and it has only been accentuated since then. In 1982, as we have seen, 2.1 million members of the workforce had higher degrees, while there were 1.6 million workers at the managerial level (cadres); thus there were thirteen members of the workforce with higher degrees for every ten cadres. In 2010, 8 million members of the workforce held higher degrees, while there were 3.6 million cadres, or twenty-two members of the workforce with higher degrees for every ten cadres. In 1990, 45 percent of people with higher degrees were cadres. Twenty years later, the proportion had fallen to 37 percent. At the same time, the territorial distribution of opportunities to get a position as a cadre became more and more unequal: cadres with higher degrees were concentrated in the Paris region and to a lesser extent in the major regional metropolitan centers such as Lyon, Marseille, and Toulouse. See Léger, “Plus de diplômés,” pp. 4–7.
28 28. Here we can speak of the “finite world,” as Zygmunt Bauman does in Globalization: The Human Consequences (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998) and in Wasted Lives: Modernity and its Outcasts (Cambridge: Polity, 2004).
29 29. This conception of culture in terms of “art for art’s sake,” exempt from financial considerations, penetrates even into galleries of contemporary art (despite their orientation toward commerce), which proliferated in the postwar years and sought to break with the compromises of the art market during the occupation (after the Jewish-owned galleries had already been eliminated) by turning toward artists whose work embodied both the rejection of “capitalism” and aesthetic research in its most elitist dimensions. The same phenomenon is found in the domain of publishing. See Julie Verlaine, Les galeries d’art contemporain à Paris: une histoire culturelle du marché de l’art, 1944–1970 (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 2012), pp. 23–45.
30 30. Maryvonne de Saint-Pulgent, Jack Lang: batailles pour la culture (Paris: La Documentation française, 2013), p. 56.
31 31. On the shift from ethnographic museums to ecomuseums, see Martine Segalen, La vie d’un musée, 1937–2005 (Paris: Stock, 2005).
32 32. See Nathalie Heinich and Roberta Shapiro, eds, De l’artification: enquêtes sur le passage à l’art (Paris: Éditions de l’EHESS, 2012).
33 33. The delegation for the plastic arts, established in 1982, created twenty-two positions of regional counselor for the plastic arts under the Direction régionale des affaires culturelles (Regional Office for Cultural Affairs) and the same number of Fonds régionaux d’art contemporain (FRAC, Regional Foundations for Contemporary Art).
34 34. The critique of the new cultural policies that had the most significant media impact was probably that of Marc Fumaroli, in L’État culturel: une religion moderne (Paris: De Fallois, 1991).
35 35. See Laurent Jeanpierre and Séverine Sofio, “Chronique d’une mort annoncée: les conservateurs de musée face aux commissaires d’expositions dans l’art contemporain français,” in Frédéric Poulard and Jean-Michel Tobolem, eds, Les conservateurs de musée: atouts et faiblesses d’une profession (Paris: La Documentation française, 2015), pp. 111–39.
36 36. As François Dosse points out, “Guattari va jouer auprès de Jack Lang le rôle d’une boîte à idées”; see François Dosse, Gilles Deleuze et Félix Guattari: biographie croisée (Paris: La Découverte, 2007), p. 450.
37 37. Félix Guattari and Suely Rolnik, Micropolitiques (Paris: Les Empêcheurs de penser en rond/Seuil, 2007), p. 33.
38 38. Philippe Urfalino, “De l’anti-impérialisme américain à la dissolution de la politique culturelle,” Revue française de science politique, 45/5 (1993): 823–49.
39 39. See Thomas Angeletti, “Le laboratoire de la nécessité: économistes, institutions et qualifications de l’économie,” Doctoral thesis in sociology, Paris, EHESS, 2013.
40 40. On the foundation of the economics of conventions, see L’économie des conventions, special issue, Revue économique, 40/2 (1989). See also Laurent Thévenot, “Les investissements de forme,” in Conventions économiques: cahiers du centre d’études de l’emploi (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1985), pp. 21–72, and “Essai sur les objets usuels: propriétés, fonctions, usages,” in Bernard Conein, Nicolas Dodier, and Laurent Thévenot, eds, Les objets dans l’action (Paris: Éditions de l’EHESS, 1993), pp. 85–111. See also Philippe Batifoulier, ed., Théorie des conventions (Paris: Economica, 2001), André Orléan, Analyse économique des conventions (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2004), and Robert Salais, “Conventions de travail, mondes de production et institutions,” L’Homme et la Société, nos. 170–1 (2008–9): 151–74.
41 41. For a synthesis, see Arnaldo Bagnasco and Charles Sabel, PME et développement économique en Europe (Paris: La Découverte, 1994). On the development of the “Third Italy” in opposition to the industrial triangle Milan–Turin–Genoa, see also Arnaldo Bagnasco and Carlo Trigilia, La construction sociale du marché: le défi de la troisième Italie (Cachan: Les Éditions de l’ENS de Cachan, [1988] 1993). (The “third Italy” designates a region in central and northeastern Italy where clusters of small family-run businesses developed with municipal support in the 1970s and 1980s.)
42 42. Michael Piore and Charles Sabel, “Préface,” Les chemins de la prospérité: de la production de masse à la spécialisation souple, trans. Luc Boussard (Paris: Hachette, 1989), p. 10 [preface to the French translation of The Second Industrial Divide: Possibilities for Prosperity (New York: Basic Books, 1984)].
43 43. Piore and Sabel, The Second Industrial Divide, p. 214; more generally, see pp. 213–16.
44 44. See Andrea Colli and Elisabetta Merlo, “Family Business and Luxury Business in Italy (1950–2000),” Entreprises et histoire, no. 46 (2007): 113–24.
45 45. Robert Salais and Michael Storper, Les mondes de production: enquête sur l’identité économique en France (Paris: Éditions de la MSH, 1993). A revised English version appeared four years later entitled Worlds of Production: The Action Frameworks of the Economy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, [1993] 1997).
46 46. Salais and Storper, Mondes de production, p. 39.
47 47. Ibid., p. 117.
48 48. Pierre Moulinier, “Naissance et développement du partenariat contractuel dans le domaine culturel,” in Philippe Poirrier and René Rizzardo, eds, Une ambition partagée? La coopération entre le ministère de la culture et les collectivités territoriales (1959–2009) (Paris: Travaux et documents du ministère de la culture, no. 26 (2009), p. 60.
49 49. Ibid., p. 61.
50 50. In 2001, in France, one association out of five had a cultural purpose. See Valérie Deroin, “Emploi, bénévolat et financement des associations culturelles,” Culture Chiffres, no. 1 (2014): 1–12.
51 51. Ibid.
52 52. Excerpts from the documentation presented on the site of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
53 53. See Thomas Piketty, Capital in the Twenty-First Century, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, [2013] 2014).
54 54. See www.forum-avignon.org.
