World Affairs, no. 5 (2018), see http://www.sohu.com/a/224071296_825951 (accessed on March 19, 2018).
44The change of the Asia-Pacific security environment and China’s opportunity, International Economic Review, no, 6 (2013), see http://www.zaobao.com/wencui/politic/story20180315-842938 (accessed on March 18, 2018).
45Huang Renwei, op. cit.
46Www.CRNTT.com, China Review Forum: What caused the complication of China’s periphery environment?” November 11, 2013, see http://hk.crntt.com/crn-webapp/touch/detail.jsp?coluid=7&docid=102877362 (accessed January 10, 2018).
47Zhang Yunling, op. cit., pp. 11–12.
48Ruan Zongze, op. cit.
49Li Weijian, How to understand the change of content and conditions of the China’s current period of strategic opportunities — A perspective from the Middle East studies, Western Asia and African Studies, no. 5 (2013), p. 9.
50Zhang Yunlin, op. cit.
51Ruan Zongze, op. cit.
52 Ibid.
53Chen Xiangyan, The direction of China’s grand diplomacy in the new period, Xinhua Net, see http://lw.xinhuanet.com/htm/content_4954.htm (accessed on March 21, 2018).
54Base on periphery to plan for a global reach, Xinhua Net, March 2, 2015, see http://www.xinhuanet.com/globe/2015-03/02/c_134030635.htm (accessed on March 21, 2018).
55Chinese Central Government’s Official Web Portal, Important speech of Xi Jinping at peripheral diplomacy work conference, Xinhua, October 25, 2013 see http://www.cciced.net/cciceden/NEWSCENTER/LatestEnvironmentalandDevelopmentNews/201310/t20131030_82626.html (accessed August 12, 2018).
56Base on periphery to plan for a global reach, op. cit.
57Ruan Zongze, op. cit.
58Wang Baofu, op. cit.
59Ruan Zongze, op. cit.
60Wang Baofu, op. cit.
61Chinese Central Government’s Official Web Portal, op. cit.
62Xi’s speech at Moscow Institute of International Relations, Xinhua, March 23, 2013.
63Douglas Paal, Contradictions in Chinese foreign policy, December 13, 2013, see http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/12/13/contradictions-in-china-s-foreign-policy-pub-53913 (accessed on March 16, 2018).
64Ruan Zongze, op. cit.
65Zhu Feng, op. cit.
66Trump is providing diplomatic and strategic opportunity for China — interview with Dean of the School of International Relations at Tsinghua University, December 11, 2017, op. cit.
67Wang Yi, op. cit.
68Ruan Zongze, op. cit.
69Zhang Feng, Trump’s diplomatic transformation and China’s option of peripheral diplomacy, February 14, 2017, see http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001071355?page=rest (accessed on March 18, 2018).
Chapter
3
U.S.–China Competition in East Asia
Xin Jin
U.S. is a hegemonic state that has dominating influence over East Asia. China is a rising power which is changing the face of East Asia owing to its fast development. Their relations have a decisive influence on East Asian development and peace. The chapter discusses the U.S.–China competition in East Asia.
The competition occurs when China’s power is on the rise. The rise makes China win more and more regional advantages. Thus, U.S. regional dominance faces competition from China. Now U.S. is no more the only engine in the regional economy. In 2017, China was the largest trading partner of U.S., Russia, Japan, South Korea, India, Australia and ASEAN.1 In East Asian geopolitics, China broke the status quo in two sub-regions: East and South China Seas.
China rising deepens U.S. concern over its regional dominance. Balancing the growing influence of China has been U.S.’s strategic priority in East Asian affairs. The grand strategy of the Obama Administration (2009–2017) was rebalancing toward the region,2 but the reality was that China had established itself as a stronger regional existence. As the strategy failed to achieve success, the Trump Administration (2017–) replaced it with the Indo-Pacific strategy. This calculation is now pulling the rising India into regional affairs toward helping U.S. in the U.S.–China competition, but the strategy in its incipient stage needs to be enriched with practical steps.
A U.S.–China trading war broke out on July 6, 2018. This means that the U.S.–China competition has now reached a new high. This trading war combined with potential others between U.S. and regional countries offers historical chances for regional countries in disputes to improve certain relations on the one hand, while hurting other regional relations, especially that of U.S. with East Asian countries, on the other.
However, U.S. and China not only compete but also collaborate with each other. As the Trump Administration resolves to denuclearize North Korea, China becomes a mediator between U.S. and North Korea. At the same time, collective efforts progress in regional relations. South Korea and Singapore also made their contributions to the U.S.–North Korea Summit on June 12, 2018.
For regional countries, China is indispensable in terms of economy while U.S. is indispensable in terms of security. Hence, on the one hand, they hope that the U.S.–China competition could be controlled, while on the other hand, they hedge between U.S. and China for their respective interests. As for regional countries in dispute with China, they hope to see a competitive U.S.–China relationship.
Compared to the past, regional relations were made more complicated in the U.S.–China competition. So, how did the two deal with each other in the competition? What was the role of other regional states in the competition? What is the future for the Region?
U.S. Competition with China in East Asia
The
