forced to live in sheds. In one instance sixty-nine newcomers were found living in one small house. Whenever houses were vacated by white people and rented to Negroes, the rental price was largely increased, sometimes doubled.
After reviewing the corruption in East St. Louis, the report of the Congressional Committee discussed the riot. It described the condition of affairs on the night of July 1, 1917, when the second and most serious outbreak occurred. An automobile (some witnesses said two) went through the Negro section of the city, its occupants firing promiscuously into homes. This aroused fierce resentment among the Negroes, who organized for defense and armed themselves with guns. The ringing of the church bell, a prearranged signal for assembling, drew a crowd of them, and they marched through the streets ready to avenge the attack. A second automobile filled with white men crossed their path. The Negroes cursed them, commanded them to drive on, and fired a volley into the machine. The occupants, however, were not the rioters but policemen and reporters. One policeman was killed and another was so seriously wounded that he died later.
Thousands viewed the riddled car standing before police headquarters. The early editions of the newspapers gave full accounts of the tragedy, and on July 2 the rioting began. Negro mobs shot white men, and white men and boys, girls and women, began to attack every Negro in sight. News spread rapidly and, as excitement increased, unimaginable depredations and horrible tortures were committed and viewed with "placid unconcern" by hundreds. Negro men were stabbed, clubbed, and hanged from telephone poles. Their homes were burned. Women and children were not spared. An instance is given of a Negro child two years old which was shot and thrown into a doorway of a burning building.
On the night of July 1, Mayor Mollman telephoned to the Adjutant General of Illinois saying that the police were no longer able to handle the situation and requesting that the militia be sent. Both the police and the militia are severely censured by the Congressional report for gross failure to do their duty. The police, says the report, could have quelled the riot instantly, but instead they either "fled into the safety of cowardly seclusion or listlessly watched the depredations of the mob, passively and in many instances actively sharing in the work."
In all, five companies of the Illinois National Guard were sent to East St. Louis. Some of them arrived on the morning of July 2, the first at 8:40 a.m. These forces were in command of Colonel S. O. Tripp. Concerning the conduct of the militia, the Congressional Committee reported in strong terms, singling out Colonel Tripp for especial condemnation. It said that he was a hindrance instead of a help to the troops; that "he was ignorant of his duties, blind to his responsibilities and deaf to every intelligent appeal that was made to him."
The troops, in the estimation of the Committee, were poorly officered and in only a few cases did their duty. The report states that "they seemed moved by the same spirit of indifference or cowardice that marked the conduct of the police force. As a rule they fraternized with the mob, joked with them and made no serious effort to restrain them."
Many instances are given of active participation and encouragement of the mob in its murders, arson, and general destruction.
The only redeeming feature of the activities of the militia, according to the Congressional Committee, was "the conduct, bravery, and skill of the officer second in command, whose promptness and determination prevented the mob from committing many more atrocities."
By eight o'clock of the evening of July 2 there were seventeen officers and 270 men on duty, and by July 4 the force had increased to thirty-seven officers and 1,411 men. On the evening of July 2 the fury of the mob had spent itself, and the riot subsided.
The behavior of the troops was condemned not only by the Congressional Committee but by citizens generally, and a special inquiry was made into their conduct by the Military and Naval Department of the State of Illinois. Witnesses to dereliction on duty on the part of the soldiers were examined and commanding officers of troops were asked to testify and explain specific acts of violence and neglect of duty. In all seventy-nine persons were examined. Although the charges against the soldiers in a large number of cases were serious and sufficient to warrant the criticism which they received, identification of individuals guilty of these acts was difficult. This probably accounts for the fact that only seven court-martials resulted from the inquiry. The commanding officer, though severely censured by the Congressional Committee, was exonerated by this inquiry.
CHAPTER III
THE MIGRATION OF NEGROES FROM THE SOUTH
I. INTRODUCTION
During the period 1916–18 approximately a half-million Negroes suddenly moved from southern to northern states. This movement, however, was not without a precedent. A similar migration occurred in 1879, when Negroes moved from Mississippi, Louisiana, Texas, Alabama, Tennessee, and North Carolina to Kansas. The origin of this earlier movement, its causes, and manner resemble in many respects the one which has so recently attracted public attention.
The migration of 1916–18 cannot be separated completely from the steady, though inconspicuous, exodus from southern to northern states that has been in progress since 1860, or, in fact, since the operation of the "underground railway." In 1900 there were 911,025 Negroes living in the North, 10.3 per cent of the total Negro population, which was then 8,883,994. Census figures for the period 1900–1910 show a net loss for southern states east of the Mississippi of 595,703 Negroes. Of this number 366,880 are found in northern states. Reliable estimates for the last decade place the increase of northern Negro population around 500,000.
The 1910–20 increase of the Negro population of Chicago was from 44,103 to 109,594, or 148.5 per cent, with a corresponding increase in the white population of 21 per cent, including foreign immigration. According to the Census Bureau method of estimating natural increase of population, the Negro population of Chicago unaffected by the migration would be 58,056 in 1920, and the increase by migration alone would be 51,538.
The relative 1910–20 increases in white and Negro population in typical industrial cities of the Middle West, given in Table II, illustrate the effect of the migration of southern Negroes.
The migration to Chicago.—Within a period of eighteen months in 1917–18 more than 50,000 Negroes came to Chicago according to an estimate based on averages taken from actual count of daily arrivals. All of those who came, however, did not stay. Chicago was a re-routing point, and many immigrants went on to nearby cities and towns. During the heaviest period, for example, a Detroit social agency reported that hundreds of Negroes applying there for work stated that they were from Chicago. The tendency appears to have been to reach those fields offering the highest present wages and permanent prospects.
| TABLE II | ||||
| Negroes | Percentage of Negro Increase, 1910–20 | Percentage of White Increase, 1910–20 | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1910 | 1920 | |||
| Cincinnati, Ohio | 19,639 | 29,636 | 50.9 | 8.0 |
| Dayton, Ohio | 4,842 | 9,029 | 86.5 | 28.0 |
| Toledo, Ohio |
| |||
