66. Cf. ST I, 10, 6, resp: “A twofold opinion exists on this subject. Some say there is only one aeviternity; others that there are many aeviternities. Which of these is true, may be considered from the cause why time is one; for we can rise from corporeal things to the knowledge of spiritual things. Now some say that there is only one time for temporal things, forasmuch as one number exists for all things numbered; as time is a number, according to the Philosopher (Phys. iv). This, however, is not a sufficient reason; because time is not a number abstracted from the thing numbered, but existing in the thing numbered; otherwise it would not be continuous; for ten ells of cloth are continuous not by reason of the number, but by reason of the thing numbered. Now number as it exists in the thing numbered, is not the same for all; but it is different for different things. Hence, others assert that the unity of eternity as the principle of all duration is the cause of the unity of time. Thus, all durations are one in that view, in the light of their principle, but are many in the light of the diversity of things receiving duration from the influx of the first principle. On the other hand, others assign primary matter as the cause why time is one; as it is the first subject of movement, the measure of which is time. Neither of these reasons, however, is sufficient; forasmuch as things which are one in principle, or in subject, especially if distant, are not one absolutely, but accidentally. Therefore the true reason why time is one, is to be found in the oneness of the first movement by which, since it is most simple, all other movements are measured. Therefore time is referred to that movement, not only as a measure is to the thing measured, but also as accident is to subject; and thus receives unity from it. Whereas to other movements it is compared only as the measure is to the thing measured. Hence it is not multiplied by their multitude, because by one separate measure many things can be measured. This being established, we must observe that a twofold opinion existed concerning spiritual substances. Some said that all proceeded from God in a certain equality, as Origen said (Peri Archon. i); or at least many of them, as some others thought. Others said that all spiritual substances proceeded from God in a certain degree and order; and Dionysius (Coel. Hier. x) seems to have thought so, when he said that among spiritual substances there are the first, the middle and the last; even in one order of angels. Now according to the first opinion, it must be said that there are many aeviternities as there are many aeviternal things of first degree. But according to the second opinion, it would be necessary to say that there is one aeviternity only; because since each thing is measured by the most simple element of its genus, it must be that the existence of all aeviternal things should be measured by the existence of the first aeviternal thing, which is all the more simple the nearer it is to the first. Wherefore because the second opinion is truer, as will be shown later (I:47:2) we concede at present that there is only one aeviternity.”
67. Cf. Voegelin, Science, Politics, Gnosticism.
68. Cf. von Speyr, Cross.
69. Levinas, “Beyond Intentionality,” in Levinas Reader, 5. See Walsh on Levinas in Modern Philosophical Revolution, 311: “Love is love only when it loves an other as an other, not just as an other self. The Child is that unmerited event by which an other is ‘more exactly, me, but not myself.’ Transcendence has reached its goal when it has endangered, beyond its own finality, the finality of the transcendence of an other. I can love myself in the child but never as myself; it is always as other that the child is loved.” As such, the lines in Galatians are deeply suggestive of the intentional union we seek to elucidate. See Gal. 3:28 (KJV): “There is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither bond nor free, there is neither male nor female: for ye are all one in Christ Jesus.”
70. Pegis, Thomistic Notion of Man, 51.
71. Borges, “New Refutation on Time,” in Labyrinths, 234.
72. Bachelard, Intuition of the Instant, 6–8.
73. Timaeus, 37d. Cf. Kierkegaard, Concept of Anxiety, §IV 358–59: “‘The moment’ is a figurative expression, and therefore it is not easy to deal with. However, it is a beautiful word to consider. Nothing is as swift as a blink of the eye, and yet it is commensurable with the content of the eternal . . . Whatever its etymological explanation, [‘the sudden’] is related to the category of the invisible, because time and eternity were conceived equally abstractly, because the concept of temporality was lacking, and this again was due to the lack of the concept of spirit. The Latin term is momentum (from movere), which by derivation expresses the merely vanishing. Thus understood, the moment is not properly an atom of time but an atom of eternity. It is the first reflection of eternity in time, its first attempt, as it were, at stopping time . . . The moment is that ambiguity in which time and eternity touch each other, and with this the concept of temporality is posited, whereby time constantly intersects eternity and eternity constantly pervades time. As a result, the above-mentioned division acquires its significance: the present time, the past time, the future time.”
74. Possenti, Nihilism and Metaphysics, 349.
75. Maritain, Degrees of Knowledge, 453. The operation of the will within ourselves involves also another procession, that of love, whereby the object loved is in the lover, see ST I, 27, 3, resp., and Hegel, Natural Law, 104: “There is nothing else but the performance, on the ethical plane, of the tragedy which the Absolute eternally enacts with itself, by eternally giving birth to itself into objectivity, submitting in this objective form to suffering and death, and rising from its ashes into glory. The Divine in its form and objectivity is immediately double-natured, and its life is the absolute unity of these natures. But the movement of the absolute contradiction between these two natures presents itself in the Divine nature (which in this movement has comprehended itself) as courage, whereby the first nature frees itself from the death inherent in the other conflicting nature. Yet through this liberation it gives its own life, since that life is only in connection with this other life, any yet just as absolutely is resurrected out of it, since in this death (as the sacrifice of the second nature), death is mastered.”
Acknowledgments
I am entirely grateful to Eric Austin Lee for his insightful comments, assiduous review, and patience! Thank you to the community at University of Holy Cross for their support, especially and including the awarding of the Adams Endowed Professorship, which assisted greatly in the completion of this book. In particular, special thanks to Drs. Claudia Champagne, Michael LaBranche, Victoria Dahmes, and David M. “Buck” Landry. I am also most grateful to Mrs. Jane Simoneaux, Mrs. Cindy Self, Ms. Rhonda Aucoin, Ms. Celia Zaeringer, and Ms. Daisi Sue Smith. Thank you to my students at Holy Cross, who make each day an adventure in the classroom!
Abbreviations
Aristotle
De Anima DA
De Caelo DC
Metaphysics Met.
Nichomachean Ethics NE
Physics Phys.
Prior Analytics Pr. An.
Rhetoric Rhet.
St. Thomas Aquinas
