environmental successes are not always what they seem.
A preview of our main argument is in order. We set out to investigate the emergence of a new kind of environmentalism: a state-led, coercive, authoritarian style of environmental governance. What our investigation yields, however, is not a new environmental paradigm but an emerging political strategy to fold environmental concerns into the concatenation of the techno-political interests of the Chinese state. Building on prior studies that examine the broader, non-environmental implications of China’s decisive moves in this arena, we try to provide a systematic portrait of “green” China’s methodologies. As we follow the sprawling scope of Chinese environmental power from its industrial East to outer space, we discover a coordinated effort to align environmental interventions with the state’s ambitious political agenda. This alignment has led to the wholesale subsuming of environmental goals and interests to the supreme leadership of the Chinese state. In the name of ecological wellbeing, the state exploits the environment as a new form of political capital, harnessing it in the pursuit of authoritarian resilience and durability. In this process, some environmental conditions such as urban air quality have seen marked improvement, but others such as desertification and deforestation have been made even worse.
These observations lead us to question the accuracy of the term “authoritarian environmentalism” for describing the empirical reality of contemporary China. The term suggests that authoritarianism is merely a vehicle in service of the honorable goal of sustainability. Thus, it implies an instrumental view of politics: the end justifies the means. Its use invites a leap of faith toward accepting authoritarian politics on environmental grounds. As readers will see, however, the cases in this book suggest an inverted picture, whereby authoritarianism is the end and environmentalism is the means. In some cases, there has been a measure of environmental success. In others, the environmental achievements are elusive, if not dubious. Common to all, however, is the intense consolidation of political and epistemic power in the hands of the Chinese state. In this light, a more accurate term than “authoritarian environmentalism” is “environmental authoritarianism.” This formulation is more consistent with the empirical evidence presented in this book.
Towards Mutually Agreed-upon Coercion
Counterintuitively, the success of state-led environmentalism hinges not on a strong state, but on mechanisms that place state power in check. It is precisely the fragmented nature of Chinese state institutions, with their often conflicting lines of authority and tensions between the Party and the state, that has permitted de facto checks and balances. The Chinese state under the leadership of the Communist Party is no monolith. The state’s fragmentation gives it an advantage in governing a vast and complex nation, making possible pluralistic deliberations even under authoritarianism (Mertha 2009; Spires 2011; Teets 2018). However, the state’s efforts to consolidate and centralize power risk losing some of the elements that have contributed to China’s environmental successes. China’s progress in environmental governance would not have been possible were it not for the government’s consultation and collaboration with scientists, citizens’ groups, judicial authorities, entrepreneurs, and many other non-state actors that limit state power. The space for this is shrinking under an increasingly authoritarian regime. At the same time, some of China’s environmental programs have gone awry because the state chose to ignore non-state voices. The promise of state-led environmentalism can be fully realized only if the exercise of environmental power rests on a broad base of knowledge, perspectives, expertise, participation, and, ultimately, support. By the same token, some of the darker consequences of coercive practices can be avoided if an autocracy remains sensitized to the wide range of environmental sentiments and practices in the society at large.
The effectiveness of state leadership in environmental affairs is thus premised on its incorporation of civil society inputs into the policy process. Some environmental initiatives we examine in this book, such as the mandatory recycling program in Shanghai, afforestation by monoculture in Inner Mongolia, and the sudden switch from coal to natural gas in Northern China, went awry because the state went too far, too fast. By contrast, the state has done much better when citizens feel empowered to participate in environmental governance, or deploy “supervision by the masses” (qunzhong jiandu 群众监督). In fact, in examining the practice of environmentalism under Chinese authoritarianism, we discover pockets of democratic strength. Democratic confidence remains strong when scientists and activists join together to fight against hydropower dams, citizens use their smartphones to record and report polluters, artists and filmmakers discover creative means to shed light on the darker side of Chinese modernization, and students organize campaigns to clean up the plastic-littered coasts. These democratic moments may be short-lived, and some may be one-off events, but they speak to the strength of citizen determination even in the face of authoritarian environmentalism. These pockets of democratic strength are pivotally important in keeping state environmental power in check and environmental undertakings on track.
Seen in this light, the authoritarian environmentalism hypothesis operates on a false coupling between coercive environmentalism and authoritarian politics. In other words, environmental coercion need not always be authoritarian in nature. As the empirical chapters in this book illustrate, the Chinese state has been able to achieve durable success in some cases such as the rehabilitation of the Loess Plateau, not because it acted in any way that was less coercive, but because the flexing of coercive muscle was based on extensive consultations with non-state actors ranging from international scientists to local peasants. Nevertheless, only with the backing of the state’s coercive power did the complex and elaborate rehabilitation plan materialize. Coercion came after consultation. We note that consultation often entails the messy legwork of meeting, talking, understanding, and ultimately appreciating different positions and interests. Yet consultation is key to achieving the kind of mutually agreed-upon coercion that Garrett Hardin saw as the only way out of the tragedy of the commons. Just as international environmental treaties are agreed-upon coercive instruments between nation states, much of environmental governance in subnational contexts can be fashioned into coercive measures that emerge out of a consensus-building process involving diverse and broad representations.
We are not suggesting that agreed-upon coercion is an easy process, but it is essential if the abuses and missteps chronicled in this book are to be avoided. During the consultative process, the state must be at once forceful and humble, even-handed and responsive, decisive and prudent, focused and inclusive. But instead, much of what we document in this book is the abrupt wielding of coercive and capricious power by state officials against the interests and wills of the people. We show a pattern of coercion that all too often lacks long-term vision, thoughtful planning, or sensible implementation. Driven by short-term bureaucratic self-interest, many Chinese officials have misused coercive policy instruments under the noble disguise of planetary sustainability. The resulting policies have advanced the state’s agenda for power consolidation but produced a mixed record in environmental and social terms. In the cases in which the state’s worst instincts were moderated by international actors or civil society groups, the restrained exercise of power produced more durable policies for the betterment of human and ecological conditions.
In China, examples of agreed-upon coercion are woefully difficult to find. Understood from this perspective, China offers less a model for global action than a cautionary tale. In fact, herein lies the inherent contradiction of state-led, authoritarian environmentalism. The effectiveness of the model is heavily dependent on non-state inputs, broad-based consultations, “supervision by the masses,” and similar processes that hold state power in check. Yet the authoritarian instinct is not to broaden and uphold such spaces of accountability and transparency, but to surveil, suppress, and subjugate them. As the state increasingly centralizes environmental power, it undermines the basis of its own efficacy. The state’s aggressive moves to limit the space for civil society are thus a disservice to the state’s grip on environmental power. To borrow a Chinese idiom frequently deployed by the spokesperson of the Chinese Foreign Ministry when responding to international criticism, China’s brand of coercive environmentalism amounts to “lifting a stone only to drop it on its own feet,” or banqi shitou za zijide jiao 搬起石头砸自己的脚.
