and pressures from all directions in China’s periphery. The possibility of war has been increasing.6 Many believe that there have appeared some new and important changes in China’s peripheral environment and peripheral relations. These changes are characterized by intensification of territorial disputes in South China Sea and East China Sea, formation of a regional quasi-alliance to balance China’s rise and the change of direction of regional economic integration. These new changes constrained China’s ability to shape its peripheral environment and brought new challenges to China’s peripheral diplomacy.7
Other scholars predicted that with the U.S. Asia Rebalance strategy, China’s relations with its neighboring countries would enter a period of “intensified strategic friction”. As a result, the centrifugal tendency of China’s neighboring countries will increase reducing the mutual political trust between China and its neighboring countries; hence, increasing the uncertainty in China’s periphery.8 In this regard, one big change in China’s peripheral environment in recent years is that different from the past when China was not the leading factor in regional conflict, China now has become the main focus of the regional conflict and contradiction.9
Other assessments tend to see light in the darkness. While recognizing the seriousness of new dynamics in China’s peripheral environment, some also caution that Beijing should not overestimate the severity of the changes in the region. The overall structure in China’s periphery has not been qualitatively reversed. Different from the situation in the Cold War period, a hostile ring of encirclement against China has not been formed. While the United States and many peripheral countries do share something in common to cope with a “stronger China”; they are not in a position to contain and confront China. In the meantime, one should also take into consideration that with the ever-growing Chinese power, its capability to mould its peripheral environment has also been on the rise as reflected in the increasing degree of dependency upon China by its neighbors. China has no reason to panic.10
Some analysts draw people’s attention to the dual feature of China’s peripheral environment. On the one hand, it converges the most acute contradictions and potential conflicts such as great power competition, nuclear non-proliferation, territorial disputes, terrorist and separatist forces, and energy and water resource security. On the other hand, it is also the region with the fastest economic growth in the world and a more vibrant regional economy.11 This duality is also reflected in another dimension. China’s peripheral situation is characterized by the so-called “stability on land but instability in sea” (lu wen hai luan), meaning that China’s relations with its land neighbors are relatively stable and the main source of conflict comes from the sea.12
Related to the reassessment of China’s peripheral situation is the debate about China’s “strategic opportunity period”. This concept was first formally articulated by Jiang Zemin in 2002. He argued that the first two decades of the 21st century will be China’s period of strategic opportunity. China should firmly grasp this opportunity to strive for big achievements.13 He obviously had the 9/11 episode, which dramatically changed the geostrategic structure of the world and diverted the U.S. attention from China and Asia to elsewhere for the purpose of waging the war on terror, in his mind when he made the comment. Since then, this concept has been used to justify China’s concentration on domestic economic and social development and keeping a low profile in international affairs. The assumption is that international environment including the periphery one is favorable to China.
However, the ominous developments since 2010 triggered a debate about whether this period of strategic opportunity has abruptly come to an end. Quite a few scholars and analysts argued that with the U.S. return to Asia and subsequent deterioration of China’s peripheral environment, the window of China’s strategic opportunity was closing. Instead of “period of strategic opportunity”, the next 10 years could be the period of “strategic danger”. The “strategic danger” school based its judgment on the following reasons. First, the United States is already determined to take China as its strategy adversary. Second, domestically the reform dividends have almost exhausted and China’s economic development has begun to slow down and encounter new difficulties. 14 Another variation along the same line holds the view that while the window of strategic opportunities may still be open, the “golden decade” for China has definitely gone. China has entered a period of “strategic challenge”. For the longest time in the future, China will be in a period of strategic sensitivity, tension and friction.15
Others, however, tend to be more optimistic. While they also recognize that China’s peripheral environment has become less benign and tougher, the strategic opportunity is still there for China to grab. Among other things, domestically China’s economy still has great potential for continuous growth. In terms of geopolitical environment, the limited availability of resources does not allow the United States to effectively contain China.16 It is a mission impossible.
In addition, China’s periphery is not limited to East Asia and Pacific, while China did encounter difficulties and frictions in East Asia, strategic opportunities may exist in other parts of China’s periphery including Central Asia and Northwest Asia. China could explore these opportunities with more resources and efforts. That is why some Chinese scholars came up with the idea of “going westward”. Additionally, there are some bright spots in China’s periphery. Sino-Russian relations and cross-strait relations were both the best in history. Others also pointed out that China should not overestimate “enemy’s situation”. While China is a main factor in America’s returning to Asia strategy, it is not the only factor. The United States has other goals in its mind such as reviving the U.S. economy, preventing the disintegration of its alliance system in Asia-Pacific, etc. China should not take the strategy as exclusively targeting at China; thus, should not react excessively. In sum, while China’s peripheral environment did become worse and more complicated, that does not necessarily mean the period of strategic opportunity is gone. Rather, its intension has been changing, and is different from the past.17
This line of analysis later was acknowledged in an official discourse on the same issue. The work report of the 18th Party Congress reaffirms that “China remains in an important period of strategic opportunities for its development, a period in which much can be achieved”, although it also admits that the nature and conditions of this period have been changing and these changes have to be correctly understood.18 In his speech at the high-level meeting on China’s peripheral diplomacy in 2013, Xi Jinping reiterated the importance of maintaining and making full use of China’s period of strategic opportunities. While characterizing China’s overall peripheral environment as stable, he also recognized that China’s peripheral environment and its relations with peripheral countries have changed a lot.19 This judgment was further confirmed by Xi Jinping’s report at the 19th Party Congress in 2017 in which he asserted that although China and the world are in the midst of profound and complex changes, China is still in an important period of strategic opportunity for development.20
Consistent with the reconfirmation of “period of strategic opportunity”, it is noticeable that as a general trend, China’s assessment of its peripheral environment has become more positive in the recent years. Some Chinese pundits believe that China’s deteriorating peripheral environment has been largely reversed in the last 5 years. While some hot spots in China’s periphery remain outstanding, the overall situation has improved. The peripheral configuration has been moving toward a better direction and China has enough reason to be highly confident about the peripheral development in the next 5 years.21
An editorial of Global Time at the end of 2017 typically reflected Beijing’s more sanguine views of its periphery.22 According to the editorial, 2017 witnessed the generally positive development in China’s relations with neighboring countries. Although some trouble spots remain, strategic stability has increased. As a rising power, China is getting to know better how to adapt to its surrounding nations. China made progress in managing the hot button issues and difficult
