utilize Church tradition, in terms of the accumulated content of Christian doctrine, to interpret Scripture. As Shelton rightly observes, Luther appears to embrace Church tradition at times in his hermeneutical approaches, though with a caveat that tradition should be critically evaluated and must not be allowed to supplant Scripture. See his “Martin Luther’s Concept of Biblical Interpretation in Historical Perspective,” 391–95.
108. See Shelton, “Martin Luther’s Concept,” 187. With this argument, Martin Luther eschewed the notion of ‘dictation theory’ with respect to divine inspiration of Scripture.
109. McLean, Biblical Interpretation, 36. However, the scriptura sacra sui ipsius interpres principle, together with Luther’s declaration that there was no distinction between the spiritual capacity of the clergy and the laity in terms of scriptural interpretation, might have opened the door for arbitrary interpretations of Scripture. As Grondin points out, the Roman Catholic Church’s Counter Reformation Council of Tent (1546) saw this as the ‘Achilles’ heel’ of the Reformation hermeneutic and, therefore, reaffirmed the Roman Catholic Church’s interpretive magisterium as the sure way to prevent arbitrariness. See Grondin, Introduction to Philosophical Hermeneutics, 41.
110. Waltke, An Old Testament Theology, 46.
111. See also Kramm, The Theology of Martin Luther, 116.
112. As Wood notes, Martin Luther argued that the literal understanding of the grammatical-historical details of the biblical text was necessary before the exegete could enter the interpretation of the ‘sensus plenior’ of Scripture. Wood, Luther’s Principles, 24–27.
113. Farrar, History of Interpretation, 327.
114. The notion of a “primary authorial intent” has, however, become problematic in modern critical study of the Bible. As Waltke observes, “the reality of the situation is that we cannot talk precisely about an original author of biblical narratives, for these books are mostly anonymous and underwent at least some editing over long periods of time” (An Old Testament Theology, 85). Perhaps it is more appropriate to talk about “authorial intent” in terms of the meaning of the texts of the Bible in their final canonical shape.
115. See also Plass, What Luther Says, Vol 1: 95.
116. See also Wood, Luther’s Principles, 11–12.
117. See Poland, Literary Criticism, 21. Waltke equally argues that “Since the biblical message is communicated through the impersonal semiotic signs that constitute human language, they are subject to a grammatical-historical analysis.” (An Old Testament Theology, 86).
118. Luther, Luther’s Works, vol. 20, Lectures on the Minor Prophets, 108.
119. Grondin, Introduction to Philosophical Hermeneutics, 40.
120. See Shelton, “Martin Luther’s Concept,” 392. It is, however, noted that, whereas allegory tendentiously belittled the role of history and imposed arbitrary or even philosophical readings of the Bible, typology has been viewed as having a positive role in biblical interpretation. Barr does not, however, see any methodological difference between allegory and typology; he views both as arbitrary approaches to biblical interpretation, Barr, “The Concepts,” 65–102. On the other hand, Childs has persuasively argued that, in patristic hermeneutics, typology was “viewed as an extension of the literal sense of historical events in a subsequent adumbration and served to signal the correspondence between redemptive events . . . typology was considered closely akin to prophecy and fulfillment and thought to be a major New Testament category in relating to the Old Testament.” Childs, Theology of the Old and New Testaments, 13.
121. Luther, Luther’s Works, Vol 15, Ecclesiastes, Song of Solomon, 339. See also Doermann who observes that Christological interpretation forms the basis of Luther’s hermeneutic, “Luther’s Principles,” 24.
122. Shelton, “Martin Luther’s Concept,” 190–91.
123. For a detailed explication of the semiotic differences between sign and symbol, see my analysis in Muindi, Pentecostal-Charismatic Prophecy, 186–190.
124. See, for example, Shelton, “Martin Luther’s Concept,” 255.
125. See also Shelton, “Martin Luther’s Concept,” 239–55.
126. Luther, Luther’s Works, vol. 4, Lectures on Genesis Chapter 21–25, 68.
127. Martin Luther argued that divine illumination was necessary for the true interpretation of the Bible. Thus, the Holy Spirit was the true interpreter of the word which He had inspired: “for if God does not open and explain Holy Writ, no one can understand it; it will remain a closed book, enveloped in darkness” (Luther’s Works, vol. 13: Selected Psalms II, 17).
128. Shelton, “Martin Luther’s Concept,” 239, 255.
129. Shelton, “Martin Luther’s Concept,” 255.
130. See Calvin, Institutes, 1:52–55. See also Torrance, The School of Faith, 23.
131. Shelton, “Martin Luther’s Concept,” 231.
132. Schultz, “The Problem of Hermeneutics,” 44. See also Poland who notes that, for Luther, “the proper understanding of Scripture concerns not only the ‘outer clarity’ of the theological content gained from exegesis, but also the ‘inner clarity’ of the reader’s heart—the experience of grace and salvation given by the Holy Spirit through the external word of Scripture.” (Literary Criticism, 19). See also Grondin, who understands Luther to mean that “the literal meaning rightly understood, contains its own proper spiritual significance,” (Introduction to Philosophical Hermeneutics, 40).
133.
