Periphery Diplomacy in Action
In striving for a more holistic perspective, the book argues that China’s periphery diplomacy has evolved to become more ambitious, more extensive and more proactive. The latter characteristic is the key. No longer content to be a passive recipient of the strategic currents in Asia, Beijing is now taking more initiative to actively shape its regional context. The increased sophistication of Chinese periphery diplomacy is reflected in the calibrated ways in which Beijing has sought to balance its seemingly “contradictory” twin goals of pursuing deeper and stronger regional relations while safeguarding or advancing its regional territorial interests. The chapters in this book undertake an in-depth inquiry in these regards.
Broad regional context
The first part of the book is aimed at providing a regional setting to contextualize China’s periphery policy.
China’s policy toward its neighboring nations in large measures is determined by its perception of the peripheral environment. In Chapter 2, Jianwei Wang traces the evolution of Chinese leaders and foreign policy elites’ perception of China’s changing peripheral environment, including the nature, causes, implications of the changes as well as the possible ways to deal with them. While different assessment and opinions do exist, three consensuses have emerged. First, the weight of periphery diplomacy in China’s overall diplomacy has significantly increased. Second, China’s peripheral environment has become, if not necessarily worse, more complex and challenging in recent years. Third, while the main source of changes in China’s new periphery comes from the exogenous powers such as the United States and its regional allies, the rise of China per se is also a critical contributing factor. Finally, China needs new ideas, approaches and strategies to deal with a new and more dynamic peripheral environment.
The most consequential variable in this environment is the United States. The greater U.S. strategic focus on Asia in recent years is examined by Xin Jin in Chapter 3. Jin notes that while several Asian states have become more dependent on China economically, a number of them have increasingly tilted toward the U.S. in the security arena. This has led to suggestions that the more vigorous responses by some regional states were in part an outcome of their strategic emboldenment by the stronger U.S. regional presence; in that sense, U.S.–China dynamics have an inevitable impact on shaping regional security dynamics. Jin suggests that Sino-American relations have reached a historical crossroad. While both powers perceive each other with having fundamental strategic importance and are able to (thus far) address their differences in a relatively pragmatic way, this could change in the future and a potentially more conflictual U.S.–China relationship cannot be discounted. This certainly has turned out to be true in terms of the relationship under the Trump administration.
This notion of a prospective U.S.–China conflict is an argument commonly made by realist scholars or power transition theorists. According to these scholars, a structural dilemma exists when an emerging power rises to challenge the incumbent power, making war or conflict more likely to break out. Harvard scholar Graham Allison calls this the “Thucydides trap”,6 and it has been suggested that the U.S. and China are headed toward this trap as both “contest for supremacy” in Asia.7
While not set up to address the debate on U.S.–China power transition, Dan Liu’s Chapter 4 looks at one possible factor in mitigating great power competition, one that relates to role of ideas — specifically, China’s New Security Concept. The concept calls for the rejection of zero-sum, Cold War security thinking in preference for “mutual trust, mutual benefits, equality and coordination” in regional security approaches. Liu’s chapter shows how China has tried to actualize its New Security Concept and temper regional concerns through its growing involvement in bilateral and multilateral confidence-building measures (CBMs). The latter form of CBMs, in particular, has become increasingly important in China’s periphery diplomacy. The author also discusses obstacles facing China’s efforts to increase mutual trust and confidence with its neighbors.
Northeast and Southeast Asia
The second part of the book dives deeper into China’s diplomacy with the “traditional” periphery of East Asia. Northeast Asia is the regional focus of Chapters 5 and 6. Ru Sun examines China’s evolving policy in the Korean peninsula, noting that while its relations with the South (ROK) have moved forward, dynamics with the North (DPRK) have become more strained. Beijing has been particularly frustrated by Pyongyang’s pursuit of its nuclear and missile program, and has publicly backed UN Security Council’s resolutions that impose sanctions on the DPRK. This tougher Chinese response does not mean, however, that Beijing has fundamentally shifted its policy toward North Korea. The DPRK is still significant for China’s strategic interests, and Beijing continues to see negotiations as the best way to promote enduring stability in the Korean peninsula. The recent rapid thaw of the relationship between China and DPRK seems to suggest that the fundamentals underlying the relationship remain intact.
In Chapter 6, Yunxiang Liang discusses the complex dynamics between China and Japan. The history issues as well as rising national-isms in both countries have challenged this relationship, while the disputes over maritime boundaries in the East China Sea and the sovereignty of the Diaoyu–Senkaku islets have added further complications in recent years. These complications make it even more important, Liang argues, for both countries to resolve their differences through diplomacy and dialogue. The Sino-Japanese Four Point Consensus that was reached in November 2014, for example, is a right step in that direction. Liang suggests that the France–Germany example in Europe may be a possible model of regional cooperation that could help China and Japan achieve positive breakthroughs in their relationship. The slow improvement in Sino-Japanese relations apparently points to this direction.
Following the examination on China’s Northeast Asia relations, the book turns its regional focus toward Southeast Asia. In Chapter 7, instead of dealing with China’s relations with ASEAN countries in a bilateral fashion, Zhimin Lin explores Beijing’s engagement with ASEAN — the most important institution in the region. He argues that ASEAN countries serve as a litmus test of how well or difficult it is for China to manage relations with its neighboring countries. China’s engagement with ASEAN and its affiliated institutions has helped create a new model for China to manage its relations with neighboring countries. In this endeavor, China developed an approach of regionalism that is different from both the American and European ones. Instead of focusing on security and formal agreements, China’s institutional engagement with ASEAN is more open-ended and informal. The challenge for Beijing is whether such an approach is sufficient to manage conflicts rising from competing interests. The tension and subsequent gap between China and ASEAN on the issue of South China Sea highlight China’s dilemma in engaging ASEAN countries.
This is exactly the focus of Chapter 8. In that chapter, Penghong Cai analyzes China’s strategic relations with ASEAN countries, noting the security dimension of this relationship has generally lagged behind its economic facet. The escalation of the territorial disputes in the South China Sea, differences in perceptions over China’s intentions and its maritime behavior, the growing capabilities of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy as well as the U.S.’s Asia strategy are some key factors that have led to a more complicated security landscape between China and ASEAN countries. While China will not give up what it considers to be its legitimate security and territorial interests in maritime Southeast Asia, it will also not turn away from cooperative and “soft power” solutions to strengthen regional stability.
One of these soft power
