of the Chicago River to Fifty-fifth; west of Wentworth, including Wentworth.4 Area south of Fifty-fifth and east of Wentworth.
5 Area south of Fifty-fifth and west of Wentworth.
6 Area north and west of the Chicago River.
7 "Loop" or business district and vicinity.
In the district designated as the "Black Belt" about 90 per cent of the Negroes live. District II, the "contested area," is that in which most of the bombings have occurred. Negroes are said to be "invading" this district. Extension here instead of into District III, toward the Stock Yards neighborhood, may be explained partly by the hostility which the Irish and Polish groups to the west had often shown to Negroes. The white hoodlum element of the Stock Yards district, designated as III, was characterized by the state's attorney of Cook County, when he remarked that more bank robbers, pay-roll bandits, automobile bandits, highwaymen, and strong-arm crooks come from this particular district than from any other that has come to his notice during seven years of service as chief prosecuting official.[5]
In District IV and V, south of Fifty-fifth Street, Negroes live in small communities surrounded by white people or are scattered through white neighborhoods. District VI has a large Italian population. District VII is Chicago's wholesale and retail center.
THE CHICAGO RIOT
JULY, 27 TO AUGUST, 8, 1919
On only one day of the riot were all these districts involved in the race warfare. This was Tuesday. On Sunday Districts I, III, and IV suffered clashes; on Monday all but District VI were involved; on Tuesday the entire area was affected; on Wednesday District VII was not included, and District VI witnessed only one clash; on Thursday District IV was again normal, and Districts II, V, and VII were comparatively quiet; during the remainder of the week only the first three districts named were active.
The worst clashes were in Districts I and III, and of those reported injured, 34 per cent received their wounds in the "Black Belt," District I, and 41 per cent on the Southwest Side, in the district including the Stock Yards, District III.
Factors contributing to the subsidence of the riot were the natural reaction from the tension, efforts of police and citizens to curb the rioters, the entrance of the militia on Wednesday, and last, but perhaps not least, a heavy rain.
The longest period of violence without noticeable lull was 9:00 a.m. Monday to 9:00 a.m. Tuesday. On Tuesday the feeling was most intense, as shown by the nature of the clashes. Arson was prevalent on Tuesday for the first time, and the property loss was considerable. But judging by the only definite index, the number of dead and injured, Monday exceeded Tuesday in violence, showing 229 injured and eighteen dead as against 139 injured and eleven dead on the latter day. While it is apparent that no single hour or even day can be called the peak of the riot, the height of violence clearly falls within the two-day period Monday, July 28, and Tuesday, July 29.
The change in the nature of the clashes day by day showed an increase in intensity of feeling and greater boldness in action. This development reached its peak on Tuesday. Later came a decline, sporadic outbursts succeeding sustained activity.
Factors influencing growth of the riot.—After the attacks had stopped, about 3:00 a.m. Monday, they did not again assume serious proportions until Monday afternoon, when workers began to return to their homes, and idle men gathered in the streets in greater numbers than during working hours. The Stock Yards laborers are dismissed for the day in shifts. Negroes coming from the Yards at the 3:00 p.m., 4:00 p.m., and later shifts were met by white gangs armed with bats and clubs. On Tuesday morning men going to work, both Negro and white, were attacked.
The main areas of violence were thoroughfares and natural highways between the job and the home. On the South Side 76 per cent of all the injuries occurred on such streets. The most turbulent corners were those on State Street between Thirty-first and Thirty-ninth, on Cottage Grove Avenue at Sixty-third Street, on Halsted Street at Thirty-fifth and Forty-seventh streets and on Archer Avenue at Thirty-fifth Street. Injuries at these spots were distributed as follows:[6]
| Injuries | Deaths | ||
| State Street— | |||
| at Thirty-first | 7 | ||
| between Thirty-first and Thirty-fifth | 2 | ||
| at Thirty-fifth | 9 | 1 | |
| between Thirty-fifth and Thirty-ninth | 19 | 2 | |
| at Thirty-ninth | 3 | ||
| Cottage Grove Avenue— | |||
| at Sixty-third Street | 8 | ||
| Halsted Street— | |||
| at Thirty-fifth | 8 | ||
| at Forty-seventh | 5 | ||
| Archer Avenue— | |||
| at Thirty-fifth Street | 7 | ||
| Streets which suffered most from rioting were— | |||
| State | 61 | 6 | |
| Thirty-fifth | 50 | 5 | |
| Forty-seventh | 32 | 2 | |
| Halsted | 32 | ||
| Thirty-first | 29 | 1 | |
The street-car situation had an effect upon the riot both before the strike and after it. Because of a shortage of labor at the time, the surface-street-car company had put on a number of inexperienced men. This may account for the inefficiency of some crews in handling attacked cars.
An example is the case of Henry Goodman who was killed in an attack on a Thirty-ninth Street car. The car was stopped at Union Avenue by a truck suspiciously stalled across the tracks. White men boarded the car and beat and chased six or eight Negro passengers. When asked under oath to whom the truck directly in front of him belonged and what color it was, the motorman replied, "I couldn't say." When asked what time his car left the end of the line and whether or not he had seen any Negroes hit on the car, he answered, "I didn't pay any attention." The motorman said he made a report of the case, but it could not be found by anyone in the street-car company's office. The conductor of this car had been given orders to warn Negroes that there was rioting in the district through which the car ran. He did not do this. He ignored the truck. No names of witnesses were secured. The motorman was an extra
