to the military authorities at Fort Le Boeuf (near the present-day site of Erie, Pennsylvania).
The British-French contention then focused on a strategic geographic area identified by the Forks of the Ohio (near present-day Pittsburgh). During January 1754, a Virginia militia company began work on a stronghold there. On April 17, 1754, a larger French force captured the half-completed stockade and then built Fort Duquesne on the site. The Virginia assembly countered by raising an independent regiment and sending a small expedition under Washington against the French. In May 1754, the young officer (now a militia lieutenant colonel) routed a French patrol and killed its commander. Expecting an attack from the main French military establishment at Fort Duquesne, Washington retreated and hastily constructed Fort Necessity while waiting for the rest of the regiment to join him. On July 3, 1754, a superior French and Indian force attacked Fort Necessity, forcing Washington to surrender his untenable position the next day. This action gave France temporary control of the entire Ohio region.
When news of Washington’s defeat reached London, the British government sent Gen. Edward Braddock to America with the mission of defending Britain’s claims. On July 9, 1755, Braddock was leading his army of some fourteen hundred British regulars and seven hundred colonial militiamen in an advance on Fort Duquesne when attacked by a nine-hundred-man force of French and Indians. Braddock’s humiliating rout, which cost him his life, was one of the worst military disasters in British history and underscored the depths that English fortunes had plunged in the struggle against France in North America.3
In May 1756, the Seven Years’ War formally began in Europe, with Britain and Prussia pitted against France, Austria, Sweden, and some German states. Spain would join the French alliance later. During this period, Britain suffered frustration and disappointment in its military strategy against France. After William Pitt became prime minister in 1758, British prospects in the conflict began to improve. Pitt, who recognized the value of Canada and the American western frontier to the British war effort, sent a well-organized military task force to the colonies to turn around the situation. Montgomery’s 17th Regiment was included in this army upon which Britain pinned its hopes.
The orders for his regiment to be part of the invasion force must have been a welcome change for young Montgomery. Since he accounted for just one of nine ensigns (the lowest-ranking officer in the army) assigned to the unit, he was eager for an opportunity to distinguish himself. At this point in his life, Montgomery represented a loyal and proud member of His Majesty’s armed forces, sworn to protect the British dominion. Advancement through the ranks measured success in his chosen profession of arms, and the aspiring officer knew that military recognition and promotion were attained much more rapidly in wartime. Like all junior officers, he trusted that enthusiasm and fortitude would overcome his lack of experience in the pending hostilities.4
Montgomery also regarded the mission as a grateful break in the tedium of routine garrison duty. Since joining the unit, his days had been filled with endless drill and practice as the regiment simulated battlefield tactics during peacetime. This was the opportunity to employ these skills for their intended purpose. Braddock’s debacle had raised questions by some detractors over the British army’s readiness to fight the French and Indians in America, but Montgomery and his comrades maintained confidence in their abilities. The British officer corps held no doubt about the effectiveness of its military doctrine and training against any enemy. After all, the renowned reputation of the British army had been established throughout the world as it helped to win an empire upon which the “sun never set.” So, Montgomery received the news that his regiment would participate in the forthcoming operation with great expectation and even exhilaration.
On February 3, 1757, the British government issued orders for the 17th Regiment to march from its garrison at Galway to Cork in Ireland to prepare for overseas deployment. Brig. Gen. Edward Richbell commanded the regiment when Montgomery joined, but he died on February 24, 1757. Richbell’s successor, Col. John Forbes, led the unit during its initial activity. Six other Irish regiments joined the 17th at Cork to await passage abroad.5
All of the units designated for the expedition were foot (infantry) regiments—the backbone of the British army organization. A number of companies made up each regiment, including a company of grenadiers and a light-infantry company. Grenadiers represented the tallest and strongest men in the army, originally selected because they could throw a grenade, or hand bomb, farther than ordinary troops. By this time, none of them actually carried grenades, but they stood out for their physical strength and endurance. The light-infantry troops possessed similar attributes. They could march faster and farther while carrying less supplies than common soldiers. Separate ranger troops, who were specially trained in raiding tactics, were also included in the organization. These three units, then, formed the elite contingent of the army.
The standard-issue individual weapon of foot soldiers was a flintlock musket that weighed twelve pounds and measured four feet nine inches in length. Its nickname, “Brown Bess,” came from the color of the walnut stock. King George I introduced the weapon into the British army in the early 1700s. A thin-bodied triangular-shaped bayonet, fitted to the muzzle, added another fourteen inches and two pounds to the weapon, and might have been its most important component. The musket fired a lead ball three quarters of an inch in diameter (.75 caliber) and weighing one and a half ounces—considerable stopping power even by modern standards.
Yet, the range and accuracy of the musket presented a problem. Because the musket was designed to be loaded expeditiously by its muzzle using a ramrod, the clearance between the bore and the lead ball was not close. This caused much of the propelling power from the exploding powder charge to escape around the ball when the weapon discharged. The muzzle-loading characteristic of the musket limited its maximum effective range from fifty to one hundred yards. Because the musket had a smooth bore, it imparted very little guidance to the ball once it was shot out of the barrel. This unstable trajectory resulted in a relatively inaccurate weapon.
Consequently, the muzzle-loading, smooth-bore musket dictated the tactics that the soldiers armed with it used. Its inaccuracy was reflected in the British manual of arms. There was no command to “aim.” Instead, men were ordered to “level muskets” before firing. To compensate for the lack of accuracy from individual weapons, battlefield maneuvers stressed compact formations from which a wall of massed musket fire could be presented to the enemy. Foot soldiers usually deployed into battle lines three ranks deep. The musket’s restricted range also forced combat into an encounter at close quarters. Trained troops could perform the dozen steps involved in loading and shooting their weapons to lay down a steady two to four rounds per minute. This time-consuming reloading left soldiers vulnerable to return fire and promoted hand-to-hand combat. A volley from the muskets followed immediately by a bayonet charge was the logical battlefield tactic when forces converged in short-range engagements. The shock of cold steel was usually the moment of truth for opposing eighteenth-century field armies. Battles were won or lost by how well foot soldiers stood up to this physical and psychological trial.6
Artillery battalions were highly specialized units that employed cannons in an attempt to give depth to the battlefield by concentrating long-range firepower on enemy troop staging areas or dueling with opposing artillery positions. However, cannons lacked effectiveness during close infantry clashes because of their erratic accuracy and the possibility of inflicting friendly casualties. Supply and transportation difficulties persisted, because cannons consumed huge amounts of shot and powder and were ponderous to move. Thus, most cannonry was employed during more deliberate siege warfare.7 Military planners left British cavalry regiments in the British Isles, where they engaged in ceremonial and internal security tasks. Heavily forested terrain in the North American theater of operations led British strategists to regard it as unsuitable for the use of cavalry tactics. Also, support demands of mounted troops were much more costly to a field command than those of foot soldiers. Maintenance of horses required extensive forage, which created a drain on supply efforts. To conserve shipboard space, higher headquarters even ordered the Irish foot regiments to dispose of their baggage horses before they
