of innovation at the enterprise level is patchy. According to the monitoring survey on the innovation activity of the Russian manufacturing and service sectors by the Higher School of Economics in 2009–2012 (Kuznetsova and Roud, 2013),13 few enterprises prioritise product innovation and new goods. Their lack of enthusiasm is attributable to the fragile NIS, inefficient and insufficient R&D expenditure, inadequate skills, restricted access to capital markets, a lack of an open innovation culture (World Bank, 2018, p. xxiii) and low resource inputs into research fields. Significant administrative barriers are stultifying (Dezhina, 2016, p. 5). Investors moreover are short-sighted and lack in-house development capabilities, further constraining Russia’s domestic innovation potential.14
Government statistical data confirm these problems (Figures 8 and 9). Less than 10% of Russian companies actively innovate and have negative attitudes towards ecological and marketing innovation.15 As for organisational innovation, even though more than 60% of enterprises implemented reforms to improve employee participation and quality management, enterprises are conservative. They resist new reforms such as strategic alliances, changes in governance, establishing R&D departments and flexible labour hours. Marketing innovation remains poor. Although enterprises do innovate, levels differ by industry. Innovation is strong in the equipment, IT, metallurgy, electronics communication and automobile industries and weak in the light construction and chemical industries (Kuznetsova and Roud, 2013, pp. 91–101). Diffusion is concentrated in the state corporations and companies where state orders and national security are important (Knyaginin, 2017).
Figure 8:Innovation active enterprises share by type (%).
Source: Rosstat, http://www.gks.ru, accessed on 1 May 2019.
Figure 9:Innovation active enterprises share by type (%).
Source: Rosstat, http://www.gks.ru, accessed on 1 May 2019.
Severe global competitions force enterprises to adapt to the new conditions. The people and enterprises/banks/governments must cope with the rapid spread of ICT/digitalisation and the Internet (Figure 10). Search engine and business models using digitalisation have expanded. Taxis, parking, retail and e-transaction, and Internet shopping sites provide illuminating examples (https://www.rbc.ru, 27 April 2018).16 The share of organisations with ICT technology rapidly increased in the 2000s. Nonetheless, utilisation levels remain low.
Many companies are switching to ICT management models. Successes include state corporations such as Rosnano, Rostelecom, Russia post, military enterprises, Skolkovo innovation centres, software companies (Kaspersky Labs, Yandex, Rambler Media Group, Mail.ru, Rhonda Software, ElcomSoft, ABBYY) and others. Nonetheless, digitalisation is slow. “Many Russian industries have not yet started to adopt emerging technologies, … and companies do not have the ability to develop required digital tools, products, and services” (World Bank, 2018, p. 68). There is no single standard for Internet utilisation and enterprises distrust digitalisation. Russia still has a long way to go to achieve a full ICT revolution (Rostelecom, https://www.if24.ru, accessed on 27 April 2018) hindered as it is by economic sanctions and the widening gap between the Russian and foreign companies.
Figure 10:The spread of ICT (%; number).
Note: Number of organisations and number of computers are indicated in the right axis and others in the left axis (%).
Source: Rosstat, http://www.gks.ru, accessed on 1 May 2019.
This assessment is confirmed by the pilot survey on the opinions in the manufacturing sector in the second half of 2018 (Ekonomika i Zhizn, No. 49, 14 October 2018). While more than 40% of managers consider their digitalisation level high, 35% consider it low. Even though 47% of managers show a positive attitude towards digital technology, 37% do not consider the technology necessary. Positively disposed managers expect digitalisation to increase labour productivity (52%), reduce production costs (44%), increase responsiveness to customers (40%) and spark competitiveness (30%). Barriers to digitalisation persist. Around 60% of managers are concerned about financial stringency and skill shortages. Their cautiousness is attributable to the volatile macroeconomic conditions and sanctions.
Finally, despite the high-technology-led job creation policy, high-tech job growth has been invisible (from 17.49 million in 2013 to 15.98 million in 2016 and 17.11 in 2017), and specialists remain in short supply (Kuvalin et al., 2018, p. 118), despite improvements in higher education. There is a mismatch between education and qualifications. Russia’s traditional strengths in human capital and scientific excellence (World Bank, 2018, p. 12) are waning. Educational organisations are conservative (Aleksankov, 2017, pp. 55–56) and Russia’s digital education lags the global trend by 6–8 years (Kondakov, 2018). Companies and the public are leery about digitisation and are not yet committed to it. State-led policy is essential in this field.
Conclusion
The distinguishing features of Putin’s regime are its energy strategy, administrative discipline and government domination. Even though, the regime has emphasised on “modernization”, Russian development is lagging. The economy remains energy dependent and state over-regulation is making it vulnerable to external shocks. The economic crisis, sanctions/ counter-sanctions and global industrial competition have forced Russia to modify its growth strategy. Innovation has become the new cornerstone of Russian economic growth.
The NIS in all countries is path dependent. Russia’s state-led innovation policy is aimed for the long term. The state-led National Technology and Digital Economy Initiatives of 2014 marked a turning point in the intensification of state-led development. State corporations and government became the main engines for innovation, with the government introducing fresh initiatives like cluster formations, incubators, academic reforms and state industrial policies.
The results have been mixed. On the one hand, R&D expenditure increased, and some innovation models succeeded. Innovation increased, and the research organisations grew. On the other hand, the share of GDP devoted to innovation has been static, and state control has increased. Even though technology innovation slightly improved, organisational/ marketing/ecological innovation remains immature.
Enterprises’ adaptation has been uneven. Information and communication technologies diffused broadly into Russian business/society, but attitudes towards digitalisation have been negative, and the impact of digitalisation on modernisation has been weak. Russia will not be able to keep pace with its competitors economically and militarily unless it does a better job of facilitating innovation.
References
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